Commentary

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The Latest Myths About the Soviet Union

Nick Eberstadt

Why Blacks, Women & Jews Are Not Mentioned in the Constitution

Robert A. Goldwin

Crazy in the Streets

Paul S. Appelbaum

Churchill at War

Eliot A. Cohen

The Rise & Fall of Interfaith Dialogue

Howard Singer

Dead from Lincoln Center

Samuel Lipman

Picasso's Motif

James Gardner

Books in Review: Suzanne Garment / Robert Alter / André Ryerson / Tod Lindberg / Angelo M. Codevilla

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

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Letters from Readers

Poles and Jews

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a Polish subscriber to COMMENTARY who is neither a historian nor a journalist but is more or less typical of the younger generation of the Polish-Catholic intelligentsia, I would like to comment on Ruth R. Wisse's article, "Poland's Jewish Ghosts" [January]. My overall impression is positive; the article appears to be a major step forward in mutual understanding. Most of Mrs. Wisse's observations are not only correct but keen and significant. I should like to complement them by presenting the Polish perspective, which is obviously very different from the Jewish one. . . .

Every Pole knows about the three million Polish Jews murdered by the Nazis; every Pole knows the names of Oswiecim (Auschwitz), Treblinka, and Maidanek. I cannot recall exactly when I was told about the fate of the Polish Jews, but it was in my early childhood. . . . To tell the whole truth, I also heard from someone (not my parents) about ritual murders, but I can honestly say that I never believed these tales.

What is true, however, is that for a long time the Jewish perspective on the Holocaust was not presented in my country or was presented improperly, in an exclusively polemical manner. This obviously hindered discussion and obstructed the process of understanding. It is also true that unlike knowledge of the Holocaust, knowledge of Jewish culture and its contribution to Poland's history is very poor, especially among the younger generation.

The problems of World War II and the Holocaust are perceived in Poland quite differently from the way they are viewed in America. In brief, the Poles admit the uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust in a quantitative but not necessarily in a qualitative sense. The Poles in general consider themselves co-victims, since three million Polish Christians also died.

Mrs. Wisse's remark about the bad conscience of people inhabiting former Jewish cities or quarters sounds strange to me. As far as I know, there is no such phenomenon in Poland today. . . .

While the existence of anti-Semitism in prewar Poland is widely recognized by the younger Polish generation, and several accounts of it, mainly by Catholic authors, have been published, the problem of postwar events is more controversial. For example, most people in Poland (including me) believe that the so-called Kielce pogrom in 1946 was staged by Communist security forces for propaganda purposes. . . . It is also believed that many "acts of abuse" toward the Jews were committed primarily out of anti-Communism, not anti-Semitism, since the majority of the Jews returning from the Soviet Union were believed to be (and many were) Communists. Numerous Polish Communists were killed at that time as well.

The "March events" of 1968 are also perceived differently in Poland from the way they are seen in Jewish circles in the U.S., although injustice done to people of Jewish origin by state authorities is generally recognized. For us, the persecution of the Jews, which followed the March events, was a typical example of what can be called "functional anti-Semitism," i.e., anti-Semitism used as a tool to achieve goals which have nothing, or very little, in common with the so-called Jewish problem. . . . The number of non-Jewish victims of 1968 is large, and includes Catholic writers and journalists . . ., together with many scientists and students. There is a distinct "March generation" among the Polish intelligentsia, and these people were particularly strong supporters of the Solidarity movement in 1980-81. . . .

To understand the present state of Polish thinking in respect to the Jewish question, it is important to distinguish between the official government line and the prevailing views of various parts of Polish society. Mrs. Wisse's article does a great deal of justice to this point, but a few additional remarks are necessary.

In the virtual absence of observant or affiliated Jews in Poland today, anti-Semitic propaganda is directed toward assimilated Jews, especially those engaged in anti-government activities (another example of "functional anti-Semitism"). Thus Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron of KOR, S. Blumsztajn, K. Modzelewski, and others of Solidarity, and dissident journalists like Stefan Bratkowski are some-

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

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times labeled "Jews" or even "Zionists" in propaganda newspeak.

The main source (but not the only one) of anti-Semitic propaganda in contemporary Poland is believed to be a group of people connected with the Ministry of the Interior. . . . It is pertinent to note that the intensification of this propaganda . . . coincided with an intensification of the assaults against the Polish Church in late 1984, which culminated in Father Jerzy Popieluszko's assassination by the security police and the trial of his murderers. It is therefore very likely that both actions were intended as a concerted effort to harm the last officially existing independent institution in Poland, the Catholic Church, by direct action and by hurting its image abroad. This line was apparently later abandoned, in favor of attempts to woo Jewish opinion in Israel and the U.S.

Although certainly not all in the ruling circles in Poland are anti-Semites (Jaruzelski himself is probably not anti-Semitic), anti-Semitism in the militia and the security forces serves as a tool to keep discipline, and possibly to provide some sort of "psychological comfort" for those whose activities are clearly directed against vital Polish interests and physically against Poles. It is much more comfortable for these people to believe that their actions are directed against a "Jewish plot." So it is unlikely that this brand of anti-Semitism will disappear soon.

I can understand Mrs. Wisse's objections to the image of Poland as a country of exclusively Catholic heritage, as expressed in a quotation from one of Father Popieluszko's famous "patriotic sermons." Yet it has to be understood that the Polish-Christian past was deliberately diminished for years by Communist propaganda and Left-oriented scholars. Popieluszko's words do not necessarily imply a negative attitude on the part of the Church to non-Catholic Poles and to the Jewish question in general. Indeed, this attitude is quite different today from what it was in the interwar period . . ., although I do not insist that the problem of anti-Semitism is nonexistent in Catholic-Polish society. . . .

One of the last points raised by Mrs. Wisse is whether the Jews in prewar Poland should have been regarded as Poles exactly as American Jews are Americans. However, citizenship as a criterion of nationality cannot be applied to Eastern Europe, otherwise we would have to assume that Polish-speaking inhabitants of Vilna changed their nationality no fewer than seven times during the first half of our century. Neither is ethnicity—Poles from Vilna are mostly ethnic Lithuanians, which is the reason there was continuous hostility between Poland and nationalist Lithuania.

The only reasonable criterion is therefore a sense of belonging to a national, cultural, and/or political community, however ambiguous this idea might be. . . . This concept, together with a commitment to human rights, also implies the right to free choice of nationality by an individual. By this criterion, the ethnically Polish Joseph Conrad was an Englishman, but the half-French Chopin was a Pole. . . .

Polish Jews formed a vital part of Polish society. But Polish and Jewish cultural/religious/political communities were separated (intermarriage was banned), and in some periods hostile to one another. It is now obvious to most Poles that a distinct Jewish nationality existed in Poland. To answer the question of whether Polish Jews were Poles or not it is necessary to decide first whether dual nationality is possible. Both Polish and Jewish nationalists rejected this possibility. Yet numerous examples confirmed it. Let me cite just one: Arthur Rubinstein, who in the absence of a Polish delegation at the opening session of the UN decided to begin his concert by playing "Poland Is Not Yet Lost." He was a Pole. He was a Jew, too. There is nothing contradictory in this statement, at least not to my Polish mind. . . .

I do not intend to leave the impression that only assimilated Jews are regarded as Poles by the Polish intelligentsia. But some sense of belonging to Poland as a country (not a state), as a cultural tradition, pluralistic as it is, and as a cause, seems to be a necessary condition.

I am well aware of the fact that differences between Polish and Jewish views are great, the degree of mutual aversion still considerable, although not without many individual exceptions. I am not sure if I can convince anyone. But perhaps the presentation of these comments might be helpful in developing a degree of understanding and lowering the level of undesired negative emotions, which is especially important in view of many common points of interest. I am convinced that Mrs. Wisse's article serves this goal as well. . . .

Because I am a Polish citizen and intend to return to Poland, I have to ask you not to reveal my name or address.

NAME WITHHELD

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I found much of Ruth R. Wisse's article, "Poland's Jewish Ghosts," insightful and thought-provoking. Mrs. Wisse appreciates the extremely complex issues involved in understanding Polish-Jewish relations. But there are two issues which need to be addressed further.

The first concerns those Poles who assisted Jews during the Nazi occupation of Poland, even under penalty of death for doing so. As of January 1986, 1,600 Poles had been honored by Yad Vashem for saving Jews during the Holocaust. These Poles represent over 25 percent of the total number of persons receiving this honor. More than 20,000 Poles are documented as having risked their lives saving Jews during this time. . . . This is surely an important piece of information that would help readers understand more fully the multifaceted Polish-Jewish relationship during World War II.

The second point concerns Mrs. Wisse's statement that "many Poles still cherish the belief that Jews require drops of Christian blood for their bread and matzah and wine." Such an authoritative statement by a noted scholar, published in a highly respected magazine, can profoundly affect readers' attitudes toward the Polish people and Polish culture. I am sure that Mrs. Wisse is aware of the pernicious nature of stereotyping and of its role in generating prejudice and discrimination. . . . What is her evidence for this statement? Is it gathered from a current, validly conducted survey based on a representative sample of the Polish population? If so, is such a belief held by more people in Poland than in other nations? Exactly what percentage of the Polish population is "many"? Is it more or less than the estimated number of Poles who assisted Jews during World War II? . . . Without very strong objective documentation, such a claim could be construed as not only unfair but defamatory to the Polish people and to their heritage.

JEROME TOBACYK
Ruston, Louisiana

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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In her excellent article, Ruth R. Wisse expresses her discomfort with the phrase "Poles and Jews" which became the motif of her visit to Poland. She found the phrase puzzling and even offensive "to a North American ear," and asked how anyone could accept the juxtaposition. The members of her party —revisiting a Poland without Jews —all saw themselves as "Polish Jews," as Polish as any other Poles. But this critical phrase—Poles and Jews—did not seem offensive to other members of the group, most of whom were Israelis. . . .

Mrs. Wisse writes that the phrase "Poles and Jews" obviously is not offensive to "other Poles," who do not see and never have seen Polish Jews as being just as Polish as any other Poles. We must, however, go one step farther to find the reason for this sensitivity of the North American ear. . . .

History clearly would not share Mrs. Wisse's feeling of offense, since it has long since shown us—though all do not yet comprehend —that indeed there are Spaniards and Jews; there are Germans and Jews; there are Poles and Jews; and it may even be the case (no offense intended, Mrs. Wisse) that there are North Americans and Jews.

Mrs. Wisse nicely documents how the Israelis in her group returned from their visit to Poland renewed and reinvigorated Zionists. If she returned puzzled and offended, could it be perhaps that even the most intelligent and perceptive "hyphenated" Jews of the younger democracies still have a lesson to learn from their own people's history?

ORRIN PERSKY

Jerusalem, Israel

RUTH R. WISSE writes:

The letters of the anonymous correspondent and of Jerome Tobacyk are characteristic of contemporary Polish thinking about the Jews, the first in its intense absorption with the problem Jews represent, the second in its discomfort. One of the inadvertent effects of the Jewish historical consciousness is the pressure it exerts on European nations that contributed to and bore witness to the genocide of European Jewry. It would be fine if fear of Jewish "defamation" were now a deterrent force, discouraging enemies of the Jews from seeking to injure and eliminate them. Unfortunately, to date, the political opportunity offered by anti-Semitism is still more potent than the threat of Jewish memory.

Having wanted to deemphasize the issue of Polish anti-Semitism, I am forced by the defensive zeal of my correspondents to deal with it more fully. As Mr. Tobacyk notes, Jews are eager to honor those Poles who risked—and sometimes lost—their lives during World War II in acts of kindness and charity. He fails to note, however, that the risk of denunciation and reprisal from their fellow Poles severely limited these efforts. Indeed, the number of Poles honored at Yad Vashem would be somewhat higher were it not for those who pleaded after the war with the Jews they had rescued never to reveal the dark secret of their compassion lest they be punished for it by their neighbors.

If one of the two Polish correspondents admits to having heard about Jewish ritual murder, perhaps the second can draw his own conclusions about its statistical frequency. His request for sociological data on this question in today's Poland is disingenuous. He may be interested to know, however, that I was frankly surprised by its evocation among young Polish scholars and intellectuals who had heard it "from somebody"—in one case from a grandmother—as a fact.

The thoughtful anonymous correspondent is also less than candid. His convenient explanation that the "so-called" Kielce pogrom was staged by Communist security forces does not cover the more than 350 returning Jews known to have been murdered by Poles in 1945-46; the gangs of Polish nationalists who dragged Jewish refugees from the trains to rob and beat them; the documented instances of local Polish residents in towns and cities who made sure by their harassment of Jewish returnees that none would resettle in their former homes. As it happens, I do have some firsthand evidence of bad conscience among Poles who took over Jewish property.

I believe that informed Jews in the United States and elsewhere fully realize that a faction of the Communist regime of Poland orchestrated the Jewish question in 1968 to quell internal opposition. But this application of "functional anti-Semitism" begs the question. What made it so effective, so useful? Polish historians today tell us that anti-Semitism in Poland from the beginning of this century was also "functional"—encouraging the peasants to organize in their own economic interests, strengthening the power of the Polish middle class, consolidating a Polish state *against* the incursion of Communism—goals, in the words of the correspondent, that "have nothing or very little in common with the so-called Jewish problem." Anti-Semitism is the selection of Jews to serve these various functions; if it were not useful it would hardly be so popular, and vice versa.

But it was not only as a Jew that I raised certain questions about the nature of Polish Catholicism and Polish identity. The political posture of Poland is very important to all those who place a supreme value on freedom. Poland's struggle for national independence and the struggle of its citizens for personal liberty are as painful as they are inspiring because one can offer so little effective assistance.

Yet the Polish will to freedom is also problematical. The question —as my correspondents know far better than I—has to do not only with the dream of independence from Soviet Communism but with the kind of society that will replace it. Will its Catholicism be liberal and relevant or repressive and vengeful? Will its nationalism be xenophobic and proto-fascist (as in the late 1930's) or hospitable? It was on such shifts of religious and political policy that the fate of the Jews in Poland depended and on which their place in Polish historiography depends today.

Thus I neither said nor meant to imply that the American model of citizenship should be retroactively applied to interwar Poland, which was expected to respect, but not to integrate, its national minorities. Nor is it possible for Poland, given the current identification of church and state, to wish to follow the American model of separation. I used the comparison to show how poignantly unreciprocal is the identification of Polish Jews with their homeland. By an honest reappraisal of the role of the Jews in Poland, the Poles stand to gain not a return of the Jews—it is too late for that—but a healthier polity than they had during their last period of sovereignty.

I appreciate but resist Orrin Persky's attempt to turn my conclud-

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

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



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ing remarks into a Zionist manifesto. Though political Zionism grew in reaction to inhospitable European nation-states, it has long since transcended its origins, and needs no such argument as he offers. North American Jews indisputably enjoy the rights and fulfill the responsibilities of citizens, and Zion would not gain from any decline in their security. More than that: Israel can only thrive in a tolerant world, which is why the emerging attitudes of freedom-loving Poles are so important.

Contras and "La Prensa"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Peter Collier and David Horowitz, who once mouthed all the correct slogans for the "devious and dishonest Left," now perform the same service for the Right ["Another 'Low Dishonest Decade' on the Left," January].

A good example is their treatment of my report (now published as *Contra Terror in Nicaragua*) documenting a systematic pattern of *contra* attacks and atrocities against Nicaraguan civilians. Each of the report's 37 incidents of assassination, brutality, and kidnapping was based on the sworn affidavits of eyewitnesses who were selected and interviewed with no outside interference, and whose names and addresses were provided for verification purposes. Substantial portions of my report were independently verified by the New York *Times*, Americas Watch, the Washington *Post*'s Christopher Dickey, and the International Human Rights Law Group, in addition to WOLA [Washington Office on Latin America].

Because this evidence shattered President Reagan's portrait of the *contras* as the "moral equivalents of our Founding Fathers" (and in the inability to refute my findings), the President labeled me a Sandinista "sympathizer" and the administration orchestrated a campaign to discredit me personally. Perhaps the seamiest episode in this effort was the staging of a press conference to present one Bayardo Payan, a Nicaraguan "defector" who alleged, among other things, that the Sandinistas supplied my witnesses and my transportation in Nicaragua. These charges were false, and at an April 17, 1985 congressional hearing Payan was forced to admit not only that he had no information on my interviews but that he is the half-brother of Mike Lima, the *contras*' chief of operations and perpetrator of some of the worst massacres. The absurdity of Payan's charges, as well as his bias, has been spelled out in a number of places. Nevertheless, Messrs. Collier and Horowitz—in an attempt to show how dishonest the *Left* is—report these charges as fact.

On the subject of Nicaragua, Jaime Chamorro's article in the same issue, "How *La Prensa* Was Silenced," is misleading on at least three seminal points: first, Mr. Chamorro alleges that in 1980 a "group of *La Prensa* employees" tried a "takeover" of the paper to "gain control" for the Sandinistas. According to contemporaneous U.S. press reports (e.g., Miami *Herald*, April 23, 1980 and May 19, 1980), however, this "group" comprised 80 percent of *La Prensa*'s reporters and staff and they struck not to change the newspaper's direction, but to prevent the ouster of Editor Xavier Chamorro, also a brother of the slain Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. When Xavier was nevertheless fired for what he described as "critical support" for the Sandinistas, *La Prensa*'s employees left *en masse* to start *El Nuevo Diario*, which, then, has an equal if not greater claim to be "heir" to the now legendary *La Prensa* of old.

Second, Mr. Chamorro makes only passing reference to the central fact of Nicaraguan life, the ongoing attempt by the United States to destabilize that country by any means necessary including military attacks, economic strangulation, internal sabotage, psychological operations, and disinformation. (Prior to the onset of the war, censorship of *La Prensa* was only "sporadic," to use Americas Watch's description.) History shows that virtually all governments resort to censorship during real or perceived emergencies. Our own government has consistently engaged in forms of censorship during wartime (the World War I Censorship Board, the World War II Office of Censorship, etc.) even in the absence of an emergency of the magnitude faced by Nicaragua.

Third, Mr. Chamorro admits but plays down the fact that the post-split *La Prensa* was rewarded for its anti-Sandinista line with a $150,000 grant (huge in Nicaraguan terms) from the U.S. government. The Nicaraguans have not forgotten that CIA media operations—including the covert takeover of leading newspapers—contributed significantly to the successful campaigns to oust the leftist governments of Salvador Allende in Chile (*El Mercurio*) and Michael Manley in Jamaica (the *Daily Gleaner*). While a newspaper has a right to obtain support from whence it can, it is not odd that it is "smeared" locally when it openly accepts support from a hostile foreign power bent on destabilization.

REED BRODY

New York City

PETER COLLIER and DAVID HOROWITZ write:

Reed Brody evidently believes that he can use the same tactics of disinformation on readers of COMMENTARY that he used on naive members of Congress when he wrote about *contra* human-rights abuses.

This is the basic reality, unchanged by anything Mr. Brody has said in his letter: the "investigative report" he produced was conceived in the first place by paid agents of the Sandinista dictatorship as a propaganda weapon in the psychological-warfare campaign the Nicaraguan Communists are waging *in America* against the Nicaraguan resistance to the Ortega regime and ultimately against the United States itself. Arrangements for his on-site "investigation" in Nicaragua were made by the same paid agents for the Sandinistas, the Washington law firm of Reichler and Appelbaum, who handpicked Mr. Brody for the assignment.

Until 1984, the Sandinista legal account was held by the Atlanta law firm of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer, and Murphy. Paul Reichler and his assistant Judy Appelbaum worked on the firm's Nicaraguan desk, with the understanding that their representation was to be non-political and and limited to commercial and normal litigation matters. In the spring of 1984, Reichler's activities in behalf of the Nicaraguan Communists began to go beyond what the firm felt an attorney's duties should be and he was asked to leave. Reichler did leave, accompanied by Judy Appelbaum, taking the Sandinista account with them. With the Nicaragua dictatorship as their client base (and $156,932.62 in fees warm in their pocket), Reichler and Appelbaum set up a firm of their own.

One of the first actions of the

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new firm was to contact Reed Brody, a former New York prosecutor who had spent time in Nicaragua in the Sandinista community and whose name had been suggested to Reichler by the activists he met there. Clearly 1984 was going to be a critical year in Congress for the Nicaraguan opposition and the mission that Reichler and Appelbaum had in mind for Mr. Brody was to "document" cases of atrocities and human-rights abuses by the *contras*, as if gathering "evidence for a legal case." Accompanied by James Bordelon, Mr. Brody went to Nicaragua in the fall of 1984.

When we wrote our article, we were unaware of the testimony of Bayardo Payan and therefore we did not rely on his evidence. We relied instead on Mr. Brody's own words. In the explanatory notes appended to his published report, he states that while in Nicaragua, "Mr. Brody and Mr. Bordelon lived in a house owned by the government. While they were in Managua, Mr. Brody and Mr. Bordelon were furnished office space at the government-funded *Comision Nacional de Promocion y Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos*." In subsequent interviews about the report, Mr. Brody has admitted that the Ortega dictatorship also provided him with transportation and staff.

And witnesses, too. According to Gary Moore, a free-lance journalist formerly on the staff of the Atlanta *Constitution*, Mr. Brody told him that he had worked with a uniformed female employee of the state-security apparatus named Guadalupe, who provided him with witnesses. One of the witnesses Guadalupe provided and Mr. Brody promoted was the celebrated Digna Bareda who was widely featured on network TV in America and Europe as a humble peasant woman who had been helped by the revolution and then had been gang-raped in front of her husband (who himself was allegedly beaten) by a force of marauding *contras*.

Suspicious of the cases that self-styled human-rights activists like Mr. Brody were making, Gary Moore went to Nicaragua to retrace their footsteps. His own (unpublicized) investigation established that far from being a simple peasant, Digna Bareda was a ten-year veteran of the FSLN (dating to the time when it consisted of only 200 hard-core cadres), while her husband was a decorated member of the state-security police. Her testimony was a tissue of half-truths and lies.

Mr. Brody asserts that "substantial portions" of his report were "independently verified by the New York *Times*" and groups like Americas Watch. In fact, the *Times* (and CBS News) made advance agreements to publicize the findings of the verifying team that went to Nicaragua in February 1985. As Kathleen Bertelsen, a member of the team, told Gary Moore: "When we went down there, we had an exclusive arrangement with CBS News and the New York *Times* that they would get our story while we were down there."

One of the co-leaders of the verifying team was the brother-in-law of a high-ranking Sandinista official and the other members were all people easily identified as Sandinista sympathizers. The group's American-born translator, a two-year resident of the Sandinistas' "new society," had written a book lauding the indoctrination program waged by the regime under the guise of a "literacy campaign." Nicaraguan arrangements for the "independent" verification team were made by the Sandinistas' own registered agent in the U.S., Paul Reichler, who met them at the airport in Managua and stayed on the scene to see that everything went all right. Meetings with Sandinista officials were arranged, a government car and driver were provided. The team stayed a week and reinterviewed ten out of the 156 witnesses in the Brody report. *No attempt was made to verify the truth of the testimonies themselves.*

The publicity the American news media provided for Mr. Brody's unsubstantiated allegations provided the Sandinistas with the victory they had sought. Presented as a petition of independent American citizens concerned about human rights, Mr. Brody's propaganda helped sway enough members of Congress to defeat a pending motion in the House to provide the anti-Sandinista opposition with government funding.

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Given the capacity for deceit that this record displays, it is probably superfluous to comment on Mr. Brody's opening slander on us. Just for the record, however, in all our dubious years on the Left, we were never mouthers of anybody's slogans, least of all the totalitarian sympathizers and allies of that "devious and dishonest Left" we wrote about in our article and for whom Reed Brody is such a prominent spokesman today.

JAIME CHAMORRO writes:

Reed Brody contends that I am "misleading on at least three seminal points." Let us see who is misleading whom. First, of the two "contemporaneous" U.S. press accounts, only one (Miami *Herald*, April 23) mentions a "strike" on behalf of Xavier Chamorro: it quotes a Sandinista union official to this effect, but it is equally clear in the article that we in *La Prensa* considered it a takeover.

In contrast, an article by Shirley Christian in the May 19 Miami *Herald* contradicts what Mr. Brody asserts. Miss Christian states, correctly, that Xavier Chamorro had previously offered his resignation as editor several times, and in mid-April 1980 his resignation was accepted.

Thus it is absurd to maintain, as Mr. Brody does, that Xavier was "fired for what he described as 'critical support' for the Sandinistas." He had already resigned, and his resignation had been accepted *before* the takeover on April 20. Indeed, although he was being replaced as editor, he was never fired and he was never asked to go elsewhere; it was understood that he would occupy another position at *La Prensa*.

Miss Christian also reports that Xavier Chamorro and *La Prensa*'s Sandinista employees physically occupied the newspaper plant, taking "control of the newspaper site." Readers of COMMENTARY can judge for themselves whether this constitutes a "strike" or a takeover.

In addition, it is simply bizarre to suggest that *El Nuevo Diario* "has an equal if not greater claim to be 'heir' to the now legendary *La Prensa* of old." A majority of *La Prensa*'s employees (75 percent) did go over to *El Nuevo Diario*, but this is not surprising given the fact that during the last years of the insurrection against Somoza many Sandinistas and their sympathizers had incorporated themselves into *La Prensa*. Most of these were relatively new employees, while the "legendary *La Prensa* of old" was carried on by employees who had been with the newspaper and its assassinated editor, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, from the beginning. They represented both the old *La Prensa* and the independent line of Pedro Joaquín—whose words have been censored by the Sandinistas since 1982.

Moreover, of the 75 percent of the employees who chose to leave, the vast majority were from the technical and mechanical side of the newspaper. They were not, as Mr. Brody maintains, "80 percent *of La Prensa*'s reporters and staff." In addition, many of the people who went to *El Nuevo Diario* did so under the impression that *La Prensa* would soon be closed, a point the Sandinistas were then making in the state-controlled media. When it became clear that *La Prensa* would not be closed, many returned, asking for employment again.

Finally, as *El Nuevo Diario* had and has the lowest circulation of any of the principal newspapers in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan people themselves have never recognized it as "heir" to the "legendary *La Prensa* of old." It remains a pro-government newspaper, partially subsidized by the very government it slavishly supports.

Second "seminal" point: "the central fact of Nicaraguan life" is not, as Mr. Brody contends, the ongoing attempt of the United States to destabilize the "country" (read the Sandinista government). The central fact of Nicaraguan life is the ongoing attempt of the Sandinista government to turn Nicaragua into a Marxist-Leninist state. From the neighborhood Sandinista Defense Committees to the ubiquitous, repressive forces of the government, the average Nicaraguan is subjected daily to the most intense levels of oppression in our country's history. This is the fundamental fact of life today in Nicaragua.

As to the "sporadic censorship" of *La Prensa* before "the onset of the war," even this concession is telling—the Sandinistas had formerly claimed that there had been no censorship at all prior to March 15, 1982. But they did, of course, institute censorship from the very beginning, thereby violating a series of Sandinista decrees and laws guaranteeing freedom of expression. Moreover, this censorship had nothing to do with "national security," and it was not "sporadic." For instance, in 1981, before the war, Sandinista censorship was already being strictly exercised: we were prevented from publishing five times, and we were forbidden to publish anything on a series of topics ranging from news items about the rising cost of sugar and rice to opinion polls taken by anyone other than the Sandinistas.

In addition, Mr. Brody's reference to other governments that have also resorted to censorship, specifically the U.S. government, is misleading. During both world wars, the government of the United States did not require the media, written and spoken, to submit their copy to prior censorship, as is the case in Nicaragua. In World War II, the Office of Censorship was unable to prevent a New York newspaper from revealing that the U.S. government had cracked the Japanese code. At the height of the war, not one newspaper or radio was closed or suspended. In contrast, the Sandinistas had already done both in the first year of their rule—and not all of these acts were directed against the "Somocista" media, as they pretend.

Third "seminal" point: Mr. Brody says that I "admit" but "play down the fact" that *La Prensa* was "rewarded for its anti-Sandinista line with a $150,000 grant (huge in Nicaraguan terms) from the U.S. government." As the grant was publicly announced by the donor, the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the verb "admit" suggests a reluctant concession that exists solely in Mr. Brody's mind. Moreover, $150,000 is not "huge" in any terms (let alone Nicaraguan) for a newspaper that a government has intentionally tried to bankrupt.

After the government imposed the state of emergency in 1982, *La Prensa* lost roughly $6.5 million dollars—"huge in Nicaraguan terms"—due to a series of deliberate government actions mentioned in the article. The government refused to sell us the foreign currency we needed to buy paper, thereby creating the conditions that made the grant necessary, though, of course, the government hoped *La Prensa* would die quietly instead. The NED funds were hence used to make us independent of government control, and this is one of the reasons the government closed *La Prensa*.

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If Mr. Brody questions a grant given, without conditions, for the very survival of *La Prensa*, then we also have a right to question why *Barricada*, the official newspaper of the FSLN, is able to receive donations of paper and financial assistance from "socialist" countries; we have a right to ask why *Barricada* can receive a printing press from the Communist party of East Germany and employ "internationalists" who help staff the paper; we have a right to probe the ideological double standards of a government that receives foreign aid and assistance from governments alien and hostile to the rights, the beliefs, and the values of the Nicaraguan people.

Mr. Brody also asserts that "the Nicaraguans have not forgotten that CIA media operations—including the covert takeover of leading newspapers—contributed significantly to the successful campaigns to oust the leftist governments of Salvador Allende in Chile (*El Mercurio*) and Michael Manley in Jamaica (the *Daily Gleaner*)." It is presumptuous of Mr. Brody to speak of "the Nicaraguans" when he means the Sandinistas and their supporters. Moreover, a government that genuinely has the support of the people is hardly in danger of being "destabilized" or "ousted" by one censored newspaper, let alone a hundred free ones.

Finally, Mr. Brody's implicit suggestion that *La Prensa* used techniques that had supposedly been employed by CIA-backed newspapers in Chile and Jamaica is patently absurd, even without taking into consideration the fact that we never saw a copy of *El Mercurio*, let alone the *Daily Gleaner*. Let us examine the specifics of this vague, calumnious charge, which is an old Sandinista chestnut. The principal accusation was formulated by an "internationalist"—a North American who wrote a series of articles for *Barricada* and *El Nuevo Diario*. According to him, we were publishing "subliminal" anti-Sandinista messages that supposedly affected the reader on a subconscious level. As we had to submit to *prior* censorship ever since 1982, perhaps the "subliminal" messages also affected the censors, causing them to ignore the subversive anti-Sandinista propaganda, hence turning them into unwitting CIA agents tricked into destabilizing the Sandinista regime.

Arms Control

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Among the many virtues of Eugene V. Rostow's article, "Why the Soviets Want an Arms-Control Agreement, and Why They Want It Now" [February], is its insistence that ". . . the traditional Western enthusiasm for arms-control agreements has become an obsession." He underlines the point that Western public opinion must understand that the mere signing of an agreement with the Soviet Union does not assure peace.

As evidence to support the view that Western enthusiasm for arms-control agreements is a romantic illusion, let me cite the hundreds and perhaps thousands of "dissidents" still remaining in Soviet prisons and psychiatric hospitals. I refer to these unfortunate Soviet citizens in quotation marks because most of them are neither dissidents nor criminals in terms defined by the Soviet constitution and by Soviet laws. Unfortunately, the political leadership of the Soviet Union is not constrained by law, as American leaders are. Why then should Soviet leaders comply more scrupulously with agreements made with a foreign country—and a capitalist enemy at that—than they do with the legal contracts they have established with their own people?

JACKSON TOBY
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, New Jersey

Dostoevsky and the Jews

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was very pleased to see the article by Fernanda Eberstadt, "Houses of the Dead" [February], which rightly praised the remarkable book of Gustav Herling, *A World Apart*. It was interesting to learn that the book was refused by Gallimard in 1956, after having been accepted by Albert Camus, and that probably Louis Aragon and perhaps Jean-Paul Sartre were responsible. But why has the book taken so long to be published in the United States? It appeared, after all, in England in 1951 with a preface by Bertrand Russell. Could it have been blackballed here for the same reasons that barred its publication in France?

Since Miss Eberstadt was kind enough to mention my own writings on Dostoevsky's *The House of the Dead* in connection with Herling's book, please allow me to correct a slight error. She speaks of my "third" volume, which does contain an analysis of the book, but then mistakenly gives the title of the second one. The correct title is: *Dostoevsky, The Stir of Liberation, 1860-1865*.

While happy to see Miss Eberstadt advising the readers of COMMENTARY to consult the excellent book of David Goldstein, *Dostoevsky and the Jews*, her remark that I am "reluctant to give Dostoevsky's hatreds their due" may create a false impression. I do think that when he wrote *The House of the Dead* his anti-Semitism was probably less virulent than later in his life. But I also state flatly that "Dostoevsky's supposedly comic portrait of Isay (the Jewish convict in the camp), whatever its relations to what he [Dostoevsky] may have actually seen, cannot be said to transcend the contemptuous treatment of the Jew prevalent in Russian literature for most of the 19th century. . . ." I add, however, that within this context Dostoevsky is far from being the worst offender.

JOSEPH FRANK
Stanford University
Stanford, California

FERNANDA EBERSTADT writes:

I thank Joseph Frank for his kind letter and regret having shuffled the subtitles of the second and third volumes of his biography of Dostoevsky.

Mr. Frank raises once again the vexed question of how we must regard Dostoevsky's caricature of the Jewish convict Isay Bumstein in *The House of the Dead*. That in this largely autobiographical rendering of his prison years, Dostoevsky should have turned a man whose real-life original was Greek Orthodox into a practicing Jew solely in order to provide occasion for a malicious burlesque of Jewish religious observances suggests, to me at least, a somewhat more active animus than Mr. Frank allows.

Mr. Frank also takes issue with my remark that he has been reluctant to give full due to Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism, which, he stipulates in his letter, was "virulent." He joins me in praising David I. Goldstein's "excellent" *Dostoevsky and the Jews* (University of Texas Press, 1981). As it happens, Mr. Frank wrote the foreword to that work, which is essentially an anthology of Dostoevsky's references to the Jews in his fiction, journalism, and letters, fleshed out with historical

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background and with Goldstein's own judicious and (to quote Mr. Frank's foreword) "scrupulously impartial" expositions.

It is a foul harvest. As Goldstein reveals, Dostoevsky was indeed an ever more maniacal enemy of the Jews, and his theories, insinuations, invective, and fabrications of "fact" (his specialty was ritual murder and the crucifixion of Christian children) ran the familiar gamut of anti-Semitic hate literature. Most importantly, however, not only Dostoevsky's journalism but also his novels reek, at times, of his rage against the Jews. And this is Goldstein's saddest news: that this willed and willful pathology, by no means rare among late 19th-century Russian writers, may have betrayed Dostoevsky in several of his finest novels into violations of the twin tenets of his artistic creed, factual accuracy and psychological truth.

In his foreword to the documents which Goldstein assembles, Mr. Frank offers a response which is strangely disappointing. Dostoevsky could not, he argues, have been an out-and-out anti-Semite, since the novelist exchanged "frank and courteous letters with at least two Jewish correspondents." Mr. Frank does not tell us, however, that this correspondence consisted of the protests of two Jewish readers to Dostoevsky's infamous "The Jewish Question" and of Dostoevsky's replies, which were alternately abusive (accusing one correspondent of bad faith) and dishonest (pretending that the czarist decrees restricting Jewish settlement and travel and barring Jews from educational establishments and the professions were in fact sweetheart laws conferring special privileges and protections denied ordinary Russians).

While deploring "false apologetics," Mr. Frank maintains in his foreword that Dostoevsky's anti-Semitic fulminations were by no means so monolithic as the printed record would suggest, but rather should be seen as the "manifestations of a profoundly ambiguous and divided sensibility." Dostoevsky was anti-Semitic "just as he was anti-French, anti-German, . . . and particularly anti-Polish." Hence his anti-Semitism "should be placed in this larger context of a more general xenophobia" and—unlike Wagner's, for instance—"need not be considered ignoble or humanly repugnant." With the case thus closed, Mr. Frank assures us that we may continue reading Dostoevsky's novels "without any gnawing doubt."

In short, I consider amply justified my suggestion that Mr. Frank has been "reluctant to give Dostoevsky's hatreds their due."

I hope I am not wrong in discerning in Mr. Frank's present letter some change of heart on this disturbing issue, and I look forward very much to reading the future volume or volumes of his biography in which he will chronicle the years when both Dostoevsky's demonic hatreds and his celestial genius came into fullest force.

Whether or not one may still rejoice in the works of this greatest of writers, knowing that they are occasionally disfigured by a mendacious anti-Semitism, is another question. I believe, with some misgivings, that one can. But it does no good to pretend that this most degrading, calculating, and falsifying of world views is in any way comparable with being "anti-French."

Markets

To the Editor of Commentary:

Robert B. Reich's article, "Of Markets and Myths" [February], though neither unintelligent nor uninteresting, seems nevertheless to be rather too smitten with a truism. Of course government affects markets in numerous ways. We were not unaware of that, but we are grateful to be given the chance to think about its implications a little more. Now, could we get on with the main argument?

For, after all, the main argument has not been obviated. It is possible to imagine a market existing without a government to "organize it" (as Mr. Reich unhappily puts it). It is possible to imagine a market that is merely an adjunct of government. In between we may generally say that governments either facilitate markets (implying market autonomy) or that they organize markets (there's that phrase again). In a world of governments, that is the choice, and there is no centrist compromise possible on this choice (although, of course, we may ask how actively a government should facilitate markets, or how thoroughly it should organize them).

Mr. Reich betrays his preference as soon as he claims that government organizes markets. I claim that it is producers, financiers, middlemen, and consumers who organize markets, and that government merely participates in the market, like the other players, or polices the market. My claim is more or less equivalent to the concept of capitalism. Mr. Reich's claim is, well, not.

To make my point a little more stark, let us take the family. After all, government issues marriage licenses, it decrees divorce, it settles custody disputes, it favors couples with children in its tax code, and so on. Thus we may say that government organizes families, and the only remaining question is how thoroughly it ought to organize them. To paraphrase Mr. Reich: the ideological fixation on privacy—on the mythic choice between government control and personal freedom—leads policy-makers to ignore their responsibilities for creating and maintaining families. But, of course, it is not a "mythic choice," nor is it unimportant. Indeed, liberal democracy depends upon the autonomy of civil society, the family, and individuals—and, I would say, markets. Government is good when it facilitates people going about their business, and not good when it tries to tell them their business. Surely one does not have to be especially libertarian to think thus.

Michael David Blume
Annapolis, Maryland

Robert B. Reich writes:

In my article, I criticized the way political discourse in modern America forces a stark choice between the "free market" and "government control," thus often foreclosing a discussion over how government might better organize the market. I cited a number of examples of how a shift in the terms of our debate, toward a focus on market organization, might lead to a more interesting and more relevant range of policy options.

Now comes Michael David Blume, who prefers that we talk about how government might better "facilitate" the market rather than how government might better "organize" the market. I have no quibble with Mr. Blume's revised language; my point remains the same, and my illustrations are quite as pertinent.

But I do take issue with Mr. Blume's rather cavalier analogy between commercial and familial relationships. The latter surely merit substantial deference to pri-

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

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vacy and autonomy. To debate how government should "organize" familial relationships might invite mischief. But commercial relationships are indubitably public. They are maintained and enforced through contract, property, and tort laws, among many other governmental devices, rather than through the more intimate ties of affection and blood loyalty. A family can live happily without externally-imposed rules governing its internal relationships; a market could not exist without some broadly understood rules of the game. To ask how government might better "organize" the market is thus to acknowledge that market rules are necessarily socially determined.

Berlin

To the Editor of Commentary:

I read with interest "In the Capital of Modern Cruelty" by Algis Valiunas [January]. It is a thoughtful and poignant article. Mr. Valiunas captures the "feeling" of East Berlin very well. The old buildings are grand. The cars, for which people wait over a year, are indeed made of sawdust, and as they chug along, their exhausts are foul. A tourist does get a feeling of "wearying sadness" in East Berlin, not only from memories, but from the appearances and attitudes of the people. . . .

The contrast with West Berlin is startling. West Berlin, in spite of its isolation, is a vibrant community. It is alive. Although memories are everywhere, the feeling of sadness is not there. . . . I believe that next to the Wall, the contrast between the East and West is the most vivid impression with which a visitor leaves Berlin.

Mr. Valiunas's discussion of the Wall is outstanding. The Wall must be seen: it is large and physically imposing. As I viewed it from a platform, I felt great anger toward the architects of this brutal composition. The purpose of this wall, of course, was not to keep people from getting in, but to keep people from getting out. It represents a huge prison, there for all to see in its physical reality and its symbolic and actual repression of people.

Where is the outcry? The media, except for noting an anniversary of the Wall or an escape, are silent. . . . Political leaders in our country and in Western Europe are all too quiet. The West has accepted the fact that millions of people do not have the same basic freedoms that we in the United States and other democracies possess. The Wall, although it exists as a stark, vivid reminder, is just another manifestation of the lack of freedom that we accept. It is disheartening that the continued existence of this monster is met with silence.

Philip J. Schiller
Chicago, Illinois

Patients

To the Editor of Commentary:

At first glance, Michael Magie's article, "Patients" [February], seems to fall well within that genre of popular prattle about dentists that perpetuates the same worn stereotypes as mother-in-law jokes. What caused me (I write both as a dentist and a practicing psychologist) to persevere rather than follow the writer's wife's inclination and stop reading was a growing curiosity about Mr. Magie's personal reactions, which he would gladly wish to impute to everyone but which are in fact much more his own than he may be willing to admit. Psychoanalytic theory describes the process of projective identification, a defense mechanism in which a person controls threatening instinctual drives by "recruiting" another, in this case the dentist, to be the "container" of highly ambivalent needs.

The issues of who is king and who controls and brutalizes whom through naked power, and who feels disempowered, humiliated, resentful, threatened, and vengeful all seem to get triggered here for Mr. Magie.

It's clear that being tilted back into a supine position in a dental chair can make one feel vulnerable, exposed, defenseless, and impotent, and as a result engender aggressive feelings that can be very uncomfortable. But many more people, happily, tend to enter the patient role less fearful of losing control. Indeed, they appear to enjoy the regression to an earlier level of trusting, being cradled and taken care of—which is, in fact, what the patient role, to be endured comfortably, demands, and what the dentist—or healer of any other stripe—facilitates and promotes, if he is any good.

It is hard to know what gets in the way for Mr. Magie. Is it the unctuous oversolicitousness of his dentist, or the aloof hubris he ascribes to his Dr. Fowl? One gets too close, the other not close enough for comfort. It is interesting that of the several doctors mentioned in the piece only Mr. Magie's dentist remains nameless, a generic blob without visible attributes of humanness, more like a calculating, mildly insidious robot. One senses that the issue of trust is a biggie for Mr. Magie. And authority. And control: being in, and being out of it.

How I feel when I do my work as a dentist may surprise Mr. Magie. Far from wallowing in the heady glow of control and power, I often feel compassionate to the point of anxiousness. Whatever sense of gentleness may be passing from my hands to the patient springs from a deep, mostly unconscious, need to treat this patient the way I would have liked to have been treated, but never was, under somewhat similar conditions when I was rendered vulnerable. Add to this the degree of high-level intensity and arousal required if a rotary instrument (a high-speed drill, by any other name) and a plethora of similar, potentially devastating gadgets and tools are to be wielded safely and with the appearance of easy gracefulness that induces patient calm; and have all this take place within the tender and delicate confines of an opening the size of a demitasse cup that moves and changes shape quite unexpectedly, and tends to obscure the object of my ministrations with at least one, often two, bodily fluids—and perhaps with all this in mind Mr. Magie can get an idea of how I can be too exhausted to feel or think much about dominance and submission.

Dentistry is unique among those medical specialties that deal with invasive procedures, i.e., where something not very pleasant is being performed that requires breaching the envelope of skin and perforating tissue and moving some around and taking some away.

When similar procedures are performed elsewhere on our body, the differences become apparent. A surgical procedure—an operation—is, with few exceptions, a once-in-a-lifetime event, and most people manage to avoid it altogether. Hence there is none of the intense personal involvement between patient and doctor extending over many years. There exists, instead, an impersonal distance that is further fostered by the fact that the patient is rendered unconscious for

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the duration of the procedure (to the immeasurable relief of the doctor, who, freed of the need to be chattily reassuring, can simply get on with what he needs to do).

As to Mr. Magie's wondering in the end whether he should talk about his anger, his resentment, and all the rest of the stuff that he is dealing with and then feels all this guilt about, at the risk of having a quarrel, maybe that would be a rewarding thing for him to do. But with someone else. There are people who get paid to listen to what's on his mind; and it might make a real difference at his next dental checkup.

ALEXANDER WALCHEK
Berkeley, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Michael Magie concludes that it is for the best that his readers become docile medical patients. He believes that his dentist and physician, in their subtle ways, expect him to submit to their authority, and that their power is derived legitimately from the knowledge and skills he anxiously seeks. So he will swallow this political pill, say "ah," and play his role. But should he not express his feelings and concerns because his physician does not appear to be interested in them? Is his doctor really a tyrant and mechanic-king who undemocratically wields the power of healing in exchange for quiet obedience?

A physician's "power" grows from something beyond his seemingly arcane rituals and the dependencies of patients. It arises from the doctor's willingness to live with uncertainty, yet paint a hopeful game plan for patients. Uncertainty pervades nearly all medical diagnoses. There is too much biological variability in how diseases affect people and too many physical and emotional ways for people to respond to their ills for a physician to nab the diagnosis at first crack. And remarkably few tests and treatments have been put through scientifically controlled studies that tell a doctor when a particular drug or surgery is better than another, or even better than a placebo. So, Mr. Magie, you really do need faith in what your doctor offers. But you are not helpless.

Patients must speak up to keep the uncertainties to a minimum. If some detail is left unsaid, either because patients believe it is unimportant or the doctor fails to draw it out, the clinician may not understand what patients mean by the symptoms they have tried to describe. An incorrect diagnosis becomes more likely. While the struggle to cover all vague aches and tingles may cause an overly paternalistic doctor to sneer and turn cold, it will make most physicians more attentive and more compulsive in getting to the basis of their patients' problems.

It is also quite appropriate for patients to let their doctor know their worst fears and anxieties about the symptoms they harbor. Patients often have their own theories about why their heads ache or their hands go numb. . . . In a few words, the doctor can gently dispel a mistaken notion that, had it persisted, might have interfered with the cure, or encourage a correct perception and use it in the healing ritual.

Mr. Magie, if you ever have a symptom that worries you, or become ill, be a politic, questioning patient. No good doc will dismiss you as a rebel and send you off to be leeched.

BRUCE H. DOBKIN
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MICHAEL MAGIE writes:

Robert Frost has a few lines, in "The Wood-Pile," about a self-deceiving bird he meets while walking in a swamp on a winter day. The bird, he says, "thought that I was after him for a feather— / The white one in his tail; like one who takes / Everything said as personal to himself. / One flight out sideways would have undeceived him."

You can never be sure but that some motion of your own is going to scare up a bird. And here comes Dr. Walchek, flapping his wings in alarm, on the defensive, even counterattacking. And here is his flight out sideways.

But undeceiving is going to be a more difficult matter in this case than Frost imagined. For the poor bird has misunderstood everything. He thinks my piece of popular prattle is about dentists—that's the white feather in his tail. Now, I have been much blamed for subtlety in my day, but I did try to hint by my title that I was writing about "Patients."

As for the rest of the doctor's little piece of professional prattle, I confess I would not know where to begin the project of disillusioning. As he suggests, he did not really want to read the article, and so he did not read it. There would be little point in suggesting he read it again—with the assistance, perhaps, of a little play therapy instead of psychoanalytical theory. Still, he has used his time to some purpose. To quell his anxiety that a few prospective patients might spurn their dentists after reading my article, he has proclaimed his ability to offer his own patients the rich unction of caring in its fullness (except for the odd parenthetical bit about the doctor's longing to be "freed of the need to be chattily reassuring"). He won't expect, however, I feel sure, to find me among the new crowd at his door, clamorous for his healing inattention.

As for Dr. Dobkin's kindly lecture on the pragmatics of patient discourse, combining as he does the authority of the doctor with the authority of the teacher, he tempts me to return to a point about politics, and to another point about metaphor. But that would be like starting over from the top; besides, I would only be repeating in a certain way what he says, which repeats (in a way) what I said. Maybe this merry-go-round explains why I feel as if this doctor has cleverly outmaneuvered me, has got me lying down again in that damn chair where I began, feeling wrong about having been right. I feel a strong urge to say, "Yes, Doctor. Thank you, Doctor. I'll try to speak up. Truly I will." And another strong urge to say, "Hands off my throne, usurper!" Maybe I'd better shut up.

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Issues of the Information Age:

The paradox of power.

The Information Age, for all its potential, has brought with it a new kind of problem. Often, the machines that contribute so much to the flood of information do little to help most of us cope with it. They are difficult to use, rigid in their demands, almost arrogant in their inability to work with any but their own kind. They are the muscle-bound tools of specialists.

In our view, the problem is not that the machines are too powerful for the rest of us. They are not powerful enough.

This is the paradox of power: the more powerful the machine, the less power it exerts over the person using it. We define a more powerful machine as one that is more capable of bending to the will of humans, rather than having humans bend to its will. The definition is deeply ingrained in AT&T. The telephone is such a powerful device precisely because it demands so little of its user.

AT&T foresees the day when the Information Age will become universal. People everywhere will participate in a worldwide Telecommunity. They will be able to handle information in any form—conversation, data, images, text—as easily as they now make a phone call.



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That day is coming closer. One example: scientists at AT&T Bell Laboratories are developing "associative" memories for computers, further enabling the machines to work with incomplete, imprecise, or even contradictory information. That's perfectly natural for a human. What makes it a breakthrough is that these computers won't ask you to be anything else.

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The Latest Myths About the Soviet Union

Nick Eberstadt

AMONG students of Soviet affairs, the publication of Seweryn Bialer's latest book, *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline,** has been treated as an event of major importance. Widely discussed within the academy, the book has also evoked extensive note and comment in the popular media.

It is not surprising that an analysis of the current situation in the USSR by Seweryn Bialer should be accorded such attention and respect. In a variety of ways, Bialer might seem ideally qualified to contribute to the West's understanding of the Soviet state. His contribution would, indeed, seem to be especially important today, when so much uncertainty has been caused by the dramatic actions of the new Soviet ruler, Mikhail Gorbachev—and when so much uncertainty of a different kind is in evidence in the foreign policies of an American administration whose outlook on Soviet affairs, even in the eyes of its critics, had once been unmistakably clear.

In addition to being a professor of political science at Columbia, Seweryn Bialer is director of the university's Research Institute on International Change (formerly the Research Institute on International Communism) and is on the executive committee of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Soviet Studies (formerly the Columbia University Russian Institute). A prolific writer and frequent television guest, he also serves on the editorial boards of major foreign-policy journals, acts as a director or adviser of foundations and research councils, has been the recipient of numerous prestigious Western awards and fellowships (including a MacArthur Foundation "genius" grant), and has functioned as an unofficial adviser to key figures in the Democratic party.

But it is not these credentials alone that place Bialer in such an exceptional position among Western students of the Soviet state. Over the past decades, Western understanding of the Soviet system has been facilitated by the erosion of a previously monolithic international Communist movement directed from Moscow, by the transit to the West of persons who have themselves experienced Soviet-style rule, and by the tactical "opening" to the West that the rulers of the Soviet state have carefully constructed, and managed, since the 1960's (and of which the much-discussed *glasnost* policy of Gorbachev is essentially a continuation). It may be said that Bialer, perhaps more than any other Western scholar seeking to gain insight into the Soviet Union, has been able to take advantage of these developments.

SEWERYN BIALER defected from Poland to the West in 1956. He was no ordinary refugee. Though only twenty-nine at the time of his transit through West Berlin, he forsook a brilliant career in the new Poland, where he was already a very important person.

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee's internal-security subcommittee in the summer of 1956, Bialer stated that he had joined the Polish Communist underground in 1942, at the age of fifteen, in Nazi-governed Lodz. By this dating, Bialer would have been one of the very earliest members of the Communist *apparat* in modern Poland. His testimony goes on to state that he was interned in Auschwitz in July 1944. A Communist and a Jew, Bialer would have had slim chances of surviving in Nazi hands. That he did in fact survive is testimony to his endurance, determination, and courage. It is also perhaps testimony to the remarkable ability to save their own that was demonstrated in many cases by the Communist networks in Hitler's concentration and extermination camps.

Upon his liberation in 1945, Bialer was immediately assigned to be a political commandant within the new, and rapidly growing, security apparatus for Communist Poland. His rise within the Polish police was astonishingly swift. By 1951, when he was no more than twenty-five years old, Bialer had by his testimony become chief of the Political Division of the Central Command of the Citizens' Militia—that is to say, political commissar of a nationwide security force which included not only tens of thousands of police, but

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also an 85,000-man military auxiliary known as the Reserve Organization of the Citizens' Militia (ORMO).

The political command within the Polish Citizens' Militia would have been an excellent vantage point from which to learn how power in a Communist state is administered. In the years in which Bialer served in that command, it would also have been an excellent vantage point from which to learn how power in a Communist state is consolidated. For the Citizens' Militia was one of the principal instruments by which Poland's Communist government achieved mastery over a nation that was overwhelmingly hostile to the prospects of its rule.

In 1951 Bialer was transferred from state to party, where he was attached directly to the Central Committee. His new area of responsibilities, according to his Senate testimony, was "anti-Western and anti-American propaganda." Bialer fulfilled his obligations in a variety of fashions. He was made First Secretary of the party organizations in what he called "the two most important Communist schools in Poland," the Central Committee's Higher Institute of Marxism-Leninism and its Institute of Social Sciences (where he was also appointed professor). He became ideological adviser to *Trybuna Ludu*, the party's daily journal. He wrote for a variety of intellectual and popular magazines, and did a good deal of lecturing. At a time when East European Communist parties were kept by Moscow on a particularly short tether, propaganda work required consultation with and approval from the Soviet apparatus for ideological warfare. Such consultation was not only extensive but also, at times, intensive: for example, Bialer testified that he spent November and December of 1954 in Moscow.

When he defected to the West in 1956—"I came to the conclusion," he told the Senate, "that all I was doing for the long fifteen years was unjust, bad, and I wanted to break relations with all this" —Bialer was, according to accounts in the New York *Times*, one of the country's top 200 party activists and functionaries. In open testimony before the Senate, he called to mind extremely sensitive Soviet documents that he had been privileged to see, including one of the full stenographic transcripts of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum from July 1955. In addition, he identified several persons, in Poland and the United States, as agents of Polish intelligence or influence.

The attitude of Moscow and its satellites toward former Soviet-bloc security personnel who commit what the Soviets take to be acts of espionage—or counterespionage— is typically less than charitable. Nevertheless, once the policy of "opening" toward the West was well under way in the 1970's, Bialer secured entry to the corridors of access in which Western academics were now permitted to tread. By his own estimate, he has visited Moscow a dozen times in the last five years alone. His past has apparently not been held against him, for many, if not most, of these visits have involved meetings and discussions with high-ranking Soviet personnel.

Few if any American academics can match this record of experience and firsthand knowledge, and it shows in Bialer's new book, which even his critics will concede is a subtle and masterful work, carefully if not always elegantly written, and skillfully if not always convincingly argued. This is a book intended, by Bialer's explicit statement, not just for specialists but for the general "interested reader in politics, government, business, journalism, and academia." It is written in an accessible manner, and it is obviously meant to have an impact on public attitudes. In the months since its publication one may, indeed, already discern traces of such an impact in the public discussion of the nature and meaning of the course being taken by the new Soviet leadership, and of its implications for Western policy.

II

According to Bialer, "The 21st century may not be Chinese, but it certainly will not be Russian." Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, in his estimate, "is the best of what the Soviets have," yet Bialer indicates that neither Gorbachev's team nor any other possible leadership configuration can secure for the USSR a position of international primacy.

By Bialer's account, Soviet power is increasingly affected by a diverse array of unfavorable and possibly irremediable trends. Its official ideology, Marxism-Leninism, is today a spent and corrupted force: "The old Bolshevik dream of authentic socialist revolution," he observes, "has been displaced by the commitment to direct military conquest as the only way to spread Communism." Yet even the spread of Communism may not ultimately betoken success for the Soviet state. In Bialer's ironic phrase, the USSR is today a victim of "Communist encirclement." On one border, it is flanked by a China which "has audaciously attacked all phases and dimensions of the Stalin-type economy at once"; and it is bordered on another frontier by expensive Eastern European "vassal states" which, entirely apart from such Communist dependencies as Cuba and Vietnam, constitute an "external empire that has become an embarrassment and a handicap to the pursuit of foreign political objectives."

Things do not look much better within the USSR's official borders. By Bialer's diagnosis, the Soviet Union is today in the grip of a "systemic crisis"—a "crisis of effectiveness," of which the USSR's widely discussed economic slowdown is but a single symptom. Bialer uses the term "internal decline" to describe the overall process he sees under way within the Soviet Union, and its

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effects seem to him very far-reaching. *The Soviet Paradox* appears in places even to question whether the Russian people, and the other peoples of what Bialer calls "the internal empire," are the stuff of which a world power could really ever be built.

Nevertheless, if the Soviet quest for supremacy is, in Bialer's depiction, consigned to virtually inevitable failure, the state itself is not about to be swept into the dustbin of history. The "Soviet paradox" to which Bialer calls attention is this: the "internal decline of the Soviet Union coincides with the height of its military power," and for "the foreseeable future, internal decline [will be] coupled with awesome military power directed at external goals."

The purpose of Soviet power is to achieve "security," which for the Soviet Union "may be identified with the achievement of a Communist world. Only such a victory will provide final security for the state." Yet insofar as this is an impossible prospect, Bialer writes, Soviet foreign policy is characterized by enormous and ultimately irreducible tensions. In recent years, as the Soviet position in the world has been exposed as "overextended," these tensions have mounted.

The West, according to Bialer, cannot afford, in an age of nuclear arsenals, to ignore Soviet insecurities. Like it or not, the danger of nuclear war exposes all of humanity to incalculable and unprecedented risk. An appreciation of this reality, he argues, must play a central role in shaping Western policies toward the USSR.

In the current, potentially perilous, international situation, the policy Bialer seems to find most appropriate for Western countries to adopt toward the Soviet Union is one he calls "containment." Bialer's containment differs substantially from George F. Kennan's now-classic exposition of the concept, for it offers no hope of ultimately modifying Soviet behavior. "It is not within the West's power," Bialer writes, "to bring about significant changes in the Soviet system or to redirect radically the leadership's preoccupations from international to domestic concerns." It is, however, "possible to frustrate the Soviet global ambitions that are the most threatening."

Though he never says no explicitly, Bialer strongly implies that the Western world, and the United States in particular, should reconcile itself to waiting the Soviets out. Such a strategy, he appears to suggest, would be both consonant with the long-range interests of the West (since "objective" conditions so clearly indicate that history is against the USSR) and responsible (since it would minimize the chance of a nuclear conflict with the USSR during the long decline that Bialer envisions for it).

FOR all the evident intelligence that crafts the intricate and extended arguments of *The Soviet Paradox*, for all the diverse data summoned to the support of its consequential judgments, the resulting product is something less than a reliable guide to understanding the current Soviet position in the world arena. In a variety of ways, in fact, *The Soviet Paradox* may be said to misinform the general reader toward whom it is expressly directed.

For one thing, *The Soviet Paradox* is full of factual errors. Some of these appear to be quite trivial; others less so. Bialer states, for example, that "the collectivization and communization of the Chinese countryside . . . was by and large nonviolent"; in point of fact, Chinese authorities themselves have officially stated that their "anti-landlord" campaigns in the early 1950's liquidated one-and-a-half million persons (this was but one of many campaigns attendant upon "land reform"). Western demographers now think that as many as 30 million "excess deaths" may have occurred in the years following the "Great Leap Forward," the nationwide campaign in the late 1950's that enforced the commune upon all rural Chinese communities. By the same token, Bialer lists "the stalemate in Poland" as one of the factors affecting the "defensive" Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan; yet the strikes in the Lenin shipyards which were to give birth to the Solidarity movement began in August 1980, while the Soviet assassination of Afghanistan's puppet President Amin, and surprise attack against his country, took place in December of the previous year.

Factual errors apart, Bialer's book misguides because it projects a serious misreading of the Soviet situation in three important and closely related areas: government, economy, and military and external strategy.

III

LIKE many other works on the USSR, *The Soviet Paradox* argues that the key to understanding the Soviet state lies in its legacy of Stalinism. "The real Soviet Revolution, the transformation of Russian society," writes Bialer, "took place from 1929 to 1939. It was directed by Stalin." His words for Stalin are not kind: "During Stalin's rule . . . the social order was that of a cemetery."

The Stalinist tendency in Soviet rule, in Bialer's view, was by no means extinguished by the dictator's death in 1953. To the contrary: "While the policy of mass terror was abolished in post-Stalin Russia, the apparatus was simply purged, not dismantled." Elsewhere he states that "the Soviet economic system remains virtually unchanged in its basic characteristics from the Stalinist model." Still elsewhere he remarks that "the survival of the police state, the permanent priority assigned to military growth, and the fusion of Leninist messianism with Great Russian nationalism are the most obvious Stalinist features of the contemporary Soviet Union."

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But Stalin's successors, according to Bialer, did not limit themselves to maintaining and preserving these fundamental pillars of Stalinism. "In the cultural field," he writes, "Brezhnev's policies, almost from the beginning, adhered rigorously to the old Stalinist approach." And after Brezhnev's death, Soviet policy was marked by a multifaceted "turn to neo-Stalinism." Today, in fact (and Bialer is writing after the accession of Gorbachev), "one cannot find evidence of any meaningful anti-Stalinist forces either in the establishment itself or in the various strata of Soviet society."

This depiction of Soviet rule would be commonplace were it not for one distinctive aspect: Bialer refuses to use the term "totalitarian" to describe the Soviet government today. His preference is for the term "authoritarian." The reasoning behind this choice of nomenclature is never explicitly supplied, only hinted at. At one point he writes about the post-Khrushchev regime that Soviet leaders "care about their own and their country's power, not about Communism"; at another that, as compared with Stalin's time, the system today "is more predictable—one is tempted to say rational"; and at still another that under Gorbachev, "domestic problems have priority over foreign-policy goals."

Bialer is hardly alone in his judgment that the Soviet polity is no longer totalitarian. In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, under the influence of the argument that the Soviet and American systems were "converging," the notion even enjoyed a certain academic vogue. And it may be said that "totalitarianism," to paraphrase the late Vyacheslav Molotov, is a matter of taste. If, as Bialer suggests, "predictability," "rationalism," and what political-science jargon currently terms "authority leakage" are taken to denote the absence of totalitarianism, then no society on earth has ever been totalitarian—and in fact, none can ever be. The Nazi death camps, the Soviet Gulag, and the Communist Chinese "thought-reform" centers were all characterized by a certain amount of "predictability" and "authority leakage" in their daily operations. Yet this should hardly come as a surprise, for the limits of any form of governance, no matter how ambitious, are ultimately set by the very real limits to endurance of the flesh and blood of the human beings beneath it. In that sense, the "totalitarian claim to power," in the words of Hans Buchheim, "is unrealizable."

But as Buchheim also pointed out, decades ago, "the realization that the totalitarian regime sets limits to its own development through its unlimited claim to control is no comfort to those who must live within its frontiers." For people who live beyond those frontiers, it serves no good purpose to mistake the realities constraining the administration of power with the claim to power itself.

Communist rule, as Bialer well knows, not only declares its intervention to be legitimate in every sphere of life, but also demands ultimate authority in each of these, no matter how intimate or important they may be. Lenin put it succinctly as far back as 1920: "We recognize nothing private." The exigencies of power and the aging of the system have, over the decades, thrust upon Soviet leadership changes in tactics, strategy, and some of the particulars of administration. But as Soviet authorities are themselves the first to emphasize, the Soviet Union, and the Communist party which commands it, have maintained unswerving commitment to Lenin's precepts in this regard.

A FEW facts overlooked in Bialer's lengthy discourse on the nature of the Soviet state since Stalin's death may be pertinent here.

In the ten years since the new Soviet constitution of 1977 came into effect, open dissatisfaction with or disapproval of proclaimed government policy by a Soviet citizen has continued to be treated as a psychiatric disorder. Persons betraying such symptoms have been entrusted to the joint custody of Soviet medical and security services, who together supervise a therapy of chemical injections and prolonged confinement in the hope that this will bring the patient to his senses.

Although the duration of imprisonment has been reduced since the days of Stalin, Soviet citizens may still be sent to jail for telling a joke that Soviet authorities do not consider funny; in the early 1980's, the sentence for such anti-state activities could be three years.

The early 1980's was also slated as the completion date for the USSR's mandatory internal-passport system. A citizen's "nationality"—his ethnic heritage—must be inscribed on the internal passport. At all times, however, a Soviet citizen's "nationality" remains provisional. Long-established Soviet policy posits the eventual "fusion" of the peoples inhabiting Soviet territory into a single, new Soviet race (*narodnost'*). This race policy is by no means a purely hypothetical concern. In consultation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Soviet state periodically updates the list of Soviet "nationalities" accorded official recognition, creating and eliminating entire peoples in the process.

It may be that such ambitious policies of experimentation with human beings remind Bialer of "the type of highly authoritarian system well known from the Russian past." But then, in dismissing the possibility that the contemporary Soviet state is "totalitarian," he might at least have provided a more precise adjective for an authority which denies its subjects not only the right to active political opposition and the right to conduct an independent economic existence, but the right to move or travel, the right to tell jokes, the right to utter what one believes to be the truth in one's home, the right to worship, the right to raise one's children in accordance with one's preferences, and the right to one's own ethnic identity.

Bialer writes that Gorbachev and his circle "are

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often called 'technocrats.' It is as good a description as any." Ignored in this description is the basic fact that the Politburo today gives representation to the Soviet police and security apparatus that is unprecedented since the death of Stalin. Of the eighteen full or alternate members in the Politburo at this writing, one—Geidar Aliev—was the head of the KGB for the Azerbaijan Republic. Another—Victor Chebrikov—is the current head of the entire KGB. A third—Eduard Shevardnadze, currently Minister for Foreign Affairs—was formerly the head of the MVD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for the Georgian Republic. The route to power taken by both Aliev and Shevardnadze, incidentally, involved securing the post of First Secretary of the Communist party in their respective republics; in each case the transition also involved the disgrace of the former occupant of the office, and in Azerbaijan, reportedly, his execution as well.

Bialer's book scarcely mentions the role of propaganda in Soviet rule. While this virtual omission may be in keeping with a verdict declaring the USSR no longer totalitarian, it does little to help the general reader understand the Soviet system, and in fact denies Soviet authorities one of their most significant accomplishments. Nor is there any indication that the "less ideological" men who have come to power with Mikhail Gorbachev are now prepared to alter longstanding Soviet policy concerning the state's command and use of communications. Yegor Ligachev, the figure in the Gorbachev Politburo most frequently associated with ideological affairs, may have announced the domestic publication of a novel by the late Boris Pasternak, but he has also emphasized that "television and radio broadcasts must be fully and totally political . . . all television and radio programs should serve one aim—propaganda, the clarification and implementation of party policy."

This viewpoint is by no means incidental to the Soviet Union's external policies. To the contrary: even if specific tactics and goals may differ, propaganda is as integral to the USSR's quest for international power as it is to the task of mastering the Soviet Union's domestic populations. Although Bialer belittles the Soviet Union's international propaganda campaigns, Soviet authorities judge these to be vital, even decisive, activities. In 1978, for example, the year of the USSR's international campaign against the neutron bomb, the Soviet Union is thought to have spent the equivalent of $2 billion on propaganda work abroad. Whatever the precise effect of this effort on Western politics, an important Soviet objective was in fact secured. President Carter, bowing to both domestic and international pressures, permanently postponed his decision on deployment, effectively forestalling the possibility that the neutron bomb might be used to assist in the defense of Western Europe in the event of an action by the Warsaw Pact.

In Bialer's vision of an American policy toward the USSR, there would apparently be no room for purposefully countering such Soviet initiatives. *The Soviet Paradox* does not acknowledge the increasing role of public diplomacy in the conduct of foreign affairs. It does not discuss the merits of beaming uncensored news reports to the populations of Communist countries. Enunciating America's values and principles for international audiences is not said to serve any positive purpose.

Bialer even seems to caution Americans against direct criticism of the Soviet Union. Commenting on the increased tension in Soviet-American relations in recent years, he states that "Reagan's rhetoric injured the self-esteem and patriotic pride of the [USSR's] political elites. . . . A rekindled sense of insecurity fires an angry and defiant response." In its practical implications, Bialer's analysis cannot be distinguished from a counsel for unilateral American disengagement and retreat from the international arena of thought and words.

It is particularly unfortunate that such an analysis should be wedded to a call for realpolitik. ("If ever there was a time in the history of mankind to have the most powerful states conduct a realpolitik, that time is now.") Whatever its proponents may say for it, realpolitik has a less than perfect record as a calming force in international relations, as students of World War I may recall. There are hard questions, moreover, about the appropriateness of a policy which dismisses ethical concerns (as realpolitik is meant to do) for a nation like the United States, whose international exertions have so often been predicated on a popular understanding of the moral purposes they were meant to serve. Under the best of circumstances, there may be limits to what could be expected of an American realpolitik in the modern world. But even less may be expected from a realpolitik that is, in some of its most important respects, uninformed by reality.

IV

The Soviet Paradox comments extensively upon economic questions, and though only a small portion of this analysis pertains directly to American policy, it leads to a significant dictum: "Through its economic policy the United States can have no more than marginal influence on Soviet military and foreign policy."

Bialer is almost adamant on the topic. "Even if the West were able to impose extreme economic sanctions [on the Soviet Union]," he writes, "the system would not crumble, the political situation would not disintegrate, the economy would not go bankrupt, the leadership would not lose its will to rule internally or its will to be a global power." The economic reason, in his view, is simple: the USSR's "financial soundness, backed by oil, gas, lumber, gold, etc. is unquestionable" and its "dependence on the world trade market is marginal."

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So insistent is Bialer against the case for Western economic sanctions, in fact, as to claim that the Soviet Union "boasts enormous, unused reserves of political and social stability"—directly contradicting one of his own principal arguments.

Describing the general steps which might be taken to "normalize" Soviet-American relations, Bialer mentions specifically one measure which he describes as a "trade-off": "Improvement in Soviet policies on human rights and emigration tied tacitly (but not through an act of Congress) to American readiness to grant the Soviets Most Favored Nation status." Bialer does not hold out hope that such measures might benefit the United States economically, or even that they might improve the human-rights situation in the Soviet Union. Instead, he explains that "the privilege is important as an expression of equality" between the United States and Moscow.

MANY things can be said of Bialer's economic analysis; one of the first is that its factual premises appear to be factually incorrect. Indeed, Bialer's understanding of the Soviet economy as very largely autarkic, a self-encased construction that is only marginally affected by the world economy, is a shopworn fiction, and is recognized as such today by most serious observers.

Thus five years ago, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, in a careful and thorough study on the role of foreign trade in the Soviet economy, reached unambiguous conclusions: "Valued in domestic prices, the Soviet Union's participation in world trade relative to its national income is in fact two to three times higher than has been recognized." According to this study, in fact, "Foreign trade has clearly played an increasingly significant role in the Soviet economy. . . ."* There is good reason to believe that the Soviet Union's ratio of foreign trade to national output has risen still further since the late 1970's, the last period examined in that report.†

Bialer's assertion that the Soviet Union's "financial soundness" is "unquestionable" hardly merits greater credence. If the Soviet Union were financially sound, one might wonder why its currency cannot be freely converted into any other currency in the world at anything like the exchange rate Soviet authorities officially assign to it.

Despite an extensive and growing need for imported goods and services, many of these from the West, the Soviet Union's ability to generate hard currency is not great. Although hard-currency earnings are treated by Moscow as a state secret, and are therefore never accurately divulged, it is thought that hard-currency exports may have earned the Soviet Union a bit more than the equivalent of $30 billion in 1985. (This would have been about the same as for Hong Kong, or about a third as much as Canada.) As for hard-currency *debt*, also a closely guarded secret, the International Monetary Fund, in an exacting exercise in deconstruction and reconstruction, has suggested that the net in 1985 may have been in the range of $14-15 billion and the gross about $26 billion.

These numbers, however, may understate the actual dimensions of the Soviet debt to the West. A former analyst for the National Security Council has warned that Soviet banking facilities in Western countries may play havoc with such estimates simply by taking advantage of the accounting rules and regulatory laws under which they operate. Attempting to correct for such financial legerdemain raises estimates of Soviet gross debt to the West for 1985 by over a third in comparison with the IMF estimate, and nearly doubles the USSR's net debt to the West, which by this calculation would have been $25-28 billion.**

The situation has not improved in the interim. In 1986, as it happens, prices for oil and gas, the Soviet Union's main hard-currency exports, continued their downward slide of the previous several years. Third World cash purchases of Soviet weaponry—another mainstay of hard-currency earnings—are also thought to have suffered. As earnings decline, so borrowings must rise if import targets are to be maintained. The USSR today would quite possibly be forced into serious economic dislocations did it not enjoy such unimpeded access to Western markets for capital and credit.

IN SHORT, Bialer's analysis of the Soviet Union on these points seems about as far off the mark as might be managed. The self-contained and creditworthy economy of which Bialer speaks is in reality more reliant upon Western produce and Western funds today than at any time since the lend-lease program. To no inconsiderable degree, the Soviet Union today augments its might by the benefits it derives from an international economic order it is doctrinally committed to destroying.

Moreover, in focusing on whether foreign economic pressure can force Soviet leaders to relinquish or reverse a specific policy, Bialer totally ignores the impact such pressure might have on the USSR's *overall economic might*—a factor that underwrites all Soviet policies. This oversight seems all the more striking in light of Bialer's interest in and enthusiasm for realpolitik.

One must wonder what Bialer means by realpolitik if it is consonant simultaneously with the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik (and other) human-

* Vladimir G. Treml and Barry L. Kostinsky, *Domestic Value of Soviet Foreign Trade: Exports and Imports in the 1972 Input-Output Table*, Bureau of the Census Foreign Economic Report #20, 1982.

† See, for example, the figures presented in Alec Nove, "Some Statistical Puzzles Examined," *Soviet Studies*, January 1986.

** Roger W. Robinson, "Soviet Cash and Western Banks," *National Interest*, Summer 1986.

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rights legislation and with extension to the Soviet Union of Most Favored Nation privileges. From the standpoint of power politics, granting Most Favored Nation status (and all that would reasonably come with it) to the USSR can be expected predictably to strengthen the Soviet Union, and to weaken the position of the United States.

First, despite the claims of so many proponents, it cannot be anticipated that liberalizing trade with the Soviet Union will liberalize the Soviet regime. To the contrary: the recent period of increased trade and credit benefits from the West is one that Bialer himself has characterized as evincing "a turn to neo-Stalinism." Liberalizing trade with the USSR may be more likely to forestall than to encourage what Westerners call "reform," for it preemptively grants to Soviet rulers economic benefits which would otherwise have to be sought through the adjustment of domestic and international policies.

Second, increasing trade and credits would materially ease Moscow's financial burden for its operations abroad. Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and other Soviet dependencies are heavily subsidized by the USSR, and maintaining them constitutes a real expense to the Soviet state. Contributing to the Soviet Union's ability to draw resources from the West can only help make this burden less onerous, and therefore extend the scope for Soviet influence abroad.

Third, thanks to the administrative intricacies of the Soviet financial system, it appears that trade with the West directly empowers the Soviet state. As we learn from Igor Birman, the émigré economist who has done so much to elucidate the workings of the Soviet state budget, it is not impossible that the sale of Western goods to the USSR may, in administrative terms, directly finance the Soviet military buildup. Defense expenditures, after all, are an item always kept low on official Soviet ledgers, and are thus particularly suited to "off-budget" financing.

Fourth, increasing trade with the Soviet Union is likely to be an expensive proposition for the American taxpayer. Through loan guarantees, subsidized credit, federal export insurance, and a host of other arrangements consistent with Most Favored Nation status, the cost (and risk) of doing business with the Soviet Union would in large measure be charged to the American public. And to the extent that the USSR's enhanced economic potential were channeled into higher military expenditures, increased trade would also require new and possibly significant additions to the American defense budget.

Fifth, relaxing trade restrictions would almost necessarily result in a hemorrhage of American military technology, to say nothing of technology with military uses. Part of this increased flow of technology would pass to Moscow by legal means —but only part. As is well known, the Soviet Union devotes high priority to efforts to steal Western technology; industrial espionage, in fact, is thought to account for the vast majority of KGB activities in the West. With increased trade privileges would almost certainly come even greater access for Soviet personnel—especially technical specialists—in the United States.

All these five considerations, however, pale in comparison with the sixth. For the relaxation of trade and credit restrictions that is envisioned by Bialer would grant Moscow an effective license to intervene in American politics, and to lobby for an American international policy more to the Soviet Union's liking. The Soviets have done this with a fair measure of success in Western Europe, where the fear of economic losses through the abrogation or diminution of trade with the East has served as a powerful incentive for accommodating Soviet political demands.

Today, Soviet authorities may have even more reason than they did in the heyday of détente to look longingly for an expansion of economic ties with the U.S. For in the months since Gorbachev's ascension to power, it has been revealed by the Soviet press that the Soviet economy is in more serious straits than had previously been admitted. (It is now indicated, for example, that real investment levels in the mid-1980's were lower than they had been a decade before; per-capita output probably also fell between the mid-1970's and mid-1980's.) Expansion of commerce through the relaxation of previously imposed Western restrictions might seem like an almost ideal solution. Thus it may not be too much to state that the commercial and economic policies Bialer favors for the United States have never before held the possibility of such strategic advantage—for the USSR.

V

MUCH of *The Soviet Paradox* focuses on Soviet foreign policy. Unlike certain Western observers, Bialer does not feel that Soviet foreign policy can be understood in isolation from other factors pertaining to Soviet power. In particular, Bialer's analysis of Soviet foreign policy is reinforced by, and interwoven with, his evaluation of Soviet military policy. For as he explains it, military power is today the Soviet Union's principal "foreign-policy resource," and has served as the engine of "external expansion" for a regime otherwise undergoing "internal decline."

This is a promising point of departure. Unfortunately, on matters bearing on the conduct of American policy, Bialer's judgments are often inconsistent, sometimes seriously so. For example, much of his book, as already noted, takes the position that Americans have little chance of altering the Soviet Union's domestic or external policies through their own international action. Yet here

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Bialer suggests that "whether conciliatory or aggressive tendencies [in Moscow] prevail [will] depend to a large degree upon Western policies."

If Bialer's reasoning thus appears at times to be (as it were) dialectical, it may also be said to have a main thesis, and one germane to American policy. Though he depicts the Soviet Union as a power obsessed with military strength, and likens the Soviet production system to a "war economy," Bialer nevertheless insists that most official Western observers seriously exaggerate the Soviet threat (a phrase he does not use). According to Bialer, in fact, "the American government consistently and continuously overestimate[s] the military strength of its adversary."

Bialer notes pointedly that CIA estimates of Soviet weapons procurements in the late 1970's—estimates, he says, which have since been conclusively proved too high—"created a seemingly solid factual basis for a public mood receptive to the need to rearm America." Such official misperceptions of the Soviet military "have been reinforced under the Reagan administration." Laboring as it does under the illusion that the USSR is a totalitarian state, the current administration, he writes, fails to appreciate obvious differences between the Soviet and the Nazi military postures. "Unlike the Nazis," says Bialer, "the Soviets do not want war with their adversaries"; moreover, "they do not propagandize or glorify offensive military action as the means by which to achieve their international goals."

By Bialer's account, American officials are also guilty of an important misreading of Soviet reality: they ascribe undue consequence to the military. According to Bialer, "the military establishment" in the Soviet Union "is not today a central actor on the political stage." Surveying the horizon, he insists that "there will be no return to high growth rates [of military expenditure or defense investment] even in the 1990's in the absence of major improvement in labor productivity." In the light of Bialer's gloomy economic prognosis, the rapid growth of Soviet military expenditures between now and the end of the century would seem a remote possibility indeed.

The slow growth that Bialer foresees for the Soviet military effort in coming years fits together with another important component in Bialer's vision of Soviet policy: the desire of Soviet authorities to achieve a secure arms-control treaty with the United States. In part, Bialer suggests, a Soviet interest in arms control may be "economically determined," and it may be related to the Gorbachev faction's assertion of control over the Soviet military. But to a great degree, in Bialer's view, the Soviet impetus for arms control emanates from Moscow's appreciation of the reality of "mutually assured destruction," which the present nuclear balance is said to enforce.

When it comes to the American posture vis-à-vis Soviet military power, Bialer, who characterizes himself as a proponent of a strong American defense, nevertheless has nothing but criticism for particular increases in the U.S. military budget. He finds no single American weapons system worthy of explicit praise or support, and offers no suggestions for alternative programs that might better contribute to American national security.

Bialer is particularly disconcerted by the American military program known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In his opinion, the United States and the Soviet Union are currently at a "strategic parity" in nuclear weaponry. There are, he implies, no rational reasons why either power would wish strategic superiority, since such superiority could confer no realistic benefit upon its possessor. Bialer describes SDI as a program undertaken in the quest for strategic superiority—and thus by inference destabilizing and irrational.

In an analysis phrased much like a recommendation, Bialer explores the merits of using SDI as a negotiating chip to press the Soviets "for concessions with regard to offensive [nuclear] weapons that will make the superpower military balance more equitable and stable." Relinquishing the SDI program, however, would be but a single action in the service of a broader strategic perspective. "The United States," in Bialer's words, "should reconcile itself to strategic parity and abandon illusions that its technological advantages can produce strategic superiority and attain a level of security available in the past but no longer possible in the nuclear age, especially when facing such a determined and powerful opponent."

Bialer's view of Soviet-American military relations frames his view of relations between the two powers overall. The possibility he evidently finds most desirable is one he calls "competitive coexistence," a modus vivendi that seems to be different mainly in name from what Americans once called "détente." Bialer dismisses what some people have interpreted as the success of the Reagan administration to date in containing the expansion of Soviet influence in the world. "In the longer run," he warns, "the United States will fail unless its goals and expectations . . . are significantly readjusted. . . ." "Competitive coexistence"—consisting principally of "military détente," increased bilateral trade ties, and deemphasis of ideological confrontation—is what Bialer offers to avert this impending American failure.

As best as can be told, most Americans would prefer to limit U.S. military spending to the absolute minimum consistent with our security and defense needs. Under such circumstances, the identification and assessment of security risks take on a special importance. Looked at from this perspective, Bialer's exposition of Soviet external policy seems particularly wanting.

Bialer's claim that Soviet propaganda does not "glorify offensive military action," for example,

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relies on the central fact that Soviet doctrine stipulates that any Red Army action by definition *cannot* be aggressive. As Soviet accounts of the recent histories of such places as Afghanistan, the Baltic Republics, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland repeatedly emphasize, these areas and their peoples have been the beneficiaries of Soviet efforts to defend "peace" and promote international socialism.

Orwellian wordplay aside, there is little evidence that the Soviet Union's officially crafted cult of militarism is less vibrant, or less comprehensive, than was the one in Nazi Germany in the 1930's. Bialer himself indicates familiarity with the war-scare hysteria released by the Soviet propaganda apparatus in the 1980's, and he also notes that nearly a third of the places in Soviet higher education in the 1970's were to be found in military institutions. Perhaps a more vivid illustration of the state of militarization of Soviet society is one he does not mention. This is the Summer Lightning/Little Eagle exercise held in the USSR every summer. These mandatory programs gather schoolchildren across the country who are then instructed in and prepared for fighting and winning wars—including nuclear wars. The Soviet press puts the number of boys and girls drilled in Summer Lightning and Little Eagle at about 30 million annually. Children as young as seven are routinely inducted into these preparations.*

Bialer's depiction of an American government that "consistently and continuously overestimates" Soviet military spending is equally questionable. To judge by its own figures, the CIA appears during much of the postwar era to have *underestimated* Soviet military spending. In the early 1970's, for example, CIA estimates of Soviet outlays on weapons were only about a third of what the Agency now believes them to have been.

Bialer shows great interest in the revised CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures that were released in the early 1980's. Those figures reduce the Agency's previous estimate of growth rates for overall military spending since the late 1970's by about half (from about 4 percent to about 2 percent in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars), and give Soviet weapons procurement a zero rate of growth. Bialer takes these new numbers to mean that the American government now acknowledges it had been overstating the extent of the Soviet military build-up, and that its earlier figures had been "faulty." His interpretation is somewhat misinformed. The new consensus about Soviet military spending that Bialer describes in some detail does not, in fact, exist. For example, the CIA and the Defense Department's intelligence unit (the DIA) have not only been involved in a continuing dispute over the revised CIA estimates for the mid-70's, but are today in public disagreement on the period 1982-84, with the CIA putting the rate of growth of Soviet military spending in those years at zero, the DIA at 3-4 percent.

The CIA currently estimates that the USSR devotes something like 12-14 percent of its GNP to the military effort. Such estimates, however, are taken as totally implausible by many Soviet émigrés. According to Igor Birman, even the notion that the USSR might spend as *little* as 12-14 percent of its GNP on defense is rejected by "practically all" of "the former and present Soviets who have spoken on the subject." These speakers include Andrei Sakharov, who has stated his view that fully 40 percent of Soviet output is devoted to the military.

Bialer's equanimity about these particular CIA estimates contrasts strikingly with his caustic attitude toward presumed errors in other CIA numbers—upon which these estimates are in fact necessarily based. His equanimity is all the more noteworthy if one speculates about what it would portend for U.S. policy if the CIA's assessment turned out to be broadly incorrect. For if it were the case that the Soviet military effort absorbed a larger share of the output of that troubled economy than is commonly believed in the West, both the Soviet Union's immediate objectives, and its longer-range prospects and needs, might differ significantly from those that Western policy-makers are accustomed to anticipating.

THIS would not mean, of course, that Soviet rulers are secretly staking their future on some imminent surprise attack against the West. That is a notion easily ridiculed. But neither the fury with which some observers set on this straw man, nor the obvious relish they take in dispatching it, can in any way dispose of the more serious issue from which they compose so assailable a caricature. What they either neglect or avoid discussing is the extent to which the threat of force figures in Soviet statecraft, and the extent to which Soviet statecraft is dependent on this threat.

The threat of force depends in part for its impact on the sorts of dangers contemplated. Bialer assures his readers that Soviet authorities are "committed consciously and deliberately to the prevention of nuclear war"; such is their commitment, indeed, that they are "prepared to prevent nuclear war for any reason whatsoever."

Thoughts of this sort, of course, have been expressed by Georgi Arbatov and other professionals engaged in the battle to influence Western opinions and policies. But these sentiments are not entirely consistent with the actual doctrine that guides the Red Army. Though Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the outspoken military theoretician, was in 1984 removed as chief of the General Staff, his writings on military affairs continue to be published. Ogarkov is the editor of the eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, published

* See Norman M. Naimark and David E. Powell, "Moscow's Cult of Militarism," *National Interest*, Summer 1986.

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in 1979, and his article in that work on "Military Strategy" is particularly informative:

> It is taken into account that with modern means of destruction world nuclear war might be comparatively short. However . . . it is not excluded that it might be protracted also. . . . The Soviet Union and fraternal states in this event will have, in comparison with imperialist states, definite advantages. . . . This creates for them objective possibilities for achieving victory. However, for the realization of these possibilities it is necessary to prepare the country and the armed forces thoroughly and in good time.*

An interest in posing a credible threat of nuclear destruction to any and all chosen enemies does not appear to be peculiar to the Soviet Union's military leadership. To the contrary: it is reflected in the viewpoint of the party ruling the Soviet state, and has been so for quite some time. As the Western European experience of the early 1980's should surely attest, not even engaging in détente spares a foreign state from Soviet efforts at nuclear extortion. Even after the demise of détente with the United States, the Soviet Union's détente with Western Europe continued on its own. Yet during the negotiations preceding NATO's decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles, Western European governments were subjected to the most explicit and violent nuclear threats by ranking Soviet officials. From the Soviet standpoint, there is nothing paradoxical or extraordinary about issuing such threats to the USSR's "partners" in détente. Indeed, as currently conceived, it would be more accurate to suggest that the Soviet policy of détente cannot be pursued without the subjecting of foreign states to nuclear blackmail.

ARMS CONTROL is foremost among the many items on the Soviet agenda for détente. What, however, is the objective of such negotiations from the Soviet standpoint? One may best appreciate the Soviet interest in arms control by considering why Soviet authorities have reacted with such undisguised hostility and alarm to the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative.

The official Soviet position on the SDI program has been carefully and repeatedly outlined in the Soviet media and by Soviet professionals abroad. It would not matter, from the Soviet perspective, if the resulting American defense system against incoming missiles were less than completely effective (or if the Soviet Union were in the midst of furious development of its own version of the system, as happens to be the case). It would not even matter if the United States were to donate to the USSR a system identical to the one it would ultimately install for its own defense.

From the Soviet standpoint, what matters is that the system of strategic defense the Reagan administration has embarked upon promises to restrict the Soviet Union's ability to conduct a foreign policy based upon nuclear blackmail. For any policy or invention that would serve to deprive Soviet authorities of their ability to manipulate the threat of nuclear war would correspondingly push their country toward a status more consistent with its economic base. Not surprisingly, this is a prospect they are loath to entertain.

The Strategic Defense Initiative poses an additional danger to Soviet interests. For all the attention he pays to arms control, Bialer neglects to inform his readers about Soviet violations of existing arms treaties—much less to mention the evidence that such violations are systematic and premeditated. In contrast to the current arms-control process, a strategic system of the sort envisioned by SDI would afford no such opportunities for summary violation. The very existence of the system would be its own "verification"—in this case, a verification which would relieve the United States of any need to presume that the Soviet Union would honor its treaty obligations.

In a curious exercise in logic, Bialer argues that the Strategic Defense Initiative would increase the threat of nuclear war. But Bialer's position is perhaps not so illogical as it would at first appear. Bialer has simply chosen to elevate "the prevention of nuclear war" to the first priority of American foreign policy. From this, and from his particular interpretation of what preventing nuclear war entails, many consequences inexorably follow. The United States, he writes, must learn to live with a level of insecurity it would have found intolerable in the past. It must not only accept "strategic parity" with the USSR, but recognize Soviet superiority in conventional forces in a number of important regions (he mentions Europe and parts of the Far East). To be sure, when Soviet actions imperil American "vital interests," it is permissible to attempt to offset them, but Bialer leaves "vital interests" conspicuously undefined, and hence subject to ongoing amendment.

Thus, *The Soviet Paradox* leads its readers to the verge of a most unusual bargain. In return for the promise of inexorable Soviet decline in the years to come, Bialer's analysis seems to request from the United States a purposely diminished, and largely reactive, role in international affairs today. Bialer warns that the alternative to such a "readjustment" would be "American failure" in the world arena. It is an interesting warning. But the failure he would protect us against and the role he would have us assume are both in some sense artificial. Not only are they based upon a misreading of key aspects of Soviet military and foreign policy, but they require as well that we subscribe to the definition of the threat of nuclear war put forward by the Soviet Union.

* Quoted in R.V. Daniels, ed., *A Documentary History of Communism*, Vol. 2 (University of New England Press, 1984).

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Bialer evidently attributes little value to the *principle* of resisting nuclear blackmail, and sees little benefit to be derived from attempting to cleanse international relations of the poison with which the programmatic introduction of blackmail has necessarily infused them. But to embrace this posture, it may be argued, would by itself constitute a vast sacrifice of the American interest in the world, and would occasion a further diminution of the institutions and values that Americans hold dear.

VI

Soviet policy is today at a critical juncture. At issue is not whether the party under Gorbachev will "democratize," or whether the economy will "reform." These hardy perennials of hopeful discussion in the West have survived sixty-five winters with the Soviet state, and will no doubt last a good many more. In Moscow itself, what is at issue today are instead the steps necessary to halt and reverse what is taken to be a relative decline in Soviet power. In Soviet parlance, the "correlation of forces" in the world seems unexpectedly, but unmistakably, to have shifted in recent years against the USSR. The Gorbachev Politburo is resolved to embark upon a path that will restore a more favorable trend of events.

One may appreciate the enormous difficulties Soviet rulers face in this task. Their official ideology, while perhaps integral to the effort to preserve and expand the sway of their state, today appears to have little emotive power of its own. Their economy is troubled, and relative to the countries against which Soviet rulers may envision themselves in conflict, getting weaker. Even the military option may, by itself, offer limited opportunities, for even so directed an economy as the USSR's can pursue the quest for military ascendancy only at a long-range cost. And one cannot count on chance to reverse a trend in the "correlation of forces"; for even in a state with historical inevitability on its side, luck may prove an unreliable ally.

There is, however, at least one promising (if delicate) strategy by which Soviet rulers may hope to regain the momentum they clearly feel the USSR has recently lost—and indeed achieve an ascendancy the USSR has not yet enjoyed. This would be to harness the power of the West to promote the Soviet Union's own objectives. If it were possible to channel Western policies in directions and into activities that serve the Soviet purpose, the USSR could prop itself on the backs of its enemies, and elevate itself through their exchange. Through such jujitsu, the Soviet Union might even use the strength of its foes to accomplish their weakening or subjugation.

What such a strategy would require is that the public and the governments of the Soviet Union's most powerful enemies be convinced that the things the Soviet Union so dearly wished them to do were actually in their own best interest. This would necessitate an ambitious and complicated battle for hearts and minds, a battle for the commanding heights of Western political will. For any hope of success it would have to be waged relentlessly, on many fronts at once.

The Soviet Union wishes Westerners to believe that it is not a totalitarian state. It wishes them to believe that Western leaders, for reasons of their own, exaggerate the Soviet threat. It wishes them to believe that the Soviet Union has an active interest in preventing nuclear war. It wishes them to believe that engaging in "ideological confrontation" can only sour international relations.

The Soviet Union needs greater access to Western trade and credit to aid its own economy. It needs an arms-control agreement with the United States that will maintain its position of "strategic parity." It needs somehow to eliminate the system of strategic defense which the United States is currently attempting to develop.

In accepting these arguments and policy preferences, Bialer is by no means unique. Many ordinary Americans, and a good number of political figures, subscribe to a very similar viewpoint. But in the case of Seweryn Bialer, there is a difference. Active as he was in the transformation of Poland into a Soviet satellite, in the Soviet-bloc security apparatus, and in the preparation of East-bloc propaganda against the United States; familiar as he was, and once again is, with the cadre that is now leading the Soviet Union's ideological struggle against the United States and the West—in his case, one can only say: he should know better.

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Why Blacks, Women & Jews Are Not Mentioned in the Constitution

Robert A. Goldwin

THE bicentennial we celebrate this year honors the Constitution written in 1787, that is, the original, unamended Constitution. Some well-meaning citizens have denounced celebrating or even praising that Constitution. They contend that its many severe defects should be considered a matter of national shame. For example, lacking the Thirteenth Amendment, the original Constitution permitted slavery to continue; lacking the Nineteenth Amendment, it did not secure the right of women to vote; and, lacking the First Amendment, it provided no protection for religious freedom, not to mention other rights. Why, they ask, should we celebrate a constitution that treated blacks as less than human, that left women out, and that did not combat religious intolerance?

These charges would be distressing if true, but fortunately they are false. They stem from a misreading of the document, a misreading that comes from not appreciating the importance of knowing how to read the original Constitution on subjects it does not mention.

Why bother with subjects not mentioned? Because, as a matter of fact, we have no choice. The list of unusually important subjects the Constitution does not mention is very long. The fact that they have not been mentioned has not prevented cases and controversies from arising, nor has it relieved courts and legislatures of the duty of determining what is constitutional with regard to them. The words "education" and "school," for example, do not occur in the Constitution, but even so the courts have been busy for decades deciding school controversies. There is no mention of labor unions, corporations, political parties, the air force, radio and television broadcasting, telecommunications, and so on, but the courts deliberate constitutional controversies on these subjects all the time. The list of subjects not mentioned in the text of the Constitution also includes words like "abortion," "contraceptives," and "sodomy," and phrases like "right to privacy," "substantive due process," and the "high wall separating church and state"—all matters on which the Supreme Court has pronounced.

The inescapable fact is that many subjects not mentioned in the Constitution must be interpreted, unavoidably, by anyone for whom the meaning of the Constitution is important. My argument is that there are valuable lessons to be learned about how we are constituted as a nation, and what in the original Constitution is worth celebrating, by devoting serious attention to subjects not mentioned in it. For that purpose, I propose close attention to three such subjects—blacks, women, and Jews.

Blacks

WHAT to do about black slavery was a major concern in the Constitutional Convention; it was discussed at length in the debates, with frequent direct reference to both slavery and race. But neither term was mentioned when it came to the writing. No words indicating race or color, black or white, occur in the text of the Constitution, and neither do the words "slave" or "slavery." Circumlocutions are used in the text to avoid the use of any form of the word "slave"; for example, "person held to service or labor," and "such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit."

In fact, the word "slavery" entered the Constitution for the first time, after the Civil War, in the Thirteenth Amendment, which thereafter prohibited slavery anywhere in the United States. The words "race" and "color" were first used in the Fifteenth Amendment for the purpose of securing the right of all citizens to vote. The words "black" and "white" have never been part of the Constitution.

What difference does it make, one may well ask, that the words were not used, if the ugly fact is that black slavery existed and was given constitutional status? Consider, for example, perhaps the most notorious and, I would contend, the most misunderstood constitutional provision re-

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lating to black slavery, the famous "three-fifths clause."

As Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, put it recently in criticism of the original Constitution: "Article I, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution starts off with a quota: three-fifths. That is what black folks were in that original Constitution." Hooks is not alone in this view. The historian John Hope Franklin has written of this same clause that the Founders "degraded the human spirit by equating five black men with three white men"; and the constitutional-law professor Lino Graglia contends that the provision "that a slave was to be counted as three-fifths of a free person for purposes of representation" shows "how little the Constitution had to do with aspirations for brotherhood or human dignity."

These three agree in expressing the widely-held view of this clause that, for the Founders, blacks were less than human, somehow or other only a fraction of a human being. The constitutional clause they are referring to reads as follows:

> Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.

In short, count all of the free persons and indentured servants, do not count the Indians, and then add three-fifths of the slaves. The question is, what, if anything, does that provision tell us about what the Founders thought about slavery and about blacks as blacks and as human beings?

James Madison said, in the convention, that slavery was the central problem. Southern delegates emphasized that there was no chance of union including the South without accepting the long-established existence of slavery in the slave-holding states. But slavery was a flat contradiction of the principles of the Declaration of Indepence, the principles that are the bedrock foundation of the Constitution—the primacy of the rights of individuals, their equality with respect to their rights, and the consequence that the consent of the governed is the only legitimate source of political power. Almost all the delegates were fully aware that slavery profoundly contradicted these principles and therefore had no proper place in the Constitution.

If, on the one hand, the continuation of slavery was unavoidable, and, on the other hand, it was a contradiction of the most fundamental principles of the Constitution the delegates wanted and thought necessary, what could principled anti-slavery delegates do? One effective and consistent thing they could do was try to make the political base of slavery as weak as possible, to diminish its influence and improve the chances of eradicating it sometime in the future.

The struggle that took place in the convention was between Southern delegates trying to strengthen the constitutional supports for slavery and Northern delegates trying to weaken them. That issue—the initial and subsequent political strength of slavery—was in contention on the question of representation in the House of Representatives. It was agreed that every state, regardless of size, would have two Senators. But the number of representatives from any state would be apportioned according to its population, and that raised the question of whom to include in the count.

Slave-state delegates were in favor of including every slave, just as they would any other inhabitant. Madison's notes indicate that the delegates from South Carolina "insisted that blacks be included in the rule of representation, equally with the Whites."

On the other side, delegates from the non-slave states were opposed to counting the slaves, because it would give the South more votes and because it made a mockery of the principle of representation to count persons who had no influence whatsoever on the lawmaking process and who therefore were not "represented" in the legislature in any meaningful sense of the word. Counting the slaves for purposes of representation would also give the slave states an incentive to increase their slave population instead of decreasing it. In short, considering the chief purpose of this clause in the Constitution, it is obvious that an anti-slavery delegate would not want to count the slaves at all.

In the end, two things were done. First, it was agreed to use the census for two opposed purposes: representation and direct taxation. As the count of persons went up in any state, seats in Congress and direct taxes to be paid went up as well; as the count of persons went down, both the number of Congressmen and the direct taxes to be paid went down. Combining these two, and thereby establishing opposing incentives, seems clearly intended to provide a restraint on a state's either getting too much representation or avoiding paying a fair share of direct taxes. The additional compromise was that three-fifths of the slaves would be included in the population count, as the alternative to including all or none.

If none of the slaves had been included, as Northern delegates wanted, the slave states would have had only 41 percent of seats in the House. If all of the slaves had been included, as Southerners wanted, the slave states would have had 50 percent of the seats. By agreeing to include three-fifths, the slave states ended up with 47 percent—not negligible, but still a minority likely to be outvoted on slavery issues.

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However the slavery provisions look to us today, they had to be explained to concerned citizens in the South as well as the North. Charles Pinckney reported to the South Carolina ratifying convention that he thought they had "made the best terms for the security of [slavery] it was in our power to make. We would have made better if we could, but on the whole, I do not think them bad." Northern delegates were, at the same time, saying the opposite in a very similar fashion. James Wilson reported to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that he thought they had succeeded in "laying the foundation for banishing slavery out of this country," but he regretted that "the period is more distant than I could wish."

In brief, both North and South, in trying to weaken or strengthen slavery, had sought more and gotten less than each had wanted, but for the sake of union had accepted a result that was "not bad."

The struggle between pro-slavery and anti-slavery forces for control of Congress, begun in the Constitutional Convention and continued relentlessly for more than seventy years thereafter, was the major cause of the Civil War, and persisted long after that war and the constitutional amendments that followed it had ended slavery.

But to understand what the original Constitution had to say about blacks, the point is that the "three-fifths clause" had nothing at all to do with measuring the human worth of blacks. *Northern* delegates did not want black slaves included, not because they thought them unworthy of being counted, but because they wanted to weaken the slaveholding power in Congress. *Southern* delegates wanted every slave to count "equally with the Whites," not because they wanted to proclaim that black slaves were human beings on an equal footing with free white persons, but because they wanted to increase the pro-slavery voting power in Congress. The humanity of blacks was not the subject of the three-fifths clause; voting power in Congress was the subject.

Thus, the three-fifths clause is irrelevant to the question of what the Founders thought of the slaves as human beings. What is relevant are two indisputable facts: in the original Constitution there is no mention of color, race, or slavery, and nowhere in it are slaves called anything but "persons."

There is nothing particularly new in the point that the original Constitution does not mention slavery. Luther Martin, a Maryland delegate to the Constitutional Convention who opposed ratification, explained to the Maryland legislature in 1787 that the authors of the Constitution did not use the word slave because they "anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious in the ears of Americans." And Frederick Douglass, the great black leader and orator, commented on this silence in 1852, arguing against the "slander" on the memory of the Founders that the original Constitution was pro-slavery. "In that instrument," he said, "I hold there is neither warrant, license, nor sanction of the hateful thing." And a major element of his evidence is that "neither *slavery, slaveholding,* nor *slave* can anywhere be found in it." "Now, take the Constitution," he concluded, "according to its plain reading, and I defy the presentation of a single pro-slavery clause in it."

These two very different speakers, Luther Martin and Frederick Douglass, knew this fact about the silence of the Constitution about slavery, and so did many, many others. But apparently it needed to be pointed out in their times, and it needs to be pointed out today. And especially when we recall that there is an equal silence about race, do we see the importance of reminding ourselves about this point that seems to have been persistently forgotten by most Americans, even by unusually knowledgeable ones like Benjamin Hooks and John Hope Franklin.

DESPITE the existence of slavery and the persistence of it for seventy-five years more, the Founders left us with a constitutional document that has accommodated a very different order of things with regard to the place in our society of the descendants of former slaves. I do not contend that delegates foresaw the present-day consequences of emancipation, that the descendants of black slaves would become voting citizens and officeholders throughout the nation. But it is true that the Founders left in their text no obstacles to the profound improvements that have come about. In what remained in the text after the addition of the amendments abolishing slavery, there is no residue of racism, however much of it may remain in the society itself.

Therefore when the time came to terminate official segregation, we had to purge the racial provisions from federal regulations like those segregating the armed forces, and from state constitutions and state and local laws—but not from the Constitution of the United States. In fact, lawyers and judges were able to argue for profound changes by asserting that they were in accord with and demanded by the Constitution. We did not have to change it to fit new circumstances and times. Instead, the argument could be made, and was made, that conditions had to be changed to fit the Constitution. In that historic national effort, it spelled a very great difference that there was no racism in the original Constitution.

We must acknowledge that there was indeed strong and widespread racism among many Americans that helped to sustain for so long the vicious system of black slavery and its century-long aftermath of racial segregation, discrimination, persecution, and hatred. How best can we understand the meaning of the disjunction between the racism widespread in the society, and the absence of it in the written Constitution?

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If a written constitution is not in close accord with the way the society itself is in fact constituted, it will be irrelevant to the everyday life of the people. But it must be more than an accurate depiction of how the society is constituted. A constitution will be a failure if it is no more than a beautiful portrait of an ugly society. A good constitution provides guidance and structure for the improvement of the society. A good constitution is designed to make the political society better than it is, and the citizens better persons. It must be close enough to the institutions and the people as they are to be relevant to the working of the society in its everyday activities, but it should also have what might be called formative features, a capacity to make us better if we live according to its provisions and adhere to its institutional arrangements. The constitutional goal for Americans would be to develop a nation of self-governing, liberty-loving citizens in a new kind of political society where the fundamental rights of all would be secure—and that would mean a society *where slavery would have no place.*

In that formative way of thinking about the task of constitution-writing, it seems entirely possible that the most foresighted and skillful of the Founders sought to make a constitution that—while accepting and even protecting slavery for a time, as an unavoidable evil, the price to pay for union—tried to make provisions for its ultimate extinction, and even gave thought to the constitutional preparations for a better society that would eventually be free of it. In that respect the original Constitution was better than the political society it constituted.

We would face a very different situation in our own time if there had been in the original Constitution any evidence of the kind of thinking ascribed to the Founders by Chief Justice Taney in the *Dred Scott* case. Taney said that the Founders thought that blacks were not included in the declaration that "all men are created equal," and that blacks were "so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." But Taney was wrong; there is no such racism to be found in the Constitution, then or now, not a word of it. Those who wrongly now assert, however laudable their motives, that the "three-fifths clause" was racist, that it somehow denied the humanity of blacks, do a disservice to the truth, first of all, and also to the Constitution, to the nation, and to the cause of justice and equality for black Americans.

Women

THE fact that blacks are not mentioned in the original Constitution requires some explanation because there are several provisions obviously concerning black slavery. But no such explanation is required in the case of women. Not only are women not mentioned in the original Constitution, there is no provision anywhere that applies to women as a distinct group. To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence that the subject of women was ever mentioned in the Constitutional Convention.

This has led to the charge, heard frequently during the prolonged debate over the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, that "women were left out of the Constitution." The fact is, however, that women were not left out; they have always been included in all of the constitutional protections provided to all persons, fully and equally, without any basis in the text for discrimination on the basis of sex. How were they included without being mentioned?

The place to start is that famous provision we considered previously, Article I, section 2, clause 3, describing who will be counted for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. The phrase "the whole number of free persons" is chiefly where the women are, but they are also among "those bound to service for a term of years," and even among taxed Indians and "all other persons." It is quite remarkable that they are not excluded from any one of these groups because, in 1787, women did not vote or hold office anywhere in the United States and were excluded from every level of government. What would be unremarkable, and typical of the time, would be a clear exclusion of women.

For example, in the Northwest Ordinance we encounter provisions of this sort:

> So soon as there shall be five thousand free *male* inhabitants, of full age, in the district . . . they shall receive authority . . . to elect representatives . . . to represent them in the general assembly. . . . Provided also, that a freehold in fifty acres of land . . . shall be necessary to qualify *a man* as an elector of a representative. [Emphasis added]

Under the terms of this famous ordinance, written in the same year as the Constitution and reaffirmed by the first Congress, which included James Madison and many other delegates to the Constitutional Convention, those who are counted for purposes of representation are men only, and voters are spoken of directly as men. That was, for the time, not at all exceptional. What is exceptional is the provision in the Constitution that everyone shall be counted. "The whole number of free persons" includes males and females. In the original Constitution, unlike the Northwest Ordinance, the words "man" or "male" do not occur, nor does any other noun or adjective denoting sex. By not mentioning women or men, speaking instead only of persons, the Constitution must mean that every right, privilege, and protection afforded to persons in the Constitution is afforded to female persons as well as male persons, equally.

The terms used throughout the original Con-

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stitution are consistently what are now called non-sexist: for example, "electors," "citizens," "members," "inhabitants," "officers," "representatives," "persons." There are pronouns—"he," "his," and "himself"—but in the entire text of the original Constitution, there is not a single noun or adjective that denotes sex.

There are some who think that because of these pronouns, all masculine, the Founders meant that only men were to hold national office, and most certainly the Presidency. But it can be shown that the text itself presents no obstacle whatever to having a woman in the office of President or any other national office, because these pronouns can clearly be read as generic or neuter or genderless—or whatever we call a pronoun capable of denoting either sex.

The Constitution says of the President that "*He* shall hold *his* office during the term of four years" (the emphases here and throughout this section are all added). It says that when a bill passed by Congress is presented to the President, "if *he* approves *he* shall sign it, but if not *he* shall return it," etc. There are similar usages of the pronoun for the Vice President and for members of Congress, and the question is, are those pronouns exclusively masculine and therefore a definite indication that these offices are to be held by men only, or could they be genderless pronouns, leaving open the possibility that the antecedent is meant to be either a man or a woman? If the latter is the case, as is my contention, then there is no obstacle in the Constitution, and there never has been, to women occupying any office under the Constitution of the United States, including the Presidency, and every protection and every right extended to men by the Constitution is extended equally to women.

My argument rests on several provisions where the masculine pronouns must certainly be read as referring to women as well as men. Consider Article IV, section 2, clause 2, providing for the return of fugitives from justice. "A person" charged with a crime who flees from justice and is found in another state shall be delivered up on demand of the governor "of the State from which *he* fled. . . ." If the "he" in this clause is assumed to mean men only, and not women, we get the absurd result that male fugitives from justice must be returned to face criminal charges, but not female fugitives.

We find similar examples in the amendments. The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against *himself*." The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against *him*; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in *his* favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for *his* defense." Will anyone seriously contend, just because the masculine pronouns are used here, that these protections were extended only to males accused in criminal prosecutions, and that the Constitution means that accused women cannot claim the same rights to confront their accusers, to compel the presence of witnesses, to be represented by a defense lawyer, and to be protected against self-incrimination?

All these examples demonstrate the absurdity of interpreting the masculine pronouns as applying to men only. And if the masculine pronouns in these provisions are genderless, then it is at least plausible that the same pronouns are genderless when used elsewhere in the same text. And if they are, and since, in fact, there is not one noun or adjective in the Constitution as ratified that in any way refers to sex, we must conclude that women are included in the Constitution, on an equal footing with men, as persons, citizens, electors, etc.—and always have been.

We are speaking, of course, of a written document, the text of the original Constitution, which is not the same as asserting that women enjoyed political equality in practice in 1787, or for a long time thereafter. Women's suffrage in the United States seems to have begun in 1838, when women in Kentucky voted in school elections. Women voted on an equal basis with men for the first time anywhere in the United States in 1869, in the Wyoming Territory. But as late as 1914, only ten more states, in addition to the state of Wyoming, had accorded women the right to vote. It was not until the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920 that the right to vote was made secure for women. That amendment provides that:

> The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

First we must observe that this article was an addition to the Constitution, but it amended nothing and was intended to amend nothing in the Constitution of the United States. No provision in the text had to be changed or deleted, because there was never any provision in the Constitution limiting or denying the right of women to vote. The barriers to voting by women had always been in the state constitutions or laws.

It may very well be that the Founders never contemplated the possibility of a woman as President, or even women voting on an equal basis with men. Nevertheless, the text they adopted and the American people ratified presents no obstacle whatsoever to the changes that have occurred.

Jews

THE significance of not being mentioned in the Constitution becomes clearest when we consider the last of the three unmentioned subjects—Jews. Most of us, when we think of the Constitution and freedom of religion, think of the double

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security provided by the First Amendment, against "an establishment of religion" and for the "free exercise thereof." These protections were not, of course, part of the original Constitution. The original Constitution mentions religion just once, but that one provision is remarkable. Article VI, section 3, says simply that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."

Jews had suffered persecution almost everywhere in the world for millennia. Universally despised, they had been beaten, tortured, murdered, and hounded from country to country and even continent to continent. The best they enjoyed, here and there, now and then, was a kind of safeguarded second-class status, where by one sort of decree or another they were permitted to engage in certain professions or businesses, or to live unmolested behind walls and gates in one or another section of a city. But these occasionally favorable arrangements were always precarious and often short-lived, never theirs by right but only by indulgence, not because they were entitled to decent treatment as citizens or subjects but because someone in authority had reason to protect them. Never did they have the security of political rights, not to mention the political power that comes with voting and holding office.

The question of religious tests was an old one in America and had been deliberated in every state from the moment of independence, and even before. At the time of the founding, almost every state had some form of religious test, but Jews were not the only target or even the main one. The chief concern was to bar Catholics in predominantly Protestant states, to bar some sects of Protestants in other states, and incidentally to exclude the very small numbers of "Jews, Turks, and infidels," as the saying went.

There were religious tests in the constitutions of at least eleven states, but the tests varied. Delaware required state officers to swear a Trinitarian oath; Georgia required that they be of the Protestant religion; Maryland demanded belief "in the Christian religion"—thus including Catholics as well as Protestants, but excluding Jews and nonbelievers; and New York discriminated against Catholics but was the only state in which Jews could hold office.

Against this background we see the history-making significance of the provision prohibiting religious tests in the Constitution. Religious toleration was amazingly prevalent in America, given the intensity of religious conviction observable everywhere, but political equality for members of different religious groups was rare. That is, provisions for the free exercise of religion were common in the state constitutions, but political equality was a different story. The free exercise of religion happened in church or synagogue; it did not assure the right to vote or hold office. Nevertheless, for whatever reasons, in a nation that had almost universal religious testing for state offices, the delegates proposed and the states ratified a constitution barring religious tests for holding national office.

Add to this one other fact, less easily discernible. That fact is that Jews are not mentioned in the Constitution. As we view things now, that Jews are not mentioned is no more remarkable than that Baptists or Roman Catholics or Muslims or any others are also not mentioned. But Jews had never been treated simply as "persons," let alone "citizens," anywhere in the world for more than 1500 years. By not mentioning them, that is, by not singling them out, the Constitution made Jews full citizens of a nation for the first time in all Diaspora history. By this silence, coupled with the prohibition of religious tests, the Founders "opened a door" to Jews and to all other sects as well.

THE Constitution of the United States is unusual, and perhaps unique, among the constitutions of the world in the way that it protects the rights of the people. The unspoken principles—at least unspoken in the Constitution—are that rights are inherent in individuals, not in the groups they belong to; that we are all equal as human beings in the sense that no matter what our color, sex, national origin, or religion, we are equal in the possession of the rights that governments are instituted to protect; and, finally, that as a consequence, the only source of legitimate political power is the consent of the governed. Because these principles, all stemming from the primacy of individual rights, are the unmentioned foundation of the Constitution, it is not only unnecessary to mention race, sex, or religion, it is inconsistent and harmful.

In short, the reason no group of any sort included in the nation it founded is mentioned in the Constitution—originally and now—is that the Founders designed a better way to make sure that no one was left out, and that everyone was in on a basis of equality.

To anyone who asks why we should celebrate the bicentennial of this Constitution, let that be the answer.

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Crazy in the Streets

Paul S. Appelbaum

THEY are an inescapable presence in urban America. In New York City they live in subway tunnels and on steam grates, and die in cardboard boxes on windswept street corners. The Los Angeles City Council has opened its chambers to them, allowing them to seek refuge from the Southern California winter on its hard marble floors. Pioneer Square in Seattle, Lafayette Park in Washington, the old downtown in Atlanta have all become places of refuge for these pitiable figures, so hard to tell apart: clothes tattered, skins stained by the streets, backs bent in a perpetual search for something edible, smokable, or tradable that may have found its way to the pavement below.

Riddled by psychotic illnesses, abandoned by the systems that once pledged to care for them as long as they needed care, they are the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, the detritus of the latest fashion in mental-health policy. The lucky ones live in board-and-care homes where they can be assured of their next meal; perhaps they have a place to go a few hours a week for support, coffee, even an effort at restoring their productive capacity. Those less fortunate live in our public places, existing on the beneficence of their fellow men and God. It is extraordinary how quickly we have become immune to their presence. Where we might once have felt compassion, revulsion, or fear, now we feel almost nothing at all.

There are times, of course, when the reality of the deinstitutionalized breaks through our defenses. Three days after the Statue of Liberty extravaganza in New York harbor last July, in the shadow of the icon of huddled masses, a psychotic man ran amok on the Staten Island ferry, slashing at enemies in a war entirely of his own imagining. Two victims died. Investigations ensued. For a moment we became aware of the world of shelters and emergency rooms, a world where even those willing to accept help and clearly in need of it are turned away because the state has deliberately dismantled the system where they might once have received care. Briefly, the curious wondered, how did this come to be?

Like its victims, the policy of deinstitutionalization has been taken for granted. It is difficult to recall that mentally ill persons ever were treated differently. Yet the process that came to be called deinstitutionalization (no one knows when the term was coined) only began in the mid-1950's, and did not move into high gear until a decade later. Although the term itself suggests a unitary policy, deinstitutionalization has had complex roots, and at different times has sought diverse goals. Its failure, however, was all but preordained by several of the forces that gave it birth. Any attempt to correct the debacle that has attended the contraction—some might say implosion—of our public mental-health systems will require an understanding of those forces.

II

THE idea that the states bear some responsibility for the care of the mentally ill was not immediately obvious to the founders of this country. Through the colonial and federalist periods, care of psychotic and other dependent persons was the responsibility of local communities. They responded then as many of them do today. Almshouses and jails were overrun with the mentally ill, who, though thrown together with the criminal, tubercular, and mendicant, were often treated with a cruelty visited on none of the others.

Change came in the second quarter of the 19th century. New interest was stimulated among a small number of physicians in a system of treatment of the mentally ill begun in a Quaker hospital in England and called "moral" care. The name—with its ironic allusion to the immorality that had governed most other efforts to deal with the mentally ill—denoted a therapeutic system based on the radical idea that the mentally ill were more like us than unlike. If they were treated with kindness, encouraged to establish order in their lives, given the opportunity to work at productive trades, and provided with models of behavior, their mental illnesses might dissipate.

The belief that the mentally ill could be treated, and thus need not be relegated to the

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cellars of local jails, was championed by Dorothea Dix, a spinster Sunday-school teacher from Massachusetts, who traversed the country, cataloguing the barbarities inflicted on mentally ill persons and petitioning legislatures to establish facilities where moral treatment might be applied. Her efforts and those of others resulted in the creation of a network of state-operated hospitals. As the states assumed ever wider responsibility for the mentally ill, the hospitals grew in size, absorbing the denizens of the jails and poorhouses.

In the wake of the Civil War, as the burdens created by waves of immigration stood unrelieved by increases in funding, the public hospitals surrendered the goal of active treatment. They continued to expand, but changed into enormous holding units, to which the mentally ill were sent and from which many never emerged. Once again sliding to the bottom of the list of social priorities, the mentally ill were often treated with brutality. At best, they suffered from benign indifference to anything more than their needs for shelter and food.

Such had been the condition of public mental hospitals for nearly eighty years as World War II came to a close. Periodic efforts at reform had left them largely untouched. Over one-half million patients languished in their wards, accounting for half of all the occupants of hospital beds in the country. The state hospitals had swelled to bloated proportions. Pilgrim State Hospital on Long Island, New York's largest, held nearly 20,000 patients. St. Elizabeths in Washington, D.C., the only mental hospital operated directly by the federal government, had its own railroad and post office. Most facilities, located away from major population centers, used patients to work large farms on their grounds, thus defraying a good part of the costs of running the institution.

A new generation of psychiatrists, returning from the war, began to express their disquiet with the system as it was. They had seen how rapid-treatment models in hospitals close to the front and the introduction of group therapy had drastically cut the morbidity of psychiatric conditions evident earlier in World War I. With the belief that patients need not spend their lives sitting idly in smoky, locked wards, they determined to tackle a situation which Albert Deutsch had described as the "shame of the states."

These psychiatrists and their disciples, emphasizing the desirability of preparing patients for return to the community, began to introduce reforms into the state systems. Wards that had been locked for nearly a century were opened; male and female patients were allowed to mix. Active treatment programs were begun, and many patients, particularly elderly ones, were screened prior to admission, with efforts made to divert them where possible to more appropriate settings. The effects soon became evident. More than a century of inexorable growth in state-hospital populations began to reverse itself in 1955, when the number of residents peaked at just over 558,000. The first phase of deinstitutionalization was under way.

A second factor was introduced at this point. In 1952, French scientists searching for a better antihistamine discovered chlorpromazine, the first medication with the power to mute and even reverse the symptoms of psychosis. Introduced in this country in 1954 under the trade name Thorazine (elsewhere the medication was called Largactil, a name that better conveys the enormous hope that accompanied its debut), the drug rapidly and permanently altered the treatment of severe mental illness. The ineffective treatments of the past, from bleedings and purgings, cold baths and whirling chairs, to barbiturates and lobotomies, were supplanted by a genuinely effective medication. Thorazine's limitations and side-effects would become better known in the future; for now the emphasis was on its ability to suppress the most flagrant symptoms of psychosis.

Patients bedeviled by hallucinatory voices and ridden by irrational fears, who previously could have been managed only in inpatient units, now became tractable. They still suffered from schizophrenia, still manifested the blunted emotions, confused thinking, odd postures that the disease inflicts. But the symptoms which had made it impossible for them to live outside the hospital could, in many cases, be controlled.

Psychiatrists still argue over whether the new ideas of hospital and community treatment or the introduction of Thorazine provided the initial push that lowered state-hospital censuses. The truth is that both factors probably played a role, with the medications allowing the new psychiatric enthusiasm for community-based care to be applied to a larger group of patients than might otherwise have been the case. The effects of the first stage of deinstitutionalization can be seen in the figures for patients resident in state psychiatric facilities. By 1965 that number had decreased gradually but steadily to 475,000.

III

UNTIL the mid-1960's, deinstitutionalization had been a pragmatic innovation; its driving force was the conviction that some patients could be treated and maintained in the community. Although large-scale studies supporting this belief were lacking, psychiatrists' everyday experiences confirmed its validity. Further, control of the process of discharging patients was solidly in the hands of mental-health professionals. By the end of the first decade of deinstitutionalization, however, the process was in the midst of being transformed.

What had begun as an empirical venture was now about to become a movement. Deinstitutionalization was captured by the proponents of a

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variety of ideologies, who sensed its value for their causes. Although their underlying philosophies were often at odds, they agreed on what seemed a simple statement of mission: all patients should be treated in the community or in short-term facilities. The state hospitals should be closed.

Some of the earliest advocates of this position were themselves psychiatrists. Unlike their predecessors, who first let light and air into the back wards, these practitioners were not content to whittle away at the number of patients in state hospitals. They sought systemic changes. The pragmatism of the psychiatrists, persuaded on their return from the war that many patients could be treated without long-term hospitalization, was transmuted into a rigid credo. No patient should be confined in a massive state facility, it was now declared. All treatment should take place in the community.

These advocates, who saw themselves as part of a new subspecialty of community psychiatry, were heavily influenced by the sociologists of institutional life, notably Erving Goffman, the author of *Asylums*. That book, based on a year of observing patients and staff at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C., catalogued the ways, subtle and blatant, in which patients were forced by the demands of a large institution into an unthinking conformity of behavior and thought. The rules that constrained their behavior, Goffman wrote, derived not from a consideration of therapeutic needs, but from the desires of hospital staff members to simplify their own tasks. From Goffman's work a new syndrome was defined—"institutionalism": the progressive loss of functional abilities caused by the denial of opportunities to make choices for oneself, and leading to a state of chronic dependency. Robbed of their ability to function on their own, state-hospital patients had no alternative but to remain in an environment in which their lives were directed by others.

Community psychiatry embellished Goffman's charges. Articles in professional journals began to allege that the chronic disability accompanying psychiatric illnesses, particularly schizophrenia, was not a result of the disease process itself, but an effect of archaic treatment methods in which patients were uprooted from their own communities. With the attachments of a lifetime severed, often irretrievably, patients lost the incentive and then the will to maintain their abilities to relate to others and function in social environments. Thus, state hospitals, in addition to subjecting patients to abominable physical conditions—the stuff of exposés since the 1860's—were exacerbating and embedding the very symptoms they purported to treat. The only way to prevent the development of a new generation of dysfunctional chronic patients was to close the hospitals.

Of course, alternative places of treatment would have to be created. In 1963, the new community psychiatrists persuaded a President already interested in mental-health issues and a receptive Congress that, with a new approach, chronicity could be averted. The consensus that emerged was embodied in the Community Mental Health Center Act of 1963. With seed money from the federal government, the law encouraged the development of outpatient clinics in every area of the country. Ultimately, it was hoped, no citizen would live outside one of the 2,000 designated "catchment areas" in which community-based treatment could be provided.

Psychiatric proponents of closing the state hospitals found unlikely allies in a group of civil-libertarian attorneys who were now turning their attention to the mentally ill. Fresh from victories in the civil-rights movement, and armed with potent new constitutional interpretations that restricted the power of the state to infringe personal liberties, these lawyers sought the dismantling of state hospitals as the first step in eliminating all coercive treatment of the mentally ill. They sought this end not simply because they believed that encouraging autonomy reduced chronicity, as the community psychiatrists claimed, but because in their own hierarchy of values individual autonomy was paramount.

Mentally ill persons seemed particularly appropriate targets for a crusade against governmental power, for the state was depriving them of liberty —with ostensibly benevolent aims, yet in conditions that belied the goal of treatment. It appeared to these critics that ultimately the state was concerned most with maintaining imbalances of power that favored the privileged classes and with suppressing dissent. By confining and discrediting the more obstreperous members of the lower classes, the mental-health system served as a pillar of the ruling elite.

Critiques of this sort were not rare in the late 1960's, when skepticism of established power was, for many, a prerequisite of intellectual discourse. Its application to psychiatry was encouraged, however, by the writings of iconoclastic psychiatrists like Thomas Szasz, who maintained that mental illness was a "myth," perpetuated only as a mechanism for social control, and R.D. Laing, whose books touted the value of the psychotic experience for elevating one's perceptions of the meaning of life. Additional academic support for Szasz's views came from sociologists known as labeling theorists who believed that deviance was a creation of the person with the power so to name it.

Whereas the community psychiatrists initially sought to achieve their ends through a legislative reconstruction of the mental-health system, the civil-libertarian attorneys favored the judicial route. They attacked the major mechanism for entry into the public mental-health system, the statutes governing involuntary commitment. These laws, they charged, were unconstitutionally broad

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in allowing any mentally ill person in need of treatment to be hospitalized against his will. Surely individual liberty could not legitimately be abridged in the absence of a substantial threat to a person's life or to the life of others. In addition, they alleged that the wording of the statutes, many little changed for one hundred years, was impermissibly vague; particularly problematic for the civil libertarians were the definitions of mental illness and the circumstances that rendered one committable.

In an era of judicial activism, many courts, both federal and state, agreed. Involuntary commitment came to be limited to persons exhibiting danger to themselves or others; strict, criminal-law-style procedures came to be required, including judicial hearings with legal representation. As the trend in the courts became apparent, many legislatures altered their statutes in anticipation of decisions in their own jurisdictions, or in emulation of California, where civil libertarians won legislative approval of a tightened statute even without the threat of court action.

The final common pathway of this complex set of interests led through the state legislatures. Although concerns about better treatment for chronic patients and the enhancement of individual liberty were not foreign here, more mundane concerns made themselves felt as well. The old state mental hospitals took up a significant proportion of most state budgets, in some jurisdictions the largest single allocation. Advocates of closing the old facilities were not reticent in claiming enormous cost savings if patients were transferred to community-based care. And even if real costs remained constant, the availability of new federal entitlement programs such as Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid, to which outpatients but not inpatients would have access, promised a shift in the cost of supporting these people from the states to the federal government.

In many states, this was the final straw. The possibility that patients could be cared for in the community at less expense, perhaps with better results, and certainly with greater liberty, was an irresistible attraction. Deinstitutionalization was too valuable a tool of social policy to remain a discretionary option of state-hospital psychiatrists. It now became an avowed goal of the states. Quotas were set for reductions in state-hospital populations; timetables were drawn up for the closure of facilities. Individual discretion in the release of patients was overridden by legislative and administrative fiat. Patients were to be released at all costs. New admissions were to be discouraged, in some cases prohibited. In the words of Joseph Morrissey, if the first phase of deinstitutionalization reflected an opening of the back wards, the second phase was marked by a closing of the front door.*

Thus did deinstitutionalization assume the form in which we know it today.

IV

If a decrease in patient population is the sole measure for gauging the outcome of deinstitutionalization, the success of the policy is unquestionable. From 1965 to 1975, inpatient populations in state hospitals fell from 475,000 to 193,000. By 1980, the figure was 137,000, and today all indications are that the number is even smaller. Relatively few of the state hospitals closed. The majority shrank from bustling colonies with thousands of patients to enclaves of a few hundred patients, clustered in a few buildings in largely abandoned campuses.

Yet by the mid-1970's professionals in the field and policy analysts had begun to ask whether the underlying goals espoused by the advocates of deinstitutionalization were really being met. Are the majority of the mentally ill, by whatever measure one chooses to apply, better off now than before the depopulation of the state hospitals? The inescapable answer is that they are not.

A large part of the reason for the movement's failure stems from its overly optimistic belief in the ability of many mentally ill persons to function on their own, without the much-maligned structure of state-hospital care. Rather than liberating patients from the constraints of institutional life, the movement to reduce the role of state hospitals merely shifted the locus of their regimented existences. Indeed, *trans*institutionalization may be a better term to describe the process that occurred. It is estimated that 750,000 chronic mentally ill persons now live in nursing homes, a figure nearly 50 percent higher than the state-hospital population at its 1955 apogee. Additional hundreds of thousands live in board-and-care homes or other group residences. Many of these facilities, particularly the nursing homes, have locked wards nearly indistinguishable from the old state hospitals. They are, in psychiatrist H. Richard Lamb's evocative phrase, the asylums in the community.

Many of the mentally ill, of course, have drifted away entirely from any form of care. Given the freedom to choose, they have chosen to live on the streets; according to various estimates they comprise between 40 and 60 percent of homeless persons. They filter into overcrowded shelters—as Juan Gonzalez did before becoming the agent of his fantasies on the Staten Island ferry—where they may experience fleeting contact with mental-health personnel. The lack of external structure is reflected in their internal disorganization. What-

* A good comprehensive history of deinstitutionalization has yet to be written. The best of the existing, essay-length works is Joseph Morrissey's "Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill: Process, Outcomes, and New Directions," in W.R. Gove, ed., *Deviance and Mental Illness* (Sage Publications, 1982). Morrissey focuses in particular on the experiences in Massachusetts, New York, and California.

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ever chance they had to wire together their shattered egos has been lost.

What of the hopes of the community psychiatrists that liberating patients from state hospitals would prevent the development of the chronic dependency which stigmatizes the mentally ill and inhibits their reintegration into the community? They learned a sad lesson suspected by many of their colleagues all along. The withdrawal, apathy, bizarre thinking, and oddities of behavior which Goffman and his students attributed to "institutionalism" appear even in populations maintained outside of institutions. They are the effects of the underlying psychiatric illnesses, usually schizophrenia, not of the efforts to treat those conditions. And contrary to the claims of the labeling theorists, it is the peculiar behavior of severely psychotic persons, not the fact that they were once hospitalized and "labeled" ill, that stigmatizes and isolates them in the community. Studies of discharged patients demonstrate that those who continue to display the signs of their illnesses and disrupt the lives of others are the ones who suffer social discrimination.

To some extent, the community psychiatrists never had a chance to test their theories. The community mental-health centers in which they envisioned care taking place were, for the most part, never built. Fewer than half of the projected 2,000 centers reached operation. Of those that did, many turned from the severely ill to more desirable patients, less disturbed, easier to treat, more gratifying, and above all, as federal subsidies were phased out, able to pay for their own care. A few model programs, working with a selected group of cooperative patients, are all the community psychiatrists have to show for their dreams. But the evidence suggests that even optimal levels of community care cannot enable many mentally ill persons to live on their own.

The goals of the civil libertarians, except in the narrowest sense, have fared little better. If one conceives that liberty is enhanced merely by the release of patients from the hospitals to the streets, then perhaps one might glean some satisfaction from the course of deinstitutionalization to date. But if individual autonomy implies the ability to make reasoned choices in the context of a coherent plan for one's life, then one must conclude that few of the deinstitutionalized have achieved autonomy. One study found fewer than half the residents of a large board-and-care home with a desire to change anything at all about their lives, no matter how unrealistic their objectives might be. If the façade of autonomy has been expanded, the reality has suffered.

Finally, and with fitting irony, not even the hope that deinstitutionalization would save money has been realized. It was originally anticipated that the closing of state hospitals would allow the transfer of their budgetary allocations to community facilities. But state hospitals proved difficult to close. As many hospitals existed in 1980 as in 1955, despite a fourfold reduction in patients. Even with current, broad definitions of who can survive in the community, tens of thousands of patients nationwide continue to require institutional care, often long-term. They are so regressed, self-destructive, violent, or otherwise disruptive that no community can tolerate them in its midst. Moreover, the communities that derive jobs from the facilities have fought hard to preserve them. As censuses have fallen, per-capita costs of care have increased, pushed up even further by pressure to improve the level of care for those who remain. Many costs for the treatment of outpatients have been redistributed, with the federal and local governments bearing heavier burdens; but no one has ever demonstrated overall savings. Even as the quality of life for many mentally ill persons has fallen, state mental-health budgets have continued to expand.

V

BOTH the failure of deinstitutionalization and our seeming paralysis in correcting it stem from the same source: the transformation of deinstitutionalization from a pragmatic enterprise to an ideological crusade. The goal of the first phase of the process—to treat in the community all mentally ill persons who did not require full-time supervision and might do equally well or better in alternate settings—was hardly objectionable. Had state-hospital populations been reduced in a deliberate manner, with patients released no faster than treatment, housing, and rehabilitative facilities became available in the community, the visions of psychiatry's Young Turks of the 1950's might well have been realized.

Once the release of state-hospital patients became a matter of faith, however, this individualized approach was thrown to the winds. In the Manichean view that soon predominated, confinement in state hospitals came to be seen as invariably bad. Freedom was always to be preferred, both for its own sake and because it had a desirable, albeit mysterious therapeutic value. Further, we came to doubt our own benevolent impulses, yielding to those who claimed that any effort to act for the welfare of others was illegitimate and doomed to end with their oppression. Thus, although we may now recognize the failure of deinstitutionalization, we as a society have been unable to reverse course; these same ideologies continue to dominate our policies not by the power of logic but by the force of habit.

It is time to rethink these presuppositions. That freedom *per se* will not cure mental illness is evident from the abject condition of so many of the deinstitutionalized. More difficult to deal with is the belief that, even if the lives of hundreds of thousands of mentally ill persons have been made

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objectively more miserable by the emptying of our state hospitals, we have no right to deprive people of liberty, even for their own benefit. In the currently fashionable jargon of bioethics, the value of autonomy always trumps the value of beneficence.

Interestingly, this position is now being challenged by a number of our leading public philosophers, who have called attention to its neglected costs. Robert Burt of the Yale Law School and Daniel Callahan of the Hastings Center, for example, have taken aim at the belief that the freedom to do as we please should be our primary societal value. This emphasis on individual autonomy, they point out, has come to mean that in making our choices, as long as we do not actively infringe on the prerogatives of others, we face no obligation to consider them and their needs. The result has been the creation of an atomistic community in which, relieved of the duty to care for others, we pursue our goals in disregard of the suffering that surrounds us. This lack of an obligation to care for others has been transmuted in some cases into an actual duty to ignore their suffering, lest we act in such a way as to limit their autonomy.

Although Burt and Callahan have not addressed themselves to mental-health policy *per se*, there is no better illustration of their thesis. The right to liberty has become an excuse for failing to address, even failing to recognize, the needs of the thousands of abandoned men and women we sweep by in our streets, in our parks, and in the train and bus stations where they gather for warmth. We have persuaded ourselves that it is better to ignore them—that we have an obligation to ignore them—because their autonomy would be endangered by our concern.

But the impulse to act for the benefit of others is the adhesive substance that binds human communities together. A value system that looses those bonds by glorifying individual autonomy threatens the cohesion of the polity. Nobody wants to live in a society characterized by unrestrained intervention (even with benevolent intent), but that does not mean we must reject altogether the notion that doing good for others, despite their reluctance, is morally appropriate under some conditions.

Meaningful autonomy does not consist merely in the ability to make choices for oneself. Witness the psychotic ex-patients on the streets, who withdraw into rarely used doorways, rigidly still for hours at a time, hoping, like chameleons on the forest floor, that immobility will help them fade into the grimy urban background, bringing safety and temporary peace from a world which they envision as a terrifying series of threats. Can the choices they make, limited as they are to the selection of a doorway for the day, be called a significant embodiment of human autonomy? Or is their behavior rather to be understood on the level of a simple reflex—autonomous only in a strictly formal sense?

Far from impinging on their autonomy, treatment of such psychotics, even coercive treatment, would not only hold out some hope of mitigating their condition but might simultaneously increase their capacity for more sophisticated autonomous choices. To adopt the typological scheme of the philosopher Bruce Miller, patients might thereby be enabled to move from mere freedom of action to choices that reflect congruence with personal values, effective rational deliberation, and moral reflection. Our intervention, though depriving them of the right to autonomy in the short term, may enhance that quality in the long run. In such circumstances, benevolence and autonomy are no longer antagonistic principles.

VI

Deinstitutionalization is a remnant of a different era in our political life, one in which we sought broadly-framed solutions to human problems that have defied man's creativity for millennia. In the 1960's and 70's we declared war on poverty, and we determined to wipe out injustice and bigotry; government, we believed, had the tools and resources to accomplish these ends; all that was needed was the will.

This set of beliefs, applied to the mentally ill, allowed us to ignore the failure of a century-and-a-half of mental-health reform in this country, in the conviction that this time we had the answer. The problem, as it was defined, was the system of large state hospitals. Like a cancer, it could be easily excised. And the will was there.

Unfortunately, the analysis was wrong. The problems of severe mental illness have proved resistant to unitary solutions. For some patients, discharge from the state hospitals was a blessing. For all too many others, it was the ultimate curse. Far from a panacea, the policy created as many problems as it solved, perhaps more. To be sure, it is never easy to admit that massive social initiatives have been misconceived. The time has come, however, to lay deinstitutionalization to rest.

It would not be difficult to outline a reasonable program to restore some sense to the care of the mentally ill: moderate expansion of beds in state facilities, especially for the most severely ill patients; good community-based services for those patients—and their number is not small—who could prosper outside of an institution with proper supports; and greater authority for the state to detain and treat the severely mentally ill for their own benefit, even if they pose no immediate threat to their lives or those of others.

Deinstitutionalization has been a tragedy, but it need not be an irreversible one.

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Churchill at War

Eliot A. Cohen

NEARLY half a century ago Winston Churchill rallied the people of Great Britain with words that have not lost the power to make the pulse quicken. If, in the eyes of his countrymen, he remains (as Isaiah Berlin has said) "a mythical hero who belongs to legend as much as to reality, the largest human being of our time," he is something of an American hero as well. This is so not only on account of Churchill's sense of kinship with the United States, and his intimate dealings with this country over decades, but also because of the magnitude of the challenges he faced and the global scope of his concerns and conceptions, which render him a figure with whom Americans may feel they have more in common than do his fellow Englishmen. For the English politician of today, Churchill serves as a reminder of an epic past; for the American politician, he might prove a source of inspiration in dealing with the problems of the present.

For this reason it would be unfortunate if his elevation to our pantheon, merited though it is, were to deprive us of the benefits of a careful examination of his statecraft. This applies especially to Churchill's war statesmanship, and in particular to his conduct of World War II. Over the last few years Congress has decided, and the executive branch agreed, that our defense machinery requires overhaul, and scores of critics, some fair and some malicious, argue that we do not know how to wage war. One cannot hope to remedy such difficulties as exist by slavishly imitating genius, but perhaps we may understand our own difficulties and dilemmas better if we study how the greatest war leader of the 20th century handled far greater ones.

The recent publication of the seventh volume of Martin Gilbert's official biography, *Winston S. Churchill: Road to Victory, 1941-1945*,* aids in such an endeavor. As in his previous volumes, Gilbert here eschews analysis or interpretation, preferring instead to recount the story from the perspective of his subject and those around him. From a mass of state papers, diaries, and essential secondary works (the recently published official histories of British intelligence in World War II, for example), Gilbert has assembled a 1,400-page record of Churchill's activities from Pearl Harbor to VE-Day. He tells us how the war looked to Churchill and how Churchill looked to those in close contact with him. Here and in the similarly constructed 1,300-page Volume VI (*Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941*), Gilbert provides a clear account of Churchill as war statesman. These volumes lack the coherence, elegance, and fullness of Churchill's own six-volume memoirs of the war—memoirs which, by the way, still repay the time required to read them. Nonetheless, by submerging oneself in the mass of detail and anecdotes, narrative and reminiscence which Gilbert offers us, one can construct a picture not only of Churchill's accomplishment but of how he achieved it.

Many readers, one suspects, will not make the effort. Exhausted, perhaps, by a perusal of *Finest Hour*, they may assume that Churchill made his signal contribution to victory in World War II through his speeches, and in particular those in the dark days of the summer and fall of 1940, and the winter and spring of 1941. Even a cursory look at accounts such as the Harold Nicolson diaries reveals what a difference that oratory made. When Churchill told the War Cabinet after the fall of France, "And I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender," he characteristically, if falsely, credited many of those about him with his own courage and determination. Great Britain might easily have struck a compromise peace with Hitler after the calamitous campaigns of 1940 had Churchill not rekindled and brought to white heat the fires of resistance. As *Finest Hour* makes clear, many prominent Englishmen, particularly within his own party, viewed the continuation of the war with faint hearts, and his assumption of the Prime Ministership with distaste. On his first entry to the House of Commons as Prime Minister, Churchill received less applause than did Neville Chamberlain, the man who had probably done

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more than any other (save possibly Stanley Baldwin) to bring his country to this ruinous state of affairs. As the crisis waxed and then passed, however, no one, no matter how bitterly he had suspected or mistrusted Churchill, would deny his role in sustaining Britain's spirits during the time of greatest threat and smallest strength.

In retrospect, this accomplishment has eclipsed all others. As time went on and in particular as the participants in World War II published their diaries (or edited versions of them), Churchill's reputation as a war leader came under attack. Many of his own generals and admirals and their American counterparts accused him of having meddled unconscionably in military matters. They recounted his strategic obsessions—his insistent interest in Jupiter, a proposed invasion of northern Norway, for instance—and disparaged the stream of queries and complaints he directed at them. The publication in the 1950's of the diaries of Alan Brooke (later Lord Alanbrooke), head of the British army and later chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff, set the tone of asperity for accounts which followed. And yet one can maintain that just as his inspirational leadership in 1940 and 1941 provided the necessary condition for Anglo-American success in World War II, it was precisely the detailed work of Churchill's strategy-making that ensured it. In fact, we should consider Churchill's "micro-management," as we might call it today, not as a blemish on his great record as a war leader but as one of its most important elements.

According to the commonly held view, favored by many military men and by a surprisingly large number of their civilian counterparts, a politician in wartime should set broad objectives and priorities, and leave the devising of strategy to his military subordinates. War, in this view, is a matter for experts, men who have devoted their adult lives to preparation for it; civilian interference can only confuse things. This orthodoxy, which Churchill's opponents threw at him during the war, which his critics have argued since, and in which many in government and outside it still believe today, is both false and dangerous. The only nations that have enforced this theory of civil-military relationships in wartime—Germany in World War I, most notably —have succumbed to a quasi-dictatorship of the generals first and to their enemies shortly thereafter.

The fundamental error comes from a misunderstanding of the nature of war, and above all from a failure to appreciate how thoroughly political it is. Those who adhere to this view believe that politics may determine why wars begin and the nature of the settlement at the end, but not the twists and turns of war itself. In fact, however, as Clausewitz observed over a century and a half ago, political considerations pervade all aspects of war. It follows from this that a statesman's interventions in the conduct of operations are in principle always legitimate, even if in practice they may be highly unwise.

When Churchill, for example, decided, against the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff, to return a small expeditionary force to France after Dunkirk but before the French government had decided to capitulate, he did so for sound political reasons. He knew that England had to maintain its reputation in France and elsewhere for adhering to its alliances, for not abandoning friends in the struggle against Hitler. Such political considerations also motivated his decision to send forces to Greece in 1941, a move subsequently denounced by some of the same men who, at the time, endorsed it. Political considerations suffused many of Churchill's decisions: who would command in different theaters of war; the timing of offensives; whether operations should be undertaken which involved heavy loss of friendly civilian life. Thus he insisted on a careful review and limitation of the pre-Normandy bombing of French railroad centers because he feared the consequences if the Anglo-American forces were to inflict tens of thousands of unintended casualties on the populations they intended to rescue. In these and many other cases his was the more comprehensive, because the more political, point of view: as he wrote in his memoir of World War I, *The World Crisis*, "At the summit true politics and strategy are one."

Moreover, it should be remembered that Churchill, like any war statesman, did not preside over an infallible or a united body of military opinion. To the very end of the war he often made military judgments well in advance of his professional advisers. In July 1945, for example, he speculated that the atomic bomb might render unnecessary the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan, and that it promised to change the shape of postwar international relations, redressing the balance of European power which would otherwise tilt to the advantage of the USSR. Lord Alanbrooke reports in his published diary that he incorrectly dismissed these notions. The British Chiefs of Staff until quite late in the day failed to see the merits of Overlord, the culminating invasion of France; Churchill, though not without some profound reservations, viewed it as indispensable virtually from the time of the American entry into the war. On the other hand, he joined them in their adamant oposition to an invasion of France in 1943, a course of action pressed by the American Chiefs of Staff and which, it now appears, would probably have led to disaster.

As this last example suggests, there is no simply "professional"' view of how any war should be fought, and of no war was this truer than the war of 1939-45. The American Chiefs of Staff disagreed with the British Chiefs of Staff; British (and American) admirals disagreed with British

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(and American) airmen; the airmen controlling the heavy-bombing forces disagreed with those charged with protecting convoys and hunting U-boats; commanders planning the invasion of France disagreed with those conducting the war in the Mediterranean. Their disputes pertained to every subject imaginable: priorities among theaters, timetables, organizational arrangements, operational concepts, appropriate weaponry, enemy potential and intentions. This does not mean that the men involved lacked expertise, only that extraordinary difficulties inhere in figuring out what will work in war and what will not. In war more than in most other human endeavors, those choices which in retrospect seem self-evidently correct or foolish are clouded in uncertainty at the time; the unfolding of events, so apparently inexorable to historians tracing decisions afterward, appears tentative and intangible to those present. Although war has a large scientific component, generalship is by no means a scientific pursuit, and leaders cannot hope to choose courses of action on the basis of *a priori* principles and rules of thumb.

WHAT, then, was Churchill's strategic vision? How did he think through the core strategic problems of the war? Let us begin with the first problem: war aims. Although Churchill's opposition to Hitler knew no limits, he thought of victory not simply in terms of the overthrow and annihilation of the Nazi regime, but in terms of the peace that was to come. Insofar as his American counterparts did the same, they thought of the world organization which would turn into the UN. Churchill, although he supported the UN, did so with little confidence; his concern, particularly after 1942, was to shape the contours of a postwar Europe, and above all to confine the reach of an extended Soviet empire. He feared the consequences of a war-shattered Europe after the departure of the Americans (who certainly planned to leave within two years of the war's end), in which the Soviet Union would be balanced only by an impoverished Britain. Understanding far better than many of his colleagues or his American counterparts that the limits of the advance of the liberating armies would determine the postwar political map, he pressed in 1944 for a number of operations—a push into Czechoslovakia and Austria, the occupation of Greece—that would leave Allied forces best disposed to help restore or establish representative governments. Only Stalin understood as well as Churchill the importance of these matters; their mutual comprehension made them wary but respectful of each other.

This constant injection of postwar considerations into wartime planning may seem obvious to us today, having lived so long with a Europe still divided along the highwater marks reached by the advancing Allied armies. At the time, however, it contradicted the instincts of the English and American peoples (who had learned to admire "Uncle Joe" Stalin and the gallant Russian people); the soldiers (who saw their task as defeating the German enemy, not indulging in political maneuvers); and the diplomats (who believed, *en masse*, that the experience of war had transformed the Bolshevik state from a mortal foe into a merely difficult and suspicious partner). It revolted public opinion to see British troops occupying Greece in late 1944, engaging in hard street battles with Communist anti-Nazi guerrillas; it offended the deepest instincts of professional soldiers to sacrifice their men's lives in order to forestall the troops of their Eastern ally. In time of war, all emotional and intellectual energies focus on "beating the enemy," for nothing else can justify the suffering and cost which war entails. And even in time of peace we do not think strategically in this largest sense, worrying about the outcome of the peace following the war. Examine, for example, any official statement of NATO doctrine, or follow any private or semi-official discussion of NATO strategy, and you will discover nothing on what sort of world the United States and its allies would wish to see should they succeed in rebuffing a Soviet attack.

The sheer fact that Churchill thought strategically, that he saw war policy in terms of large building blocks which together created a structure of victory, makes him remarkable. Very few people can or do think in this fashion. Most historians argue that no one actually shapes the outcome of a war by imposing a design upon it. Interestingly enough, this strange opinion resonates most strongly among the military men who actually implement strategy in wartime. Intimately familiar with the pressure of events, the myriad crises and forced decisions which plague commanders in peacetime and trebly so in war, many officers share the historian's disdain for strategy. They know enough to know that no one can hope to draw up a blueprint for victory which will guide a general staff through the innumerable surprises and setbacks of a serious war.

Churchill knew enough of war to understand the force of this last objection to strategic planning as such. His art lay in his conception of strategy as a set of large but definable problems to be solved or campaigns to be fought. He viewed strategy-making as the piecing together of a kind of giant jigsaw puzzle, comprised of a couple of dozen pieces, some of which would have to be trimmed, others discarded, still others glued together in order to complete the full picture. Perhaps he best captured his conception in an essay on, of all things, painting, which he explicitly compared with the conduct of war:

> It is the same kind of problem as unfolding a long, sustained, interlocked argument. It is a proposition which, whether of few or number-

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less parts, is commanded by a single unity of conception.*

At different points in the war, Churchill set forth his conception of basic strategy in lengthy memoranda to the Chiefs of Staff or to the Americans, but often, one suspects, for the sake of clarifying his own thoughts. These memoranda (particularly those written in late December 1941 as he sailed to his first wartime meeting with Roosevelt) set out, in broad terms, the strategy which the Allies actually followed. Each begins with a discussion of central factors to be faced or to be incorporated into an analysis, and continues with a discussion of the steppingstones to victory. It was with this large picture in mind that Churchill then focused his energies on particular problems.

CHURCHILL brought to the making of strategy a sense not merely of *purpose* but of *sequence*, or, more accurately, *timing*. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of Churchill's strategic thought was his acute awareness of time as a critical dimension of action in war. Each of the large portions of the war effort had its own peculiar rhythm: in each, time worked for Britain or against it, and in control of the timing lay mastery of strategic choice. Initially, of course, Churchill labored to buy time—all of his efforts in the summer and fall of 1940 were aimed at gaining time to reequip the British army. So too with the invasion of France, which he saw as a peril in 1943, as an imperative in 1944. For the most part, however, he sought not to delay but to spur things along, urging commanders to take advantage of opportunities arising from a flux of events that offered brief intervals in which to achieve large gains.

Thus, when it became apparent that Italy might desert Hitler, Churchill hounded and harassed Allied military commanders to take risks in order to arrive in force on the Italian mainland before the Germans could recover their balance and reverse Mussolini's overthrow. Acutely conscious of democracy's weaknesses as well as its great strengths, he warned the American Congress in a speech in May 1943:

> War is full of mysteries and surprises. A false step, a wrong direction, an error in strategy, discord or lassitude among the Allies, might soon give the common enemy power to confront us with new and hideous facts. We have surmounted many serious dangers, but there is one grave danger which will go along with us till the end; that danger is the undue prolongation of the war. No one can tell what new complications and perils might arise in four or five more years of war. And it is in the dragging-out of the war at enormous expense, until the democracies are tired or bored or split, that the main hopes of Germany and Japan just now reside.

This sense of timing went beyond a feel for the tempo of the war overall. It included a fine sense for when to launch operations, open diplomatic initiatives, or convene the great summit meetings by which the Allies coordinated their efforts. Churchill played the central role in convening these bilateral and trilateral conferences. In each case he sensed when the moment had come for a time-consuming and potentially divisive gathering which, however, alone could give impetus and direction to the war.

The third element of Churchill's strategic vision was his understanding of priorities, and above all of critical tasks, upon which the energies of the wartime administration must focus. Until December 1941 he set as his highest priority (aside from defense of the United Kingdom from invasion) the inveigling of the United States to participate in the war. To this end he wooed American guests not only with his charm but with his candor. While still First Lord of the Admiralty, before May 1940, he conducted a private correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt, a correspondence that blossomed after he became Prime Minister. His familiarity with the United States and its history (including, in particular, the Civil War) led him to value American entry into the war very highly indeed. At a time when his advisers gloomily contemplated disaster after disaster in the Far East, as well as setbacks in the Mediterranean, he declared that "The accession of the United States makes amends for all, and with time and patience will give certain victory." The cultivation of the American alliance, and the effort to ensure that it would work properly in war, remained perhaps his chief concern throughout the years 1942-45.

Other challenges, of course, faced the British high command. One of Churchill's greatest contributions to the success of British arms lay in his ability to define a military campaign and focus the government's attention on it. It was he who coined the terms "Battle of Britain" and "Battle of the Atlantic" in 1940 and 1941, respectively. More than ringing phrases, these terms drew a circle around varied military activities which did not lie in the province of any one theater commander or any single service. In each case, Churchill would convene a special committee, which he chaired, to bring together every part of the government with responsibility for the task at hand, to sort out priorities and tasks, and to define critical problems. The specially created committees to deal with D-Day sped up the development and production of the specialized equipment (from mobile harbors to amphibious tanks) needed for the assault on Fortress Europe. The

* *Painting as a Pastime* (1950). This pamphlet—a scant 32 pages—has a far wider range, and offers far more insight into Churchill's mind and methods, than one might guess from its title.

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Crossbow Committee monitored the development of the German revenge weapons—the V-1 flying bomb and the V-2 missile—and supported the various countermeasures (air defense, bombing of launch sites, and deception plans) devised to contain the threat. Perhaps most successful of all was the Battle of the Atlantic Committee, which gave unparalleled coherence to the British air and naval campaign to secure the Atlantic sea lanes.

Throughout the war Churchill kept in mind the constant importance of what would later be called the Home Front. He continually pestered ministers and bureaucrats not to impose greater rigors on the population than were absolutely necessary—exploding in anger, for example, at a rule that would have made it illegal to trade ration coupons. Knowing that men are ruled by words, he paid attention to them—renaming the Local Defense Volunteers the Home Guard or calling communal soup kitchens British Restaurants.

More importantly, he periodically explained to the British people and to Parliament how the war was going, and what to make of it. We know well the ringing perorations of some of these speeches; we often forget the remarkably clear and detailed discussions which preceded them. In open and secret session Churchill discussed at great length how the war had gone; he concealed no defeats, he minimized no reverses. Although invariably reticent about future operations, he discussed the past in detail, and trends of production and mobilization with remarkable openness. Despite his concern for security, he realized the importance of keeping as many people as possible "in the picture," as the wartime phrase had it, and went to great lengths to do so.

Five elements, then—a long-range view of war aims; a sense of the unity of war which transcended its many parts; a constant emphasis on the time factor; an ability to define critical tasks and battles; a determination to keep as many people as possible informed in some detail about the course of the war—formed the core of Churchill's strategic approach. They may not seem remarkably original; we should bear in mind, however, the difficulty of following this vision during six years of terrific emotional and physical strain. When we think of the hardships of war we usually think of the sufferings of troops in the field, and rarely consider the pressures concentrated on the commander and statesman at home. Yet even a casual examination of the records and diaries of the time reveals just how grim those burdens were—the crushing sense of responsibility for success and failure, and above all for the loss of human life on a staggering scale; the twelve-hour (or longer) days and seven-day work weeks lived out in poorly ventilated underground bunkers. Small wonder that many officers at the center yearned for service at the front, where they could at least *do* things rather than bear the debilitating sense of responsibility without the ability to act directly. Small wonder, too, that illness and sheer exhaustion took a toll of the Chiefs of Staff and their assistants. And no doubt the pressures of serving a leader who frequently worked into the small hours of the morning wore down his military subordinates even further.

This raises the question of Churchill's relationship with his primary military subordinates, the Chiefs of Staff. As the Alanbrooke diaries in particular make clear, it remained ambivalent throughout the war. Although the Chiefs understood in a vague sense that Churchill alone could energize the government and maintain the morale of the people, they clearly resented the fountain of ideas, pet projects, and inquiries which he poured upon their heads. These could take a brutal form. Churchill, acutely concious of Britain's manpower shortage, once began a grilling of Alanbrooke on the subject of the Middle East in the following fashion: "Pray explain, CIGS [Chief of the Imperial General Staff], how is it that in the Middle East 750,000 men always turn up for their pay and rations, but when it comes to fighting only 100,000 turn up? Explain to us exactly how the remaining 650,000 are occupied." When he met opposition by the Chiefs to a pet plan he would demand to know their objections in the minutest detail—and often infuriated them by repeating these inquisitions after they had thought the matter resolved. He often uttered mordant remarks on their advice and outlook ("The negative in our counsels is as ten is to one"; "You may take the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman, or the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together—what do you get? The sum total of their fears!") and ensured they would hear them.

Yet for all his bullying and badgering, Churchill kept well in hand his urge to override the judgment of the Chiefs of Staff. Very rarely if ever would he order them to undertake operations to which they objected strongly; and in a host of ways he made it clear to them that open, indeed violent, argument with him in no way lost them his favor—in large measure, just the reverse. In the course of the war Churchill fired a number of senior officers, but never because of a disagreement. Rather, he dismissed those who had failed in the field, or who found it impossible adequately to communicate their problems and intentions to the home government.

Despite his willingness to belabor the Chiefs in the privacy of his war council, outside of it he lent them the strongest support—backing them so fiercely that throughout most of the war the Americans had no sense of the disputes which raged among them. Andrew Cunningham, the First Sea Lord after 1942, recalled that "Anything which might affect the running of the war, even in the slightest degree, was referred to them [the Chiefs of Staff] for an opinion; . . . anyone criticiz-

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ing the Chiefs of Staff, no matter how high his position, was likely to find the Prime Minister's heavy guns turned against him." Nor were his internal relationships with them simply confrontational. The Chiefs often came as his weekend guests to Chequers, the Camp David of the British Prime Minister; and together with the sarcasm and harassment went a rare intimacy and confidence. At one point he said to Anthony Eden, in reference to a trans-Atlantic flight Eden would shortly take with the Chiefs, "I don't know what I should do if I lost you all. I'd have to cut my throat. It isn't just love, though there is much of that in it, but that you are my war machine. . . . I simply couldn't replace you." Such remarks also reached the Chiefs' ears.

Churchill dealt with the Chiefs primarily but not exclusively. On occasion he violated the chain of command, speaking directly with commanders in the field—a breach of protocol which occasionally drove them to the brink of resignation, although it often had good results. Shortly after Montgomery had accepted command of the Normandy landings, for example, Churchill quizzed him on the suitability of the plan for the invasion: Montgomery spoke up, and partly as a result of this some of the basic arrangements for the landings were changed.

Always suspicious of the military bureaucracy (in a moment of exasperation he proposed the creation of "a Sacred Legion of about 1,000 staff officers [who would] set an example to the troops in leading some particularly desperate attack"), Churchill searched out and nourished odd organizations and individuals who did not quite fit the mold. He heard of an unorthodox major in the Royal Engineers named Millis Jefferis who had sabotaged German rail lines in Norway. Forcing his promotion over the objections of senior army officers (who grumbled that Jefferis was 150th on the list), Churchill removed him from army control and set him up in an independent research establishment under the Minister of Defense. "Churchill's Toy Shop," as it was known, subsequently concocted such ingenious devices as the limpet mine and the PIAT, the main hand-held anti-tank weapon used by the British army at the end of the war. Churchill took a similar interest in the creation of the Commandos and other special-operations forces such as the SAS, or Special Air Service, which remains to this day perhaps the most adept of the West's special-operations forces.

This interest—some might call it interference—extended to the careers of odd or obnoxious commanders. In late 1940 Churchill insisted that the army recall to active duty Major General Percy Hobart (then serving as a corporal in the Home Guard), one of the pioneers of armored warfare who had been retired against his will because of what his superiors termed "impatience, hot temper, and intolerance." Here too Churchill forced the issue, remarking to Field Marshall Dill, then CIGS, "It isn't only the good boys who help to win wars. It is the sneaks and the stinkers as well." Hobart went on to command the 79th Division, whose specialized tanks (the "funnies," as more conventional armored commanders called them) made the British landings on D-Day a relatively smooth affair.

Churchill's fascination with ingenious devices and stratagems occasionally had larger consequences. He paid close attention to the development of the elaborate technology of electronic warfare which played so large a role in protecting Great Britain in 1940-41, and lent his efforts to the development of the deception operations which accompanied Allied operations in 1943 and 1944. His interest in these matters, however, went beyond gadgets, individuals, and ruses which conventional organizations might not produce without special prodding. On a number of occasions he created substantial organizations outside the normal military sphere: in addition to the Commandos and the SAS, we should note the Special Operations Executive, created to "set Europe ablaze." SOE, whose mandate was to develop resistance networks and foster sabotage and guerrilla operations in occupied Europe, soon rivaled the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) in size and activity. In this and other cases Churchill sought to develop unconventional forces and agencies not in place of regular forces but as necessary complements to them.

This insistence upon developing unconventional means and organizations stemmed in part from Churchill's understanding of the nature of warfare, and the variety of ways in which a country must wage it. It also grew from his awareness of the limits on British strength. The British isles went on a war footing more quickly than either the United States or Germany; by 1942 the economy and society had reached a plateau of mobilization. Short of materiel and foreign exchange, short of manpower, fearing the consequences of another blood bath such as the British had suffered in World War I, and confronting an entrenched enemy, Churchill and his advisers sought desperately to avoid a frontal collision with German land power. They did this in a variety of ways—by emphasizing the bomber offensive (which took its toll of British lives, some 50,000 of them), resistance movements, and operations along the periphery of German power, particularly the Mediterranean. Herein lay the great dispute with the American planners, who insisted from the beginning on a frontal assault against France. Churchill, to his credit, accepted the necessity of such an operation, much though he feared it, early in the war; by late 1943 he and the Chiefs of Staff were irrevocably committed to it—although they could not convince their American counterparts of this fact.

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UNFORTUNATELY, something besides the simple imbalance in numbers motivated Churchill to look for the unconventional solution; a deep sense of the inadequacy of British land power played a role as well. Painful though it was (and may still be) to admit it, through the first half of the war, the British armed forces and commanders, with rare exceptions, seemed incapable of coping with their German enemies. A long stretch of defeats, evacuations, and calamities undermined popular and governmental faith in the ability of British armies to handle the *Wehrmacht*. This period culminated in the cumulative disasters of the first half of 1942. During this time British armies in the Western Desert crumbled before the attacks of the Afrika Korps; the German warships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* boldly sailed up the Channel in broad daylight; a British army at Singapore surrendered to half as many Japanese troops shortly after Japanese airplanes had sunk two of the Royal Navy's finest battleships. The summer before, moreover, a careful intelligence review had revealed that only one out of three British bombers attacking Germany by night came within five miles of the targets. And although British war industry produced some remarkable weapons, it also produced more than its share of inferior ones: British tanks, in particular, fell far behind those of the Germans, the Russians, and the Americans, and the same held true in other important areas. Ironically, the good and constantly improving British intelligence made matters gloomier. Even when radio intercepts provided advance warnings of the enemy's operations, and gave a clear picture of his weaknesses, British commanders seemed incapable of stopping the enemy advance. Indeed, the accuracy of British intelligence only exacerbated Churchill's mounting frustration with his field commanders who seemed unable to exploit enemy deficiencies.

Matters reached their nadir in the spring of 1942—and it is at this point, as much as in 1940, that Churchill demonstrated his greatest powers of leadership. A long series of setbacks had undermined the faith even of those most knowledgeable about Britain's long-term prospects. Alanbrooke wrote in his diary in March, "During the last fortnight I have had for the first time since the war started a growing conviction that we are going to lose this war unless we control it very differently and fight it with more determination. . . . There are times when I wish to God I had not been placed at the helm of a ship that seems to be heading inevitably for the rocks. . . ." Churchill's rivals made an effort to restructure the government by proposing a vote of no-confidence in Parliament, a vote defeated by crushing proportions after Churchill delivered one of the very best speeches of his career.

Even at this dark moment—unrelieved by the magic of defiance which had characterized Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain—Churchill maintained his sense of proportion, realizing that the entry of the United States ultimately guaranteed victory. In an odd sense Churchill, so often damned for his volatility, served his most useful function in the balance he provided to the government and the military commanders. Optimistic when they despaired, admonitory when they celebrated, audacious when they favored caution, he usually proved to have the sounder instincts. At times Churchill pushed the military to undertake operations which it considered marginally beyond its abilities—the invasions of Iraq and Syria in 1941, where the Germans were quietly developing alliances, are a case in point. Yet he also occasionally acted as a more conservative force in the war councils. As Gilbert records, throughout the first half of 1944 he understood far better than his colleagues that the war would probably not end until early or mid-1945. Although not opposed to the taking of risks, Churchill insisted on reinforcing such major efforts as the invasion of Europe; indeed, at one point he found himself in the odd position of arguing with the Americans for the reinforcement of the central thrust into France.

CHURCHILL'S working methods, though peculiarly his own, offer instruction as well. For the most part historians have dwelled only on his habit of working in bed until noon, his invariable afternoon nap, his large dinners preceded by weak whiskey-and-water and washed down with champagne and brandy, followed by a movie and then conferences and dictation until the small hours of the morning. Not surprisingly, the Chiefs, who rose early, found this an exhausting schedule to keep up with, and it probably had something to do with the chronic irritation they felt in dealing with the Prime Minister. But interesting as such details are, they miss certain essential points that help explain why Churchill was, in fact, an extremely effective manager.

First and foremost Churchill had an extraordinary appetite for work. He read constantly, sifting through masses of state papers, intelligence reports, cables, and newspapers—an expert skimmer, as one of his secretaries noted. Churchill drew his knowledge not only from papers but from people, and this accounts for some of the strangeness of his coterie of associates. One in particular, Professor Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), a noted Oxford scientist, attracted the particular ire of the Chiefs of Staff. Yet "the Prof.," as he was known, served valuable functions. First, he provided Churchill, who took an abiding interest in technology but had no background in science, with a clear explanation of the fundamental physical principles upon which many military matters involving weaponry depended. Secondly, the Prof. ran a small statistical office which prepared accurate and comprehensible charts and tables for the Prime Minister, enabling him to retain a good picture of those aspects of the war

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(especially the Battle of the Atlantic) which could only be measured and judged in this way, rather than by the movement of battle lines. Having no interest but Churchill's to serve, the Prof. assembled data which often served the Prime Minister better than the more tendentious presentations prepared by the various departments of government. Finally, the Prof. provided an independent source of analysis, occasionally misguided but nonetheless useful in assessing certain military problems. To his credit, Lindemann first suspected in 1941 that Bomber Command had far less success in hitting its targets than it claimed, thereby initiating the series of reforms and changes in personnel which would lead to the far more capable force of 1942-45.

Despite what some of his military advisers thought, Churchill was not simply subject to the influence of the Prof. or anyone else. He would use such men to force debate and controversy and thus get at the root of a problem; to the end, however, he formed his own judgments. Moreover, to obtain expertise he would often reach down into the bureaucracy—this was particularly true in the case of the electronics war in the air. R.V. Jones, then a twenty-eight-year-old scientist working for the Royal Air Force, describes his first encounter with Churchill, who had summoned him to a special committee meeting on the threat of German precision navigation systems:

> From our encounter, I of course felt the elation of a young man at being noticed by any Prime Minister, but somehow it was much more. It was the same whenever we met in the war—I had the feeling of being recharged by contact with a source of living power. Here was strength, resolution, humor, readiness to listen, to ask the searching question and, when convinced, to act. He was rarely complimentary at the time, handsome though his compliments could be afterward, for he had been brought up in sterner days. In 1940 it was compliment enough to be called in by him at the crisis; but to stand up to his questioning attack and then to convince him was the greatest exhilaration of all.

FROM information proceeded action. Churchill wrote (or more precisely, dictated) at a pace that exhausted the stenographers, and he did so day in and day out. One has only to examine the mass of memoranda and minutes appended to his World War II memoirs (and they are but a fraction of the total) to see the range of his knowledge and attention to the running of the war. He was both a "big picture" and a detail man, and never lost sight of the importance of either.

Those minutes and queries reveal other attributes of Churchill as strategist as well. At the very beginning of his tenure as Prime Minister he passed word that no official account was to be taken of any instruction that came from him unless it appeared in writing. His staff filed and tracked these papers with great care, with the result that his exhortations or questions usually bore fruit, and no decisions depended on the fallible operation of human memory. This stream of paper acted, as one of his aides put it, like the beacon of a great lighthouse, suddenly illuminating one and then the other corner of the great war effort—and the concentration of mind produced by the sudden appearance of the spotlight sped up or corrected many difficulties. In October 1941 the cryptographers of Bletchley Park, who were responsible for breaking the German codes, had suffered for some time from deficient administrative support. In desperation they appealed directly to the Prime Minister, who wrote on the next day:

> ACTION THIS DAY
>
> Make sure they have all they want on extreme priority and report to me that this has been done.

Thereafter, the "geese who laid the golden eggs but never cackled," as Churchill called them, received the material and clerical aid they required.

This particular episode contains a number of points of interest. First, it indicates the high importance Churchill assigned to intelligence: an avid reader of decrypts, Churchill more than most wartime leaders understood the value of intelligence. He knew that intelligence cannot enable one to predict the future (the usual, and futile, hope of most politicians) but that it can give a good picture of the enemy's world view and his difficulties and opportunities. Secondly, it suggests the efficiency of the machine that Churchill had created around him. Any leader—in business, government, or the university—can demand instant information or action; rare, however, is the leader who can get it. The staff around Churchill worked with unusual harmony and efficiency. Interestingly enough, most had no prior connection with Churchill; indeed, as Sir John Colville reveals in his extremely interesting diary, for the most part they had served the Chamberlain government loyally and viewed Churchill with considerable mistrust.* Not only did Churchill win them over, he welded them into a machine which enabled his intellect and energy to do their proper work. As Churchill himself was both an insider and a maverick, so too he managed to make a group of civil servants and professional soldiers into a force that could operate within the establishment and yet transcend it.

The result blended system and anarchy in a peculiarly effective way. As the Americans ruefully discovered in their conferences with the British from 1941 through 1943, the British had a far more efficient staff machinery, and presented a far more united front than they could muster. This was in no small part because of Churchill's

* *The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1945* (Norton, 1985).

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working methods. Churchill exercised his imagination and impatience, his heterodoxy and biting humor, but in the end he worked within an organizational framework. Genius rarely accepts such limits; he did.

FEW politicians in democracies have the aptitudes and abilities required to lead their nations in war. General E.L. Spears, a British liaison officer with the French in World War I, described French politicians in 1917 as follows:

> The men to whom the people were used to look for guidance found themselves just like other men, small, puzzled, bewildered, facing a cataclysm their minds could not grasp. Ministers had a little the aspect of marionettes presented without the familiar surroundings of footlights and wings. Their usual animators, well-drilled civil servants, were powerless to actuate them on a stage for which neither experience nor training had equipped them. . . . They seem very inconsequent, very well-meaning, dealing with the war as they would have dealt with unexpected, tiresome, or alarming happenings in their own lives. . . . They talked, consulted, dined, and traveled, worried, but in spite of everything had their moments of relaxation; in fact they more or less lived through the experience of a man whose business is facing a long-drawn-out crisis, which may with luck, skill, and determination be surmounted, but which often gives little hope of ending otherwise than in failure and bankruptcy.*

Churchill's mastery of the art of supreme command had a number of roots. He had witnessed a good bit of combat at first hand. As a young man he had seen fighting in India, the Sudan, and South Africa; after his departure from the government in 1916 he served with distinction as an infantryman on the Western Front. Throughout his tenure in office he always strove to observe combat directly (in Antwerp in 1914, for example, or on D-Day, when only an order from the King kept him from the beaches). This experience, coupled with an ability to conjure up vivid pictures in the mind of the sights and sounds of battle, oriented him to the central fact of war—combat. His colleagues sometimes mocked this fascination with battle; his subordinates feared for his safety. But in truth his sense of what war at the sharp end looks like helped shape his decisions in committee and conference.

Churchill also brought to bear on the conduct of war a vast experience of high-level administration. In the thirty years before World War II he had served as the civilian head of the Royal Navy, as Minister of Munitions, and as head of the Air and War Departments: he knew how to run large organizations. Moreover, he had participated in the making of strategy in World War I, and in particular had supplied the driving spirit behind the Dardanelles campaign. The failure of that brilliantly conceived but miserably executed operation—for which he unfairly received most of the blame—haunted him throughout the interwar period. In *The World Crisis*, his combined autobiography and history of World War I, the reader can watch him meditate on the lessons of that debacle. Remarkably, for a man of his age and personality, he drew the correct lessons from that misadventure and applied them: he understood that he had failed to develop the adequate support for a strategic stroke that would probably have shortened the war. His insistence in World War II on developing strategic consensus among the Chiefs of Staff and the political elite more generally grew from those bitter experiences in 1915.

It must be conceded, in addition, that Churchill *enjoyed* leading a nation at war, and delighted in grappling with the myriad challenges of supreme command. By no means bloodthirsty (he stomped angrily out of the room when Stalin half-jokingly suggested the execution of some 50,000 German officers after the eventual Allied victory), he did have the ruthlessness required of a war lord. In the dilemmas and perplexities of strategy he found problems which summoned forth the prodigious energies of his mind. He had also trained his intellect in peacetime to deal with these problems through his writings as a historian. His early writings on Britain's colonial wars; his four-volume biography of his distinguished ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough; *The World Crisis*; and innumerable essays written for the press or private circulation dealt with the full range of military problems.

IN THE face of this extraordinary record one may ask, what relevance does it have for us today? A Churchill is not merely a rarity, but a phenomenon; no politician could hope to become such through study or self-conscious imitation, and indeed our times and world position can hardly produce his like. Nonetheless, reflection on his war leadership may inform our own thoughts on strategy and higher defense organization. Indeed, his experience has particular relevance for a country which finds itself both immensely powerful and overstretched, at a time when our central defense organization has come under searching criticism and faces imminent overhaul.

One lesson concerns the very nature of strategy. We often think of strategy as an abstract exercise, an effort of intellect rather than a day-to-day activity. Churchill's integration of the grand scheme and the grind of management gives us a more complex view, revealing perhaps how difficult it really is to operate in a strategic fashion. Moreover, his experience shows us that our usual con-

* *Prelude to Victory* (1939). Churchill once remarked to John Colville that to understand the history of World War I one needed only to read this book and its predecessor, *Liaison 1914*.

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cept of the division of labor in strategy—in which politicians set objectives and military men devise the operations to meet them—is profoundly flawed. The British war machine harnessed soldiers and statesmen together, in staffs and committees, across the full field of strategic decision. Even American politicians, who at this time made a great effort to "leave war to the professionals," found themselves compelled to intervene in the details of military decision-making—Roosevelt, for example, ordered the invasion of North Africa in 1942 against the advice of General Marshall and Admiral King.

The frictions which such civil-military fusion at the center must engender are obvious: a careful reading of the Alanbrooke diaries brings them out in depressing completeness. Nonetheless, the nature of war is such that, willy-nilly, this interweaving of civil and military authority must occur. Churchill understood this fundamental fact and proceeded from it. We, on the other hand, have failed to grapple with it, accepting in peacetime the comfortable fiction that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as strengthened and invigorated by the latest set of reforms, will conceive and implement strategy in any future war. We run thereby the very great risk of having civilian leaders every bit as astonished and befuddled at their tasks, as devoid of an organizational trellis to support them, as those French and English politicians whom General Spears witnessed in 1917.

OTHER lessons and insights await those who dip into Churchill's own writings, the Gilbert biography, and the memoirs of those who worked with him. Such an endeavor, lightened and enhanced by the glorious English which he wrote and spoke, will not only lead us to see him as an epic figure, it will also open us to the wisdom of the greatest democratic war leader of his century, and perhaps of any. Churchill was neither infallible in his judgments nor invariably prudent in his actions, but one need not succumb to hagiography to learn from his wisdom and example. We will not see his like again, but his legacy is a living one.

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The Rise & Fall of Interfaith Dialogue

Howard Singer

THE recent, ill-starred trip to Israel by John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New York, was undertaken, in part at least, at the suggestion of American Jewish leaders. The Jewish leaders hoped thereby to advance the cause of the Vatican's recognition of Israel. At the Vatican's instructions, however, the Cardinal had to strip the visit of any diplomatic significance. That provoked the American Jewish leaders to criticize the Cardinal. That, in turn, evoked the Cardinal's resentment. He expressed it publicly, adding that he hoped it would not be harder for him to work for Jewish causes in the future. In the end the Cardinal and the Jewish leaders met and let it be known, somewhat grimly, that despite everything, their fundamental friendship still remained strong.

This episode was only the most recent in a recurring, painfully familiar pattern of such events, in which hope has yielded to irritation, anger, and the gradual restoration of a public façade of reconciliation. The cycle strongly suggests that the entire process known as interfaith dialogue often resembles a *dialogue des sourdes*, a dialogue of the deaf, in which both parties speak, but neither hears the other.

I

INTERFAITH meetings are now so much taken for granted by most Jews and Christians (there were always a few dissenters on both sides) that, like computers and microwave ovens, we wonder how we ever got along without them. A reminder that interfaith activity is a recent development comes as a bit of a shock, but the fact is that before World War II there was little formal contact between Christians and Jews in America.

Religious groups were not quite hermetically sealed even then; clergymen met on Thanksgiving day, July Fourth, or other civic occasions. But the contacts were awkward, brief, and usually on neutral ground such as a veterans' cemetery. Once a year, during "Brotherhood Week," synagogues and churches arranged pulpit exchanges. The initiative was almost always taken by Jews, and the exchanges were usually limited to Reform congregations and the most liberal of the old-line Protestant denominations. Catholics never took part; neither did Orthodox or most right-wing Conservative Jewish congregations.

To make matters more difficult, by the 1930's over a hundred organizations in America were engaged in turning out anti-Semitic propaganda, and the leaders of that pack were two popular religious figures, one a Catholic priest and the other a Protestant minister. The Catholic, Father Charles E. Coughlin, attracted an enormous national audience for his weekly radio broadcasts. The Protestant, Reverend Gerald B. Winrod, published *Defender* magazine, and had a large and loyal following among fundamentalists.

Coughlin was eventually silenced by his archbishop and Winrod was indicted for sedition, but they were succeeded by others equally hostile to Jews. Father Edward Lodge Curran, president of the International Catholic Truth Society, also worked with the Christian Front, a militant Coughlinite group. (Outbreaks of synagogue vandalism and attacks on Jewish children in Boston and New York were traced to the inflammatory oratory and literature distributed by the Christian Front groups.) In the Protestant world, Winrod's place was taken by Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith, who began publishing *The Cross and the Flag* and formed the America First party, which was openly anti-Semitic and strongly anti-refugee.

In marked contrast to their present posture on admitting refugees, American churches both before and during World War II were almost totally indifferent when the refugees seeking admission were Jewish. In this they resembled their European counterparts, for the European churches had always fought "Jewish influence," and resisted the admission of Jews into society. Later, it became clear that the anti-Semitic attitudes and policies of the European churches had weakened their capacity to resist the Hitlerite tide. In his careful study of the Catholic Church in Germany, Guenter Lewy summed it up this way:

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A Church that justified moderate anti-Semitism and merely objected to extreme and immoral acts was ill-prepared to provide an effective antidote to the Nazis' gospel of hate. The roots of the Church's failure to protest or act against the later National Socialist policy of extermination lie right here, in the highly ambivalent attitude of the Church toward the Jews which we can trace from the early days of Christianity up to Hitler's accession to power and beyond.

It was the desire to put away the memory of those painful, shameful years and make a new start that explains the enthusiasm with which both Christians and Jews after the war seized upon the promise of interfaith dialogue.

II

With the election of Pope John XXIII to the papacy in 1958, a good deal of talk began to be heard about "new winds" blowing through the churches. The new Pope, a charismatic personality with a strong instinct for drama, seemed guileless and open-hearted in facing the non-Catholic world. His overtures to the Protestant "separated brethren" won an immediate response. Before long, even before Vatican II formally called for "fraternal dialogues," Anglicans and other Protestants were suddenly talking to Catholics. A strong air of expectation was abroad.

This "ecumenical" movement originally concerned only the world's Christian churches, and the centuries-old hope that eventually the "separated brethren" would be reunited. Jews had no role to play in that picture, but for reasons of their own, they wanted to be part of the growing movement.

American Jews felt particularly vulnerable after the war, unable even to mourn with dignity. The impression was widespread that their European cousins had gone to their deaths shamefully; as the popular phrase put it then, like sheep to the slaughter. More than ever before, Jews yearned to feel that they were part of America, and they would have welcomed any social device that promised to make them more acceptable to Christian society. Naturally they sought to join the interfaith movement. And the Christian world, suffering at the time from a very bad conscience about the Jews, could hardly refuse them.

For as the full horror of the Final Solution emerged and slowly claimed the world's attention, sensitive Christians began to wonder how a country that had been Christian for fifteen hundred years could have acted as did Hitler's Germany. Certain inescapable conclusions were drawn. One Protestant scholar, Dr. Bernard E. Olson, put it this way: "Hitler's pogrom was but the crown and pinnacle of a long history of hatred toward the Jew, participated in (if not initiated) by those whose duty it was to teach their children the truths of Christianity." Frank Getlein, a Catholic writer, caught the moment in a vivid image. The Catholic Church, he said, looked at the death camps and, remembering its own anti-Semitism, reacted the way a heavy social drinker does to a long-gone drunk rolling in the gutter.

But whether the motivation was a stricken conscience or merely the need to spruce up a tarnished image, a certain awareness of Jewish sensitivities seemed to develop among Christians. On their side, with Pope John's proclamation of Vatican II, and with the hint that the Council would issue a declaration of some sort on the Jews, a mild fever seized American Jews. Local Jewish organizations, rabbis, and even informal social groups made overtures to their neighborhood Catholic and Protestant social equivalents, or, more rarely, received overtures. Responses from the Christian community were usually warm. Invitations were extended and accepted; meetings took place. The only holdout seemed to be the Orthodox Jewish community.

No one quite knew what was supposed to happen at a "dialogue" and consequently a great many of those early meetings were awkward. But as many saw it, even if such meetings between Christians and Jews never got beyond small talk, the fact that they could take place at all was remarkable by the standards of the time. The real point of the meeting, then, was the meeting itself.

Before long, however, it became clear that laymen getting together to discuss religion could only exchange superficialities. The major Jewish organizations slowly took over. They hired rabbis, who presumably were better equipped, to speak to the non-Jewish community at burgeoning conferences, lectures, educational programs, and community meetings, and to supervise organizational news releases on interfaith subjects. A small Jewish interfaith bureaucracy sprang up to correspond with the Catholic and Protestant church bureaucracies forming to deal with Jewish relations.

For the Jewish community (with the exception of the Orthodox) in those early days, dialogue held tremendous promise. Shortly before Vatican II was to take place, one Reform rabbi was so moved at the prospect of its statement on the Jews that he suggested Jews respond by rethinking their position on Jesus. Laymen were equally hopeful. Once, while lecturing somewhere on social trends, I said that I had reservations about the value of interfaith initiatives. I expected an argument; I was not prepared when a young woman burst into tears. But I should have known better. It was the early 60's, the world seemed open and endlessly manipulable, and at last the representatives of the religions of humanity were meeting, talking, apparently transcending the parochialisms of their respective traditions and reaching out to one another in the spirit of love which is, in theory, the

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core of all faiths. Tears are, after all, an understandable response when one's messianic visions are lightly dismissed. But all that, of course, was before Pope John had convened Vatican II in 1962.

III

WHEN an early draft of the Vatican's Declaration on the Jews was made public in 1964, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik, an Orthodox figure of towering reputation, dismissed it as "evangelical propaganda" and pointed out that "the schema does not recognize Jews as people with the right to live their own lives and worship in their own way." The Rabbinical Council of America, representing Orthodox rabbis, stated that "Any suggestion that the historical and metahistorical worth of a faith community be viewed against the backdrop of another faith . . . can only breed discord and suspicion." The Rabbinical Council objected, also, because the draft "expressed the eschatological hope that old and new Israel will one day be united in a Christian faith."

As Vatican deliberations proceeded, Jews became aware that a bitter struggle was taking place between those within the Church who wanted a "strong" statement and those (theological conservatives and bishops from Middle Eastern countries) who wanted it toned down. The struggle, though supposedly behind the scenes, was not really concealed. Bishop Luigi Segni, one of the most influential figures in Vatican circles, let it be known that he believed "Judaism, by its very nature, still carries the judgment of condemnation by God" and that the word "deicide" was "the only fitting one for the Jewish people." Controversy arose over whether anti-Semitism should be "condemned" or merely "deplored." Whatever good will the statement might have created in the Jewish community, had it been made in a generous spirit, was gradually dissipated.

In 1965, after the death of Pope John and during the new reign of Paul VI, the Council passed its final statement on the Jews (Section 4 of *Nostra Aetate*—"In Our Time") by a vote of 2,221 to 88. In this document the Council declared that "Jews should not be represented as repudiated or cursed by God," and that "God holds the Jews most dear," but added (quoting St. Paul), "because of their fathers." It asserted that "what happened to Christ in his passion can in no way be attributed to the whole of the Jewish people living at that time, much less to those living now," [for] "Christ underwent his passion freely, because of the sins of all men, and out of infinite love." The document stated that "the spiritual patrimony common to Christians and Jews . . . is great" but "Jerusalem did not recognize the time of her visitation . . ." and that ". . . authorities of the Jews and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ." The paragraphs concerning Jews ended by declaring that with the arrival of Jesus, the "cross of Christ" became "the fountain from which every grace flows."

While exonerating Jews of guilt for the crucifixion, the document, in essence a restatement of classical Christian theology, implied that Judaism had been superseded, that after Jesus the Jewish people were superfluous in God's salvational plan, that Jewish corporate existence was without value. The Orthodox Jews had objected to the early draft because it "suggested that the worth of Jewish existence derived from its relationship to Christian aspiration." The final version justified their foreboding. Orthodox Jews are thought to "lag behind" the rest of the Jewish community, but in this instance they had been far ahead, and the opinion of the Jewish community as a whole quickly caught up with them.

Still, the document did oppose anti-Semitism, and seemed to dispose of the hate-inspiring charge of deicide. In the Jewish community, the professionals involved in the interfaith effort made the most of that. Some had been to Rome as observers during the sessions and had a vested interest in bolstering the now-flagging enthusiasm for dialogue. But barely five months after the declaration, Pope Paul preached a Lenten sermon on the Jews that made even the professionals despair, at least temporarily.

"The Gospel reading," the Pope said, "is a grave and sad page. It describes the clash between Jesus and the Jewish people. That people, predestined to receive the messiah, who awaited him for thousands of years and was completely absorbed in this hope and in this certainty, at the right moment, when, that is, Christ came, spoke, and presented himself, not only did not recognize him, but fought him, slandered and injured him, and in the end, killed him."

Jews were shocked. The Pope's Lenten sermon seemed to contradict the Declaration in letter and spirit. Vatican spokesmen quickly explained that the Pope was merely presenting the Gospel lesson to the worshippers. But since the Gospels would never be edited to remove the offensive passages, Jews began to feel that nothing had changed. Some interpreted the incident as a sign that the entire Declaration on the Jews had been a public-relations exercise whose only purpose was to improve the image of the Catholic Church.

True, the Vatican had distanced itself officially from anti-Semitism. True, there were also formal condemnations of anti-Semitism at conventions of the various Protestant churches, and the Protestant World Council of Churches; the favored formula was that "anti-Semitism is a sin against God and man." But it seemed to many Jews that all those formal votes had only one result: they enabled those who voted to congratulate themselves on their liberality, and rejoice that they and their

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churches had always been on the ,ide of the angels. But such declarations ,revent it from anti-Semitism when it surface' did not prevent surfacing, or remove its ca' fine distinctions some Christians from ,nti-Semitism, which (lost on most Jews) b' secular and political was to be condemgor.

Christians might ,ppointment and dismay, and might supp tant to Jews, so important Yet for a the threat to withdraw from dialogue nd the same time as the Vati- that ot when Rolf Hochhuth's play, *The* dialo New York. The play had en- ut successful runs in several Euro- de its theme was the failure of Pope d's "deputy" on earth during the war rotest the murder of European Jewry. American Catholic figure now let it be hat unless the Jewish comunity repudi- e play, Catholics would withdraw from any er dialogue. The representatives of several Jewish organizations promptly condemned the play; one attempted to prevent network TV coverage of the opening night. Ironically, quite a few thoughtful Catholic writers (Hilda Graef in the *Catholic World* and George Shuster in the New York *Times*) agreed with the play's thesis.

One irritant, though, was too much even for the most patient Jewish participants, and threatened to end the whole process: Jewish laymen participating in dialogue were occasionally given missionary literature or personally invited to find fulfillment in Christ. This happened with both Protestants and Catholics, for Christian laymen saw the invitations they extended as expressions of their loving concern, and refused to understand that what seemed altruism to them was subversion to Jews.

The Commission for Catholic-Jewish relations of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops eventually issued a set of "guidelines" for Catholic-Jewish dialogues. To allay Jewish fears, the seventh principle read: "It is understood that proselytizing is to be carefully avoided in the dialogue. . . ." This restrictive principle was limited to the dialogue itself, but even so it was clearly a departure from Catholic precedent (Cardinal Bea, in his interpretation of the Vatican Declaration, had stated that the Church "explicitly and openly declares that it is both her duty and her desire to preach Christ") and Jews deeply appreciated it. Indeed the comments from Jewish organizational leaders were lyrical. They spoke of the guidelines as an "unparalleled commitment," a "historic development." Faith in dialogue had rebounded from the historic low level reached after the Vatican II Declaration was issued. Now it was high again, and one might express reservations about it only at one's peril.

In January 1967, by way of illustration, the *Saturday Evening Post* published an article I had written on the subject. As I reread it twenty years later, it seems tame enough, though at the time I suppose it was shocking. I said that I was all for friendly contacts between Christians and Jews, but that we shared no theological ground and therefore theology was not a likely area for fruitful discussion. I said that Christians spoke of a "common spiritual patrimony" because the Jewish foundation "legitimates" Christianity. Jews rarely contested that because they were an insecure minority, and it would hardly be good public relations for Jews to go about quoting Santayana, who saw Christianity as a "paganization" of Judaism. But the truth, as Professor Walter Kaufmann had pointed out, was that there existed no more reason to talk of a Judeo-Christian tradition than of a Judeo-Islamic or Greco-Christian tradition.

I expected a mild reaction. I received 800 letters in reply and the *Post* got 200 more. Most of the Christians were in opposition, many were abusive, quite a few invited me to find Jesus and save my soul. I was also soundly scolded in the editorials of several Jewish publications for opposing dialogue and, even worse, for expressing my opposition in a mass medium. But my mistake, it turned out, was not in substance but in timing. Five months after my *Post* article appeared, the interfaith professionals who had scolded me for having little faith were actually denouncing their companions in dialogue. For by then the Six-Day War had broken out and had changed everything.

AS THE storm approached in the last two weeks of May and the first week in June 1967, it looked as if the Jewish state would be overrun in a matter of days. Egypt, supported by the other Arab powers, openly boasted of its intention to attack at a moment it found suitable. Israel had no allies, it was surrounded by enemies, its own military forces were greatly outnumbered. Cairo radio broadcast the warning that the Egyptian army would not spare women and children, but promised to "send the Jewish survivors back to Europe—if there are any." Jewish participants in interfaith dialogue, fearing a second Holocaust, pleaded with their opposite numbers for support. With very few exceptions, it was not forthcoming. The Jews were usually turned down on the grounds that the issue was "political," not religious.

When the war ended in Israel's astounding victory, many Christian religious leaders first seemed dazed, and then hostile. In a remarkably revealing letter to the editor of the New York *Times*, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, a Presbyterian minister and the retired president of Union Theological Seminary in New York, wrote:

> All persons who seek to view the Middle East problem with honesty and objectivity will stand

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aghast at Israel's onslaught, the most violent, ruthless (and successful) aggression since Hitler's blitzkrieg across Western Europe in the summer of 1940, aiming not at victory but at annihilation—the very objective proclaimed by Nasser and his allies which had drawn support to Israel. . . . Anyone who voices such judgments knows that he risks alienation from honored and beloved Jewish friends and associates. It is perhaps better that it be declared by one who no longer holds Christian office than by those, many of whom are expressing similar views privately, whose responsibilities in the "Christian establishment" stop them from forthright public speech.

But forthright speech ruled the hour. When one Jewish leader criticized "the organized Christian Church" for being unwilling to take a strong stand on what it considered a political issue, adding that "the survival of the Jewish people is not a political issue," a Catholic leader snapped back, "In my judgment their [the Jewish spokesmen's] 'what have you done for us lately?' criticism of the Catholic Church is a form of ecumenical or interreligious blackmail." The liberal Protestant *Christian Century* editorialized: "If interfaith dialogue must cease until all Christians become Zionists, then, of course, there will be no dialogue."

The attitude of the churchmen was all the more striking since it was in such glaring contrast to the mood of other Americans. As most Americans saw it, David had beaten Goliath once again, and the country went wild with enthusiasm and admiration for Israel. Only churchmen remained glum.

Dr. A. Roy Eckardt, a Methodist minister who at the time was teaching religion at Lehigh University, studied the reactions of his fellow clergymen and then wrote in the *Christian Century*:

> The one unbreakable bond that unites the Arab peoples is their conviction that Israel deserves to die. But this conviction retains a deep hold upon the Christian as well. For centuries Christendom has been indoctrinated with the identical idea: Jews have no ultimate or integral right to exist—in their land or anywhere, as a faith or as a people. [There is] a powerful ideological affinity between Christian predispositions and the annihilationist designs of the Arabs. . . . Whenever Israel is assailed, certain suppressed, macabre elements in the Christian soul are stirred to sympathy with the assailants.

Despite this shock to dialogue, within six months after the war, Jewish interfaith activists were fervent once again. "All it means is that we didn't explain ourselves well to the Christians," one said. "We'll have to put Israel on the agenda, and dialogue will ultimately be strengthened by this experience." Accordingly, interfaith conferences were scheduled to deal with the "religious meaning of Israel to the Jews." The ordinary "secular" concern of American Jews for the physical survival of Israel's people (so many of whom were already survivors of Nazi concentration camps as well as children of American Jews) was not good enough. The state of Israel was "theologized," its place in the Jewish dialogue with Christians. The attachment of the Jews to Israel was "explained." Then, in the spirit of civility, Christians would respect the strange religious imagination "exhibited" it might seem, as they respected the traditions of other groups with which they shared our pluralistic society.

Even then the path of dialogue was not entirely smooth. From 1967 to the present, storms have marred the tranquility of interfaith relations, with the 1982 war in Lebanon being the most notable. That war was strongly criticized on political and even moral grounds by many Israelis themselves, but the rush to condemn Israel in many church circles was of another order, notable for its theological overtones. Under all the ferocious sermonizing, Jews sensed an unwillingness to grant Israel the same right that governments of other nations have: the right to defend its citizens, or even the right to make mistakes in judgment. On the first issue, Israel was apparently the only nation in the world expected to tolerate on its borders the permanent presence of a large, hostile, heavily armed force pledged to and planning its destruction. On the second issue, the only way the Jews could keep their government from ever making a mistake was to dissolve the machinery of state, and go back to their old condition of utter defenselessness. Israel was not in immediate danger of annihilation during the Lebanon war, but to many Jews the Christian chorus of condemnation seemed to be a reprise of the same themes they had heard in 1967.

IV

WHY has the course of interfaith dialogue resembled the track of a roller coaster? Why have its oscillations in morale been so wild? One reason is that the obstacles to better understanding have themselves never been clearly understood.

Much has been made in this connection of the "vested interests" the churches, Protestant and Catholic, have in the Middle East. But doctrinal barriers are probably more serious, if only because they are less accessible and therefore harder to counter.

From its earliest days Christianity was hard put to explain the embarrassing fact that Jesus, a Jew, was rejected by his own people.* A suitable

* That the embarrassment then became an ongoing source of suppressed rage is not a new idea, but recently it has been persuasively argued by Stuart E. Rosenberg in his book, *The Christian Problem* (Hippocrene Books, 241 pp., $15.95).

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explanation appeared, and was embellished with time: the Jews were peculiarly obdurate, and blinded by their own worldly ambitions. In punishment for this they were to be scattered and doomed to wander eternally over the earth; they would endure, but only in homeless misery.

To Jews, this kind of thing might have been understandable in the 3rd century, when the two faiths were still rivals, but Jews could not imagine the churches hanging on to such ideas in the late 20th century, especially after these ideas had caused or contributed to unspeakable injury to millions of innocent people.

What Jews failed to see was that the doctrines affecting them were not merely accidental accretions but central to Christian theology. This was particularly true of the attitude of the Catholic Church toward Israel. The Church's old teaching about Jews (who were compared by Pope Innocent III to the fratricide Cain, and were supposed to "wander through the earth as fugitives and vagabonds, their faces covered with shame") would discourage full recognition of Israel even if the political issues (defined borders, the status of Jerusalem) were settled to the Vatican's satisfaction. The Church may have to deal with this new and unwelcome Israeli entity de facto, but recognizing Israel would appear to "legitimize" the return of the Jews in their unconverted state. Fortunately for the Vatican, the issue of Jerusalem is available as a fig leaf. Since Israel will never internationalize Jerusalem, the Church in turn may never have to choose between openly rejecting its old teachings and openly revealing its reluctance to embrace the elder brother.

V

ENTHUSIASTS for dialogue have suggested that it is to some significant degree responsible for a decline of anti-Semitism. It seems to me that this claim is totally without foundation. Dialogue is itself a symptom, not a cause, of the declining respectability of anti-Jewish attitudes in the United States in the past thirty or forty years.

Nor can Jewish enthusiasts for dialogue sustain the claim that it has been instrumental in creating more sympathy for Israel in the Christian community. The most fervent Christian supporters of Israel, the fundamentalists, have certainly not come to their convictions because of eloquent speeches on the subject at interfaith conferences. They are, in fact, the least likely of all Christians to attend such conferences. In any case, their support of Israel is inspired by their own understanding of Scripture, and it has always been beyond the reach of all outside influences.

What then has dialogue accomplished? It has created a forum in which those who have felt aggrieved can express their grievances. A theology cannot be struck down as easily as segregation laws, but those who accept that theology have clearly been placed on the defensive and forced, at least formally, to disown its undesirable implications. That is more than was conceivable fifty years ago, but it is not as much as the complainants in recent years thought they had reason to hope for, and there seems little prospect that their hopes will be more fully realized in the future.

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Picasso's Motif

James Gardner

PABLO PICASSO's influence has completely overleapt its artistic boundaries, implanting itself, often unseen, deeply within the souls of people everywhere. Just as the average citified Westerner, even if he has never read a page of Freud or Einstein, has yet been affected in one way or another by their respective models of the human psyche and the universe, so does he carry into the corners of his preconception certain basic intuitions about the human form, and about human life in general, which derive directly from Picasso, or indirectly from his influence upon countless lesser artists.

We may not be accustomed to thinking of painters as exercising such a profound effect on their cultures, if only because their artifacts, so small and so few, lack the impact of literature or film or music, art forms that can be mass-produced, that require more than a moment to be taken in, and that can dwell in many peoples' minds at the same time. But the explosion of inexpensive art books and publications, the proliferation of museums, and the perfection of the techniques of photography have made it difficult entirely to escape the influence of a great visual artist. The paintings of Picasso have been reproduced in thousands upon thousands of postcards, and have been parodied in advertisements and editorial cartoons. In the 60's and early 70's, when posters were the rage, Picasso's irenic depictions of flowers and children, as well as his antiwar stance and his apparent endorsement of libidinal freedom, made him a popular choice in college dormitories everywhere.

Such is the pervasiveness of Picasso's influence that we will probably need another hundred years at least before it will become possible definitively to assess and interpret his achievement. Because new discoveries are constantly being made, the returns are not all in; and because he was so prolific and protean an artist, so complex and at times so exasperating a man, few scholars are soon likely to possess the industry or the honesty to contemplate his enormous output with the requisite critical distance. Questions concerning the exact nature of his achievement, constantly present throughout a career that spanned in itself, without intermission, a full three-quarters of a century, have most recently been raised anew with the opening of the Picasso Museum in Paris and with the extraordinary discovery of almost 170 notebooks overflowing with drawings from the last seventy years of his life.*

The Picasso Museum houses what is probably the single greatest collection of the master's works, and its interest is enhanced by the fact that it was assembled by Picasso himself, and given to the state by his heirs in lieu of inheritance taxes. Even though the collection is slightly weaker in some areas than in others, it contains a staggering number of great paintings, and is especially rich in later works. It thus serves as an excellent review of the artist's overall career, and the setting, slightly drab despite the furniture by Diego Giacometti that was created specifically for the museum, is nevertheless congenial to viewing the assembled works (if the visitor can get there when it is not too crowded).

As for the countless thousands of drawings contained in the notebooks, these greatly enhance our understanding of each step of Picasso's career, sometimes recording, from day to day, the evolution of a simple idea into a shape that we easily recognize as a famous masterpiece. But the interest of these drawings is more than merely art-historical; hundreds of them are among the best things Picasso ever did. It was once conservatively estimated that in his career Picasso created over 10,000 works of art, which would make him, in addition to much else, perhaps the most prolific artist of all time. (So prolific that his works tend to sell less well at auction than the works of many lesser artists, simply because the market is quite flooded and any serious collector who wants a Picasso can have one without too much trouble.) But just when it began to seem possible to come to terms with that vastness, the sketchbooks have appeared, and a sense of oceanic wealth has overtaken all calculation.

In these drawings is found abundant confirmation of everything most prized in the work of Pablo Picasso. There is the steady sureness of his creativity, characterized by an unerring instinct for what makes artistic sense. There is the conjoined aptitude for the general and the specific, for the telling and flawlessly rendered detail no less than for the overall originality of conception. Colors are either bold in their contrasts or exceedingly subtle in their moody interaction. And together with this effortless mastery of his materials, Picasso shows himself able over and over again to start anew, bringing forth a variety of unprecedented and generally unrepeatable forms and artistic ideas. Although there are surely recurring themes in the art of Picasso, as in the art of everyone else, few if any artists have been as consistently and restlessly innovative; in many of these drawings,

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* The notebooks, currently on a nationwide tour of the U.S., were on view at the Pace Gallery in New York last year, and at the Royal Academy in London. They have been published as *The Sketchbooks of Picasso*, edited by Arnold Glimcher and Mark Glimcher, Atlantic Monthly Press, 360 pp., $65.00.

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and in so much else that Picasso did, we have the sense of a huge achievement allied to a yet larger potential.

The greatness that these drawings confirm has been more or less beyond question since the second decade of the century, and it is likely to remain so. But Picasso has been admired for a variety of reasons, and in varying degrees of intensity or consistency. Today it is understandably the case that, after two generations of adulation, he is in the process of being soberly reexamined, with the likelihood that he will be found rather less monumental than he once seemed. Any output as massive and varied as Picasso's necessarily reflects huge fluctuations in quality, and also harbors a sufficient number of themes and meanings for everyone to find something to endorse and dozens of things to reprove. But within this variation, there nevertheless do exist certain elements which guided Picasso from early in his career, and which permit us to speak of a general continuity. This continuity, spiritual or intellectual rather than formal, consists above all in the one theme to which Picasso was forever returning through a kind of unerring instinct, a motif which in part he invented and which in part he merely enunciated better than anyone else before or after him: the motif of savagery.

THE ONLY paintings in which we will not find this motif are, significantly, the works of Picasso's early teens when he was most stalwartly academic and when he was obediently following the commandments of others. In this case obedience was due to his father, an able teacher of painting in Barcelona who specialized in the anecdotal Realism of the later 19th century. Two works of Picasso's early teens are prodigious examples, if not of any early genius, at least of the ability to conform to what was required of him. In *The First Communion*, a young girl dressed in resplendent whiteness kneels at a gleaming red altar, while her mother and father stand behind her, and a choirboy places blue and yellow flowers upon the altar. A similar mood is found in *Science and Charity*, in which a doctor, seated beside the patient's bed, feels her pulse, while a nun, who holds the woman's child in her arms, is trying to console her.

These paintings are in a sense the finest things Picasso's father had ever done. They are colorful, accurate, and spiritually rubicund and reassuring. They are also breezily easy to attack, for they bespeak in no uncertain terms what Picasso would later consider the mindless complacency of the bourgeoisie, which in the next decade he would set about attacking.

The first intimations of Picasso's future greatness appeared subsequent to his initial contact with Paris, which he would visit three times between 1900 and 1902, and where, two years later, he would settle permanently. Here he would discover Van Gogh and Lautrec, as well as the Nabis, the followers of Gauguin. The artistic climate in Paris in the last decade of the 19th century was one of turbulence, vast diversity, and constant change. These influences found in the twenty-year-old Picasso an avid disciple, who could instantly assimilate and flourish in any style that he took on. He painted comfortable interiors *à la* Vuillard, and he captured the ecstatic fanfare of Bastille Day in the manner of Bonnard.

These works, better than his earlier academic efforts, nevertheless resemble them in the reassurance that they give to the social status quo. Like everything else being produced in Paris at that time, they were the offspring of Impressionism. This movement had been revolutionary in its systematic readjustment of perception, as well as in its choice of subjects, but it was an art that reflected the new social realities of the time, not one that sought to change them. One has only to glance at Picasso's beautiful painting, *The Blue Room*, which he did in 1901, clearly under the influence of Vuillard, to appreciate the evocative domesticity of the scene, in which a nude woman out of Degas is seen bathing in a cozy room featuring a bouquet of flowers and several small paintings on the walls.

But already by this time there was manifested in Picasso's works something more troublesome, something nastier and more subversive. In the Picasso Museum is a portrait of Picasso's dead friend Casagemas, who committed suicide after an unhappy love affair. His head, draped in eerie green shadow, is seen floating in a sea of sheets, while only his profile is rimmed in yellow by the light of the candle that burns perilously close to his nose. In the same year, in one of the earliest paintings of his Blue Period (1901-04), Picasso did a self-portrait in which his pallid, bearded face stares at us from out of his massive overcoat, the outline of which is shockingly extenuated by the icy blue air that surrounds it.

In general, the paintings of Picasso's Blue Period, formally advanced and skillful, represent an adolescent malaise which he would subsequently outgrow. Here he focused upon the depressed portions of urban society, the outcasts and poets sipping their absinthe, the jugglers and children and young women penuriously eking out their existence, all depicted in a lugubrious and sub-aquatic blue. By contrast, the paintings of the next, Rose Period (1905-07) are set in a generally happier tone, with soft, mellow pinks and yellows and, for subjects, primarily children, acrobats, and horses.

BUT nothing in either of these two periods, or even in the more ghoulish post-Impressionist works that preceded them, really prepares us for the revelation of *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* of 1907, one of the treasures of the Museum of Modern Art in New York. This painting shows a brothel scene, but one so abstracted as to be scarcely recognizable for what it is, resembling rather a stall in a zoo. The five women depicted are rendered in blue and pink, together with the brown tonalities of the late Rose Period, and in severe, abstracted facets, rather than modeling. They gyrate menacingly across the canvas, while in the lower right-hand corner there crouches a figure whose face is conceived as an African mask.

With *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* Picasso chose a path violently at

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variance with anything in the previous tradition of Western art. He was surely not the first to bring shrillness or perturbation to the art of painting—one finds it in Cosme Tura, El Greco, and Salvator Rosa in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries respectively, and more and more thereafter—but the perturbation of earlier paintings is a quality reflected in them, rather than something extending aggressively out of them. Starting with this painting, it was Pablo Picasso, more than any other single person, who provided artists with the formal vocabulary to represent the quintessentially modern "alternative" of the savage and the demonic. Even Picasso's most fervid admirers of the time were shocked in a way that we can never be again, no matter how meticulous our historical intuition.

This work can also be credited with introducing African tribal imagery into the mainstream of Western art. Previously, when Western artists had borrowed from other traditions, they managed to neutralize those importations into purely ornamental addenda. One thinks of black Chinese laqueur fitting patly into Louis Quinze ormolu, of the arabesques of Gerôme, or the *japonisme* of Manet and Lautrec. These had always made playful backdrops for figures that implicitly obeyed the canons of Western art. Picasso, however, was the first conscientiously to absent himself from Western tradition, and, in part, to turn upon it—again in the interest of capturing the presumed essence of man which he found in the condition of the savage.

Les Demoiselles d'Avignon is significant for still another reason; it was an essential step in the evolution of Cubism. Indeed, the spiritual and formal disorderliness of this painting was systematized, as it were, in Cubism, which visually fractured the most elemental aspects of reality in a manner almost scientific. Of course, to paint in a Cubist mode did not necessarily mean to limit oneself to the motif of savagery, and indeed in Picasso's work this motif soon subsided (though it would resurface quickly enough), giving way for a while to much tamer subjects like landscapes, still lifes, and portraits. In due course, in the Synthetic Cubism that began in 1912, he expanded his subjects to comprise scenes that implied action, and action that implied signification. These subjects also become somewhat more varied, as in the highly abstracted depictions of Harlequin, whose motley is seen against solid fields of turquoise and black, which give emphasis to his tiny pea-shaped head. Similarly, the two versions of *The Three Musicians* (1921), which are late works of Synthetic Cubism, represent a return to a more direct and personal style of communication.

With this rediscovery of the direct and the personal, Picasso would gradually find his way back to that doctrine which he first took up in 1907. By the early 1930's, there had returned to Picasso's work, and returned to stay, an atavism and savagery such as had not been seen since *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon*. In the manner of Miró he produced flat biomorphic abstractions, or brought forth a profusion of unnamable creatures resting in a state of apparent nakedness at the edge of the sea, placed against a pale blue sky and a light sandy floor as in a dream full of hidden and disturbing metaphors. This was the period, too, of Picasso's bullfighting scenes and depictions of the Minotaur. In an etching like the *Female Bullfighter I*, an aggressive sexuality is asserted in the bestial convergence of beast and frail human female, until it becomes impossible to distinguish one from the other. *Minotauromachy* depicts the mythical creature, with its bull's head and body of a man, seeking guidance from a fragile young girl.

From this point on in Picasso's career, savagery becomes thoroughly assimilated and habitual. It is also at this point in his life that Picasso's name became a household word, associated for the most part not with the Cubist or classically inspired works of the previous twenty years but rather with these turbulent and gory depictions of encounters among men, and between the sexes, reduced to the unmediated and irrational aggressions of the lower orders of the animal kingdom.

It was this same Picasso who produced as well the highly political paintings of the late 30's, 40's, and early 50's. These include most famously the *Guernica* (1937), in which is depicted the bombardment of a Basque town during the Spanish Civil War by pro-Franco forces. The metallic grays, the bare light bulb in contention with a candle, the archaic residues of weeping Niobes and horses, force a shocking and abrupt conjunction of the oldest human passions with the most essentially modern technological expedients. When we speak of a typical Picasso, or for that matter when we think of a typical painting of this century, we are speaking of this painting more than of anything before it. It is here that we have, fully developed, the sense of the passionate, unqualified cruelty of the human condition.

Several years later the motif was amplified in the *Charnel House*, a lurid response to the revelation in 1945 of the atrocities that had taken place in the Nazi concentration camps. It is seen again in *Massacre in Korea* (1951), in which a serried phalanx of soldiers takes aim at a huddled group of mothers and children, raising their arms in despair and supplication. By this time Picasso, who had of course been sympathetic to the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War, was formally enlisted as a member of the French Communist party. He joined the party immediately after the liberation in 1944, and never left, not even after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 or after Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th Party Congress of the crimes committed by Stalin—both occasions on which many French intellectuals broke with the party. Whatever his motives, first for joining and then for remaining in the most devotedly pro-Moscow of all West European Communist parties, it was for the party that Picasso created his world-famous images of doves and children.

THERE can be no question but that the art Picasso made in the last twenty-five years of his life was

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generally not as impressive as what had preceded it. The reasons that have been adduced for this are various: he has been accused of complacency, of losing touch with the latest trends in art, of surrendering to Communism, of selling out to the capitalists. But if the paintings of his last period are less prepossessing than what went before, they are only a little less so, and any one of a hundred of them would have made the name of a lesser artist. Their effortless virtuosity reveals a man who has domesticated, without destroying, his inner demons.

If the motifs of savagery and dislocation seem partially abated in these later works, it may be only because they have been more or less successfully assimilated, both by the painter and by us, his audience. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that these motifs, which Picasso, starting in 1907, lodged so firmly in the consciousness of the Western public, have in the intervening years gone from a revelation to a conviction and from a conviction to, at last, a commonplace, a view of the human condition to which even the most peaceable among us now gives tacit assent.

Whether it is a true view of the human condition is another question. The least we can say is that this notion, so common in almost every realm where serious art or music or literature is made, so dear to the culture of our time as to be perhaps its defining feature, is itself as much a creature of custom and self-delusion as were the earlier views of man which it has supplanted. For a painter truly to depict the nature of man, it would be necessary to combine Giotto and Raphael with the *Guernica*—although what that thing would look like we cannot pretend to say.

One element of the importance of Picasso lies in the fact that he revealed a side of human nature which had been systematically ignored by earlier artists. His greatness, as opposed to his importance, consists in the mastery with which he articulated this view—a view that nevertheless remains, for all its currency, one of radical eccentricity.

Music

Dead from Lincoln Center

Samuel Lipman

EVIDENCE that a massive expansion of the American opera public might be possible has been gathering since the beginning of the 20th century. The first great expansion took place with the popularity of acoustic recordings of opera excerpts shortly after 1900. This era, closely associated with the tenor Enrico Caruso (1873-1921), brought the hit tunes of the great operatic composers into every home aspiring to culture. After 1925, with electrical recording, came the presentation of famous operas in essentially complete form. More importantly, the advent of radio brought live performances, free to anyone with the price of a cheap set, by the reigning opera stars of the day singing under commercial sponsorship; those listeners with the desire and the patience to sit through a whole afternoon were able, from the mid-1930's on, to hear weekly Metropolitan Opera broadcasts featuring international casts.

After World War II, the LP made possible the recording of the entire known operatic repertory, and the exploration of sizable parts of the forgotten repertory; thanks to the LP's low price and improved reproduction, listening in the home became a viable economic and artistic substitute for attendance at live performances. Television, too, seemed to promise much for the cause of opera, including even contemporary opera; the NBC Opera Theater, a project much beloved of RCA's (and thus NBC's) then-czar David Sarnoff, presented new works specially written for the screen. This particular promise, however, unfortunately petered out after the 1950's with the increasingly total abdication by commercial television of any responsibility for the life of serious culture in the United States.

From the mid-1970's on, the future of opera on the highest level for a mass audience clearly lay with public television and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). Indeed, one of the great hopes of public television, advanced sincerely by some of its backers and cynically by others, was that opera "at its best" could thereby be made available to an American audience otherwise limited by low income, poor education, or geographical location away from the great cities. Because nothing but the best—or at least the most famous—was thought to be good enough for this projected new audience, PBS began to broadcast Metropolitan Opera productions, bathed and overbathed in the kind of glitter associated with opera for the past century and more.

But watching long operas on television, after all, requires a rather greater attention span from the audience than anyone in television might reasonably expect. And so it was soon realized that even Met offerings, restricted as they were to presenting complete works, failed to capitalize sufficiently on the stars in their casts. Now was born the celebrity recital, in which short excerpts highlighting the vocal strengths of these stars could be sold as delivering not just the best of opera, but the best of the best.

The chief beneficiary of this process on public television during the past decade has undoubtedly been the Italian tenor Luciano Pavarotti, born in Modena in

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1935. Pavarotti's career has risen spectacularly since the mid-1960's. Every success (save for a film career) has been his: roles with every major opera company, widely publicized song recitals before huge audiences, and innumerable recordings for Decca/London, capped by triumphant appearances on public television, not just in opera but in recitals of varied material including Christmas carols and those staples of the popular tenor's repertory, Italian folk songs. Through a combination of vocal strength, a teddy-bear personality on and off the stage, vastly astute commercial management, and real popular appeal, Pavarotti bids fair to join Caruso and Beniamino Gigli (1890-1957) in the ranks of the most commercially successful tenors of the Italian tradition.

One of Pavarotti's closest associates on the stage has been the Australian soprano Joan Sutherland. Born in Sydney in 1926, she came to London in 1951, where she studied at the Royal College of Music and soon gained a contract with the Covent Garden opera company. Beginning without a specialty in any particular repertory, under the tutelage of the young Australian conductor and pianist Richard Bonynge (whom she married in 1954), Sutherland turned to florid 18th-century compositions and to the Italian and French dramatic coloratura repertory of the 19th century, and therein found her métier. After her 1959 Covent Garden appearance in the title role of Donizetti's *Lucia di Lammermoor*, Sutherland embarked upon a conquest of the most brilliant and difficult works—always, however, excluding the great German operas of Wagner and Strauss—written for the female voice. From Handel through Bellini to Massenet, the singing of Sutherland in performance and on records (again, as with Pavarotti, for Decca/London) has made operatic history.

The first joint appearance of Sutherland and Pavarotti seems to have been in *Lucia di Lammermoor* at the Greater Miami Opera in March 1965. In the same year they sang together in Bellini's *La Sonnambula* at Covent Garden, and then in these two operas, along with Verdi's *La Traviata*, in the performances, promoted and directed by the soprano and her husband throughout Australia, of the Sutherland Williamson International Grand Opera Company. Since then they have often collaborated in the opera house, on records, and on television: not only do they work comfortably together as singers, but Pavarotti's height and imposing stature make him a suitable partner for the tall and equally imposing Sutherland. All this is photographically documented, together with many pictures of them at work and *en famille*, in two large and glossy books published last year, *The Joan Sutherland Album*, compiled by Sutherland and her husband (along with a short tribute by Pavarotti)[1] and in Martin Mayer's *Grandissimo Pavarotti*.[2]

And so it must have seemed natural for PBS—and the Met, its favorite (and almost sole) operatic presentor—to bring these two artists together this winter in a "gala" appearance, taped in the Metropolitan Opera on January 11, and televised across the nation on March 4. There was, not surprisingly, the usual discovery of an "anniversary" to celebrate. In this case, indeed, there were, according to the honeyed but frenetic patter of host Joanne Woodward, actually two: the 25th anniversaries of Sutherland's debut at the Met and of Pavarotti's operatic debut at a little theater in Italy.

Instead of simply singing single arias and duets, Sutherland and Pavarotti this time presented three fairly substantial staged excerpts, conducted by Richard Bonynge, from operas in which they have often collaborated: *Lucia di Lammermoor*, Verdi's *Rigoletto*, and the same composer's *La Traviata*. These passages, all imperishable moments of the high tragedy of doomed love central to grand opera, provide famous singers with every opportunity for the kind of vocal and theatrical acting that goes beyond the striking of rhetorical attitudes to the creation of personality: not the familiar personality of the singer, not the formulaic personality of a character out of literary history, but rather the amalgam which results from a great actor's total penetration of, and immersion in, the character being portrayed.

Perhaps it is enough of a verdict on the Sutherland-Pavarotti performances of these stirring scenes to remark that the most distinguished feature of the telecast was the evidence provided of the enormous improvement recently made in the television transmission of music. Heard on reasonably good equipment rather than through a standard home television set, the sound now approaches in fullness and lack of distortion that available on the FM stereo simulcasts which often accompany the original, though not the repeat, television broadcasts.

The trouble, however, is that the basic sound of broadcast opera today, whether heard via television or radio, unfortunately resembles all too closely the slick electronic packaging of pop singers. This sound is the master confection of multitrack recording, constant and intrusive variations in the mixing of these tracks, and musical decisions made by engineers and directors sitting in a control truck, not by musicians satisfying their own ears as they go about the business of performing. All this fiddling at the controls produces an artificial and unmusical loudness and nearness, in place of the natural variation of balances which conductors must employ to suggest not only dramatic atmosphere but even musical structure itself. Thus the stars, when they are singing, always sound brash and close; when they are not singing, the orchestra—even when playing minor introductory accompaniment figures—is quite literally flung in the listener's ears. The result is a spurious glossiness, with the aesthetic tension created and sustained by the sheer level of decibels rather than by artistic intelli-

[1] Simon & Schuster, 191 pp., $19.95. Full biographical material on Sutherland may be found in Brian Adams, *La Stupenda* (Hutchinson of Australia, 1980).

[2] Doubleday, 224 pp., $40.00. Mayer's book, though clearly an authorized effort of adulation, also includes much solid biographical material in addition to many pictures, and even some interesting comments on the art of singing.

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gence and the evocation of authentic emotion.

ELECTRONICS aside, the Sutherland-Pavarotti telecast had precious little to contribute to the experience of great opera. There is, I suppose, plenty of virtuosity in their work, if by virtuosity one means accurate, dependable, forceful, and generally pleasant singing. But the fact is that when isolated, virtuosity in singing, as in all other branches of musical performance, all too easily becomes *mere* virtuosity, the cultivation of display for its own sake.

In the case of Sutherland's performances as Lucia, as Gilda in *Rigoletto*, and as Violetta in *Traviata*, it was impossible to escape the impression that the singer brought no more to her work than a pretty, phenomenally agile—though essentially impersonal and, at least to my ears, often unfocused—voice and a generalized musicality. Of differentiation among the contrasting characters of the unstable and vulnerable Lucia, the ultimately heroic Gilda, and the febrile yet passionate Violetta, there was almost no trace either in voice or in stage deportment. As she sang in an all-purpose voice, there was an all-purpose look on her face, as if an expression of worried and matronly concern —rarely even rising to agitation— could be a substitute for the creation of tragic character. Nor was there anything authentic or moving in her rendering of the characteristic sound of the Italian vowels and consonants, so flavorful in themselves and so necessary, not just for conveying the story but for giving an appropriately Italianate ring to the singer's voice and to the music.

Considered solely in terms of vocalism (but excepting, of course, the problem of poor diction), Sutherland's voice retains, at sixty, much of its youthful bloom and ease in both melodic and ornamented passages;[3] it is this bloom and ease which have been responsible for her position as the queen of 20th-century *bel canto*—of the virtuoso repertory of Handel, the pre-Verdi Italians, and the French composers of the second half of the 19th century.

It is often said that Sutherland, with the vital help of Bonynge, has resuscitated this repertory, which had languished in our time for lack of competent performers. This way of putting the matter, so assiduously fostered by publicists, does scant justice to Maria Callas (1923-1977), whose commanding performances of the operas of Bellini and Donizetti—in addition to many staples of the later repertory—awakened new dramatic and especially musical interest in once-familiar works. Indeed, the recorded evidence suggests that Sutherland's mere virtuosity falls far short of Callas's phenomenal musical and dramatic achievement. Like Sutherland, Callas made many recordings; her numerous commercial recordings compete with a seemingly endless stream of "pirate" versions taken from radio broadcasts. In the case of the three operas performed by Sutherland on the telecast with Pavarotti, the Callas recordings, whether commercial or "pirate," are quite sufficient in every case—despite what must be called undeniable technical vocal flaws—to convey an unparalleled force of dramatic character in a voice of haunting and plangent quality.[4] As a singing actress Callas is at her greatest—and Sutherland is at her weakest—in *Lucia*, where every note must suggest the heroine's impending doom. To put it simply, Callas, here as elsewhere, uses her voice to create unforgettable character; Sutherland uses hers merely to convince the listener that she possesses a great voice.

I AM not sure that even this much can be said of Luciano Pavarotti. Like a tennis player who is used to getting all his first serves in, Pavarotti has always seemed to belt all his notes out with the confidence of a supreme professional. And though hardly a flattering verb, "belt" is, I am afraid, the right one to describe Pavarotti's physically (though not emotionally) jaunty method of delivery. Always brilliant rather than warm and resonant, Pavarotti's voice, unlike Sutherland's, *has* lost its youthful bloom and ease;[5] in place of these qualities, so estimable in an Italian tenor, Pavarotti today puts a kind of breathless determination, as if physical effort and concentration might just possibly serve to get the notes out in a winning way.

Of differentiated character in his vocal and dramatic portrayals, Pavarotti conveys surprisingly little more than Sutherland—surprisingly, that is, considering the distance which separates the libidinous Duke in *Rigoletto* from the tormented Edgardo in *Lucia* and the serious Alfredo in *La Traviata*. It is true that the great Italian tenors with whom Pavarotti is often compared, namely Caruso and his successor, Gigli, were not great actors either. But judging from the recorded evidence, they hardly needed to be.

Caruso, even in our digitalized age, remains the touchstone by which tenors in this music are judged. His discs, all made by the primitive acoustic process, have

[3] Documentation of the state of Sutherland's voice at the beginning of her international career is currently available, in up-to-date remasterings of the three operas excerpted on the telecast. Her 1961 *Lucia* may be found on London 411622-1 LJ3; her 1962 *Rigoletto* is on London 42012; her 1963 *La Traviata* is on London JL 42010. Comparison of these recordings of a quarter-century ago with her most recent singing makes clear that, though her voice has suffered remarkably little from the passage of time, her ability to create dramatic character has grown scarcely if at all.

[4] Callas's recordings of these operas, dating from a time before her final tragic vocal decline, are also available: her 1955 Berlin *Lucia*, conducted by Herbert von Karajan, is available in a "pirate" version on Replica 23; her commercial recordings of the same opera, dating from 1953 and 1959 and both conducted by Tullio Serafin, are available, respectively, on Seraphim 1B 6032 and on the even more deeply characterized EMI/Angel AVB-34066 (remastered); her remastered 1955 *Rigoletto*, again conducted by Serafin, is available on EMI/Angel AVB-34069; her 1955 "pirate" *La Traviata*, conducted by Carlo Maria Giulini, is (or was) available on Paragon 78-157 F.

[5] Pavarotti's recordings—all with Sutherland—of the three operas excerpted on the telecast are the 1971 *Lucia*, on London OSA-13103, the 1971 *Rigoletto*, on London OSA-13105, and the 1981 *La Traviata*, on London LDR-73002. The change over the years in Pavarotti's voice is easily demonstrated by comparing the youthful freshness of his singing in the famous aria *La donna è mobile* from *Rigoletto* and the subsequent introduction to the equally famous quartet *Bella figlia dell'amore* on the 1971 recording with the stentorian bleating of the same passages on the current telecast.

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now been remarkably improved through a method of computer restoration.[6] This technique removes the spurious resonances added to the recording by the wooden horn which, in lieu of a microphone, mechanically focused the sound onto the wax discs as they were being cut. The result of the reworking is astonishingly lifelike so far as the voice is concerned; even the weak accompanying instruments, always a problem in acoustic recording, are strengthened. Two excerpts from Act IV of *Rigoletto—La donna è mobile* and the quartet *Bella figlia dell'amore*—made in the first months of 1908, show Caruso in what can only be called juicy voice, with a rich middle and upper register and a brilliant and free top.[7] There is in the quality of Caruso's voice what can only be called joy in singing; there is also a marvelously Mediterranean joy in music and life.

This same joy colors Gigli's art. Lighter in timbre than Caruso's, and even warmer, his voice can perhaps best be described as the musical equivalent of Italian sunlight and the very best olive oil. Perhaps Gigli made some special use of these national elements of weather and food; unlike Pavarotti, who now seems to have lost the musical quality of his sound, Gigli kept his voice well into his fifties and sixties,[8] singing with seemingly vast reserves of color and breath.

As heard in records from the prime of his career in the 1920's, Gigli's combination of finesse and ardor now seems overwhelming. In the opening of the *Rigoletto* quartet, sung coarsely and brazenly by Pavarotti, Gigli uses his undoubted vocal sensuality to flatter, not to taunt.[9] Whereas Pavarotti was both strained and restrained in the closing scene of *Lucia* on the telecast, Gigli's recording of this extended passage, made in 1927 with the excellent bass Ezio Pinza and the equally excellent Metropolitan Opera Chorus, is youthful and impulsive.[10]

THE decline of singing in our time is, I know, an old story. The situation was well put by the English music critic Alan Blyth in his introduction to *Opera on Record*, the indispensable book of annotated discographies he edited in 1979:

> There can be no doubt that artists in the early part of the century took a more liberal view of the score in hand and justified such liberties by giving a more personal view of the music, enhanced by a greater care over, and love for, words. Their techniques in most cases being more secure, they could devote themselves more fully to thoughts about vocal interpretation. Today, singers are more musically respectable but, as a result, often more dull.

Because Blyth's focus was on singing, one element in the present state of opera performance today was left out. The missing element is the role of the conductor. The very greatest singers can work—or at least they think they can—without a great conductor; for these superstars a conductor is, and must always be, nothing more than a facilitator, a gentle and complaisant traffic cop who keeps everyone and everything, often including the drama of the music, out of the superstar's way. Therefore, conductors of decided opinions and forceful personality are rarely chosen as collaborators by celebrity singers. (In fairness, it must also be said that, for their part, great conductors rarely choose to work with superstar soloists.) However, there is more to being an opera conductor than keeping the orchestra down, following the singers, and taking tempos famous soloists are comfortable with. If the conductor's conception of the opera being performed is not a gripping one, the audience in its turn will not be gripped by the opera, and instead will be captured, if it is captured at all, by the individual singers on stage. Delightful as this prospect may be for great singers, it is dismal for anyone hoping to witness the total art work that a great opera can be.

For Joan Sutherland, the ideal of a perfect conductor is her husband and musical guide, Richard Bonynge. As a singer she seems truly happy only when he is in the pit accompanying her. To judge by the number of recordings and performances Sutherland and Bonynge have done with Luciano Pavarotti, the tenor too is happy with Bonynge. Unfortunately, however valuable Bonynge is to Sutherland as a vocal coach and musical influence, he is, on the evidence of a career going back more than thirty years, an undistinguished and uninteresting conductor. Although Sutherland—and others—may be happy with this arrangement, the ultimate loser is the musical integrity of the operatic work being performed.

And so it turned out on the Sutherland-Pavarotti telecast. The orchestral playing in general, and *pizzicato* playing in particular, was ragged throughout, as if at crucial moments the musicians were not quite sure when to play. Tempos were bouncy rather than taut, and the relationship of the tempos to each other seemed more accidental and random than necessary. Loudness was substituted for drama, and lush, heavy tone for emotion. A listener coming to these works for the first time might be forgiven for thinking himself in a world of popular music, of overblown tunefulness and sweeping melodies going nowhere.

But once again, recorded evidence proves, if such proof be needed, that great conductors can make all the difference in opera. Tullio Serafin's engrossing performances of *Lucia* with Callas, mentioned above, bring a kind of rhythmic weight and seriousness to Donizetti's music that lifts the

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[6] At the present time, Volumes 4 through 16 (with the exception of Volumes 9, 12, and 13) of *The Complete Caruso*, covering the years 1906 through 1919, are available from RCA.

[7] *The Complete Caruso*, 1908-09, Volume 5, RCA ARMI-2767.

[8] This remarkable vocal survival is documented in the many performances recorded between Gigli's fifty-seventh and sixty-fifth years. They have recently been available in an HMV Treasury album, EMI RLS 732.

[9] The *Rigoletto* quartet, with the great singers Amelita Galli-Curci, Louise Homer (composer Samuel Barber's aunt!), and Giuseppe de Luca, in addition to Gigli, was recently available on Seraphim 60054, and also on Seraphim 1C-6136, mentioned below in note 10.

[10] This performance, along with numerous other gems, was available on LP as Seraphim 1C-6136. It is still available on cassette tape as Seraphim 4XG-60054.

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opera from the level of a star vehicle to the level of tragedy. Carlo Maria Giulini's conducting, in the last act of the "pirate" *La Traviata* with Callas, despite its poor recorded quality, is incredibly delicate and poignant, sounding at times almost like an anticipation of Debussy's *Pélleas et Mélisande*.

NOT surprisingly, the most purposeful conducting on records of two of the telecast operas has been done by Arturo Toscanini, undoubtedly the greatest of all Italian conductors, and perhaps the greatest conductor of the 20th century.[11] It was Toscanini's achievement to purge *Rigoletto* and *La Traviata*—and much other music besides—of the accumulated sentimentality foisted upon them by generations of weak-willed but opportunistic interpreters. Though he used many first-class singers—among them such native Americans as Leonard Warren, Jan Peerce, Nan Merriman, and Robert Merrill—the animating intelligence in these performances was the conductor's own; the result, in terms of orchestral playing, is a firmness and certainty of execution not possible when the vagaries of singers rule the musical roost. Because Toscanini, as was his wont, kept the tempos strict and the prevailing texture of the orchestra lean, both *Rigoletto* and *La Traviata* emerge as masterworks of ennobling emotional directness. In listening to these records, it is difficult indeed not to feel that here is the ultimate justification for all the egotisms of famous conductors: at their best, they truly know how the music goes.

Today, more than thirty years after his death, Toscanini is as controversial as he was during his long life. He is currently the subject of an indignant and often unfair attack (though one containing much fascinating material about American musical life in the first half of the 20th century) by the music critic Joseph Horowitz.[12] Curiously, this blistering attack is not aimed at Toscanini's real or alleged musical shortcomings, though Horowitz's taste does tend to run to less tense and more thoughtful Germanic music-making. Toscanini's real crime, for Horowitz, lay in his celebrity appeal to a large and unsophisticated audience, an appeal he quite willingly accepted and even cannily encouraged. Horowitz, in his zeal to confront the very idea of the marketing of musical reputations, criticizes even such renowned associates of Toscanini as the violinist Jascha Heifetz and the pianist Vladimir Horowitz.

CERTAINLY it is tempting, as one looks at today's crop of musical celebrities, to work backward as Joseph Horowitz does to the conclusion that any artist who becomes the object of ballyhoo must somehow be undeserving of respect. The taste left in the mouth by all the many "Live From Lincoln Center" concerts and their ilk is an unpleasant one; the constant selling of not-quite-first-rate artists as historically great figures, and as entrancing human beings into the bargain, is indeed hard to stomach.

But there is a world of difference between a Caruso, a Gigli, a Callas, or a Toscanini, on the one hand, and a Sutherland, a Pavarotti, an Itzhak Perlman, or a Zubin Mehta, on the other. However great our disgust at the musical antics and the electronic gimcrackery on television, there is nothing wrong with selling a truly great artist. Indeed, music needs celebrity performers, not just because they bring new audiences to art but also because, when they are the real thing, they permanently shape our ideas of how great music sounds.

It has been clear for many years that we are living on the inherited capital of the great music of the past. Despite the present critical vogue for performances of old music and despite the original-instrument boom, it is now becoming increasingly plain that we are also living on the capital of the great recorded performers of the past. For the time being, we are largely dependent upon these performers, both for a convincing account of the works themselves and for a true standard by which to measure musical life today. One hopes that soon we will once again have a few new celebrities worthy of being sold, and worthy even of being oversold. One hopes, too, that these new celebrities will be encouraged to use the immense possibilities of television to bring serious musical culture to the largest possible audience.

But whatever the future may hold, the recent Sutherland-Pavarotti telecast demonstrates once again that our current celebrities just do not measure up.

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11 Toscanini's recording of the final act of *Rigoletto*, taken from a 1944 Red Cross benefit concert in Madison Square Garden, was available on RCA Victrola VIC-1314. My copy of his *La Traviata*, taken from an NBC broadcast in December 1946, is on RCA (Germany) 26.35008 DP.

12 *Understanding Toscanini: How He Became an American Culture-God and Helped Create a New Audience for Old Music*, Knopf, 492 pp., $30.00.

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Books in Review

The Eureka Treatment

REAGAN'S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME. By GARRY WILLS. *Doubleday. 472 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by SUZANNE GARMENT

GARRY WILLS has written what is in some respects a conventional biography of Ronald Reagan. There is real research in it, and facts that most readers will not have known before. Wills also has a large theory of Ronald Reagan: that the President is above all a superb fabricator of myths about himself and about an America that never was. Wills propounds a corollary: Reagan's great popularity stems from the fact that Americans as a whole believe in the same myths he does, and love having them reaffirmed.

The book appears at an interesting time, when the Iran controversy has revealed grave flaws in Reagan and the Reagan Presidency. But those flaws are not the ones that Wills identifies and tries to explain. Wills brings to light many facts in this book, but they often fail to support the big argument he is trying to make.

"Ronald Reagan," Wills begins archly, "calls his childhood 'one of those rare Huck Finn-Tom Sawyer idylls.'" But Wills quickly corrects Reagan: "The Twain novels he refers to are chronicles of superstition, racism, and crime." What is more, little Ronnie's father was "Jack, the Mississippi confidence man," whose family was "always living from suitcases, like actors." According to Wills, Reagan "had no boyhood home."

In real life, Ronald Reagan has not pretended that his childhood was blissful in every respect. He has, for instance, talked graphically about his father's drinking. But, Wills reveals, back in Dixon, Illinois, where Reagan spent a substantial part of his boyhood, "the extent of Jack's drinking is debated." "Certainly Jack was never a public disgrace." What then are we to make of Ronald Reagan's affecting accounts of his father's problem? "He dramatizes it," says Wills, "almost melodramatizes. He gives us scenes from a temperance play."

Thus in the book's opening chapters Wills does not allow Reagan the unchallenged memory of either a stable, happy youth or a great childhood adversity bravely overcome. The signal is unmistakable: no quarter will be given here.

REAGAN went to Eureka College, a Disciples of Christ institution. He has said that he led a student strike there to protest academic cutbacks. Wills has gone back to the college area and done fresh research, so that he can give us the lowdown on what really happened during the strike. And what has he found? That the "student" strike was actually manipulated, part of a game of internal faculty politics. That the famous speech young Ronald Reagan made to his fellow students on the eve of the strike was in reality not a very important part of the strike meeting. That though Reagan says the students studied conscientiously during the strike, they probably did not.

Wills argues from his own account of the strike that Reagan's memory of the event "had no respect for the density of the real and vivid piece of history he was living through. He converted it into a historical symbol." But Wills's "exposés" are simply not substantial enough to show that Reagan's memories have strayed pathologically far from the truth.

Wills's treatment of the Eureka strike is not some tendentious little fragment picked maliciously out of a more complex work. The "Eureka Treatment"—go back to some past event in Reagan's life, find a factual discrepancy or failure of interpretive insight in what Reagan later said about it, and use the gap to support the claim that he is a faker—is the dominant mode of argument in the book.

Here are some other examples of the Eureka Treatment:

- Reagan talks about poverty having bound families together during the Depression. This judgment is "strange," Wills thinks, for during the Depression poverty separated Reagan's family by forcing his father to take a job in another town. Besides, Wills contends, some witnesses say that the Reagans did not suffer so much in the first place: "They were not worse off than anybody," one informant has told him.
- Reagan is always talking about individualism and the need to keep society free of unnecessary government intrusion. But the society in which Reagan grew up was positively dripping and crawling with government and its benefits. Federal military force fought the Indians. Federal money sponsored the canals and railroads. And as for individualism, a comparative study has shown that there were steeper social hierarchies on the frontier than in Europe! For Reagan to speak of individualism in the face of this overwhelming reality shows, Wills thinks, huge powers of denial: "The perfection of the pretense lies in the fact that he does not know he is pretending."
- Reaganites often attack the "new class," people who manipulate words instead of producing real things. But Reagan started his career as a radio announcer. Thus he was part of the verbal "new class" from the beginning. Moreover, one of his first jobs in radio was to take telegraphed reports of baseball games in progress and use them to "visualize" the games for the radio audience—that is, to describe the games as if he were actually there watching. His audience knew what was going on,

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of course. Did this knowledge make Reagan's activities less a matter of fakery? Of course not. Instead, says Wills, "There was complicity in make-believe."

There is more. Reagan says that he is proud he was never allowed to see D.W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation*, with its racist elements. In fact, Wills tells us, Reagan was only four at the time of the movie's release. During World War II, Hollywood fan magazines suggested that Reagan was away from home doing military duty, but his job in the service was to make military movies in Hollywood itself. Moving on to postwar years, Wills tells us that Reagan's "big scene" in the movie *King's Row*, about which the former actor has spoken so proudly, was not really a big scene for him at all. His role was small compared to that of other actors.

MUCH of this is trivial. Much of it strains to find a contradiction. Much of it is merely ideological. One part of the book, though, is not trivial at all. It deals with Ronald Reagan's tenure as president of the Screen Actors' Guild. Reagan's years with the Guild turned out to be important for his later political career. His association with the Guild has been presented as powerful evidence that he is not a right-winger of the diehard sort that would deny workers the right to organize in self-defense. Wills's purpose is to show that during the Guild years, Reagan was not a real union man at all.

Reagan has called the Guild of those years "a damned noble organization," in which the big stars who least needed protection—Eddie Cantor, James Cagney, Cary Grant—used their influence to see that actors with less power got a fair shake as well. Nonsense, says Wills. Yes, the famous in the Guild did some things for the less famous. But the real story is that during the days of the National Recovery Administration, movie producers tried to use the NRA's "fair practice codes" to destroy the bargaining power of the stars. As a result, these same stars joined the Guild to protect their own interests.

Reagan's skewed view of these matters, Wills explains, reflects his general wish to see people acting from noble motives rather than out of the concrete economic interests that in fact make unions run. "This high-mindedness of Reagan's," says Wills, "may be justifiable in its own terms, and is certainly attractive; but it seems inappropriate in a union man, and even less appropriate in a union leader."

Clearly it is inappropriate in Wills's sort of union leader.

Wills also tries to debunk Reagan's image as a stalwart unionist by telling how under Reagan's leadership the Guild refused to support the 1945 strike by the Conference of Studio Unions, even though a less democratic rival union was collaborating with movie producers to try to destroy the CSU. The reason was that Reagan thought his adversaries in the CSU were Communists.

In fact, says Wills, Reagan's suspicions were unfounded. True, Herb Sorrell, leader of the CSU, "took the help" of Communists to fight off rival organizers. But when California state investigators produced what was alleged to be Sorrell's party card, Sorrell denied it was his, "and he was a man known for his touchy honor about his word." "Sorrell was an impulsive man," says Wills, "not controlled by others . . . , and obviously outside Communist discipline."

Nevertheless Reagan used the fear of Communist influence in the unions as a weapon in trying to turn the Guild into a staunch foe of Communism, and even as a justification for cooperating with the FBI. "This is the real reason," says Wills contemptuously, "he could call himself a 'rabid union man.'"

In dealing with the Hollywood years Wills makes his usual charge, saying that Reagan has played fast and loose with the "facts" of California union history of the 1940's. But Wills's entire account of those years treats the rather large fact of the Communism then threatening the unions as, for all practical purposes, an unreality. He plays much faster and looser than the amateur Ronald Reagan.

But if, in his treatment of the successive stages of Reagan's life, Wills's consistent theme is Reagan the great fabricator, the book also tells us some things at odds with the theory. For example: Reagan seems to have displayed a near-photographic memory when in school; when he was a lifeguard back in Dixon, he saved 77 people from drowning; he started his career in sports news not just as an announcer but as a journalist, and he was capable, on the evidence of the couple of passages Wills cites, of producing writing that was quite classy; his early friends were so devoted to him that when he left the Midwest to live in California they followed him there; as soon as he arrived in Hollywood, he sent for his mother and father to join him.

HERE is the most important surprise: Ronald Reagan's early life was immersed in religion. The fact of his religious upbringing is no secret, but Wills gives illuminating details. Reagan's mother underwent a "profound" conversion and became a Disciple of Christ. Much of his childhood activity was centered in the Church. He went to a Disciples college. When he started work in Des Moines, his friends were a group of students from a nearby Disciples university. They became his first friends in Hollywood. Reagan's mother, to whom he remained very close, was a dramatizer, a moralist, and a preacher at heart.

At many points in this book Wills writes of Reagan's ability to sustain belief, his own and that of others, even in propositions that Wills considers absurd. Wills also talks about the Reagan habit of pressing particular facts and events into service as parts of a morality play. In addition, Wills stresses the Reagan optimism.

Wills considers these traits part and parcel of Reagan's extraordinary capacity to deceive himself and his audiences about the true nature of the world. Wills further thinks that these characteristics come from Reagan's mother Nelle and the histrionic way she went about testifying to her faith.

But religion itself, not just his mother's special tendencies toward

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playacting, clearly had a deep effect on the young man and helped produce many of the traits that Wills finds so striking. Religion, as has been said more than a few times, can do wonders for a person's ability to find the morally significant facts amid the general messiness of daily life. Religion is also one of the best prescriptions yet discovered for maintaining confidence in the face of doubts.

There are respects, of course, in which religion indeed resembles the "theater" to which Wills assigns such a big role in Reagan's life. But the theater of religious belief is a drama rooted in the perception of underlying truth. By contrast, the theater that Wills chooses as his theme is the theater of mere fakery and illusion. No wonder that, although he documents examples of Reagan's religiousness or loyalty or heroism, Wills cannot integrate them into the main thesis of his book. That lack of integration explains why the book bounces the reader, trampoline-like, between airily contemptuous arguments about the nature of the American myth and historical details that often fail to live up to the demands of these arguments.

RONALD REAGAN has said many simple things in his political career. Someone who basically agrees with the Reagan stance toward public policy may view some of these statements as oversimplified, to be sure, or marred by factual error. But the sympathetic observer will also see Reagan's statements as expressions of ideas about society and government that are basically true. According to this view, when Reagan tells actual untruths, he usually does so for the same reasons as any other politician. If he pays a lamentable lack of attention to the management of the government, the cause is more likely laziness than a world view that has parted from reality. If he has lately seemed a bit vague, the principle of Occam's razor requires us to admit at the outset that the President is growing old.

But someone who does not like Reagan's ideology at all will say that his simple sentences are the mark of a man who has in a fundamental sense taken leave of his senses. The stories that Reagan tells will not be tolerated as a sort of quirk that is common in political figures. Instead, the tales will seem to demand explanation as part of some coherent, reality-denying pattern in his personality.

And if most Americans seem to like Ronald Reagan? Well, they can hardly be responding seriously to serious political arguments that Reagan makes, because he is only spouting myths. Therefore if Americans do respond, it must be because Reagan's myths are congruent with theirs and satisfy their own profound need to believe an unreality.

In other words, according to this second view, the American public is not, and cannot be treated as, a more or less rational modern polity. It must be analyzed in the way an anthropologist would examine an exotic primitive tribe and would carefully map out the strange elements of its bizarre belief system.

THIS second course is the one Wills has taken. It is bound to produce an unsatisfactory analysis. Just how unsatisfactory, the present crisis over Iran has made clear. Ronald Reagan and his administration are in big trouble now. They have come to look like hypocrites and bumblers, and in most of Reagan's Cabinet departments there is not enough quality or energy or breadth of ideas to create a successful distraction.

Americans still like Reagan, but they are not forgiving him. They are quite capable of withdrawing their high approval ratings from even an immensely popular President who they think has betrayed his ideals. In short, President and people are not lashed permanently together in some pathological Willsian bond of complicit fantasy.

If the Reagan administration comes to be viewed as a failure, it will not be because President and people, guided by a conservative social myth, marched blithely together into disaster. It will be the result of a much more prosaic and discriminating species of American politics.

A Golden Age

WINE, WOMEN & DEATH: MEDIEVAL HEBREW POEMS ON THE GOOD LIFE. By RAYMOND P. SCHEINDLIN. *Jewish Publication Society. 204 pp. $15.95.*

Reviewed by ROBERT ALTER

RAYMOND P. SCHEINDLIN is one of the few academic specialists, either in this country or in Israel, in what is surely one of the most exciting eras in all the 3,000 years of Hebrew literary history: the poetry of the so-called Golden Age of Andalusia, beginning in the 10th century and attaining its greatest achievements in the 11th and 12th centuries C.E. The difficulties of making these extraordinary poems accessible in translation have long seemed insuperable because of the exquisitely wrought formal design of the verse, its use of monorhymes and intricate stanzaic patterns, its quantitative meters, and, above all, its constant rich play, in even the minutest turns of speech, with biblical allusions.

Only a small portion of this large poetic corpus has been translated into English, and on the whole the results have been disheartening. The versions of Judah Halevi done by Nina Salamon early in this century are fussy and fundamentally false in their vaguely pre-Raphaelite diction. David Goldstein's slim selection, *Hebrew Poets from Spain* (1965), presents the poems in lame and lackluster unrhymed English verse. T. Carmi's versions in *The Penguin Book of Hebrew Verse* (1981) are noteworthy for their limpidity and precision, but as prose translations they are more abstracts of the poems, librettos without the music, than new performances of them in English.

Raymond Scheindlin, hitherto the author of a technical monograph and sundry scholarly articles, has devised in *Wine, Women & Death* a special method of presenting the medieval poems to an

ROBERT ALTER *is professor of Hebrew and comparative literature at Berkeley. His books include* The Art of Biblical Narrative *and* The Art of Biblical Poetry.

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

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

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English-speaking audience through a vehicle that is part introduction, part anthology, part commentary. The method does not always work equally well, but it is surprising how often he makes it succeed in conveying the liveliness, the subtlety, the boldness of these poems. Speaking with an authoritative command of the literature itself, its historical contexts, the philological problems it presents, and the scholarly debates on its form and substance, he offers an incisive general introduction to the poetry and then brief prefatory essays on each of the genres represented in the three sections of the book—drinking poems, love poems, and meditative poems about the transience of human life. The poems themselves are presented in his own verse translations, facing the Hebrew originals and followed in each instance by two or three pages of commentary on aspects of the poem ranging from sound-play and meter to the pressure of philosophic ideas on the imagery and diction.

Introducing this poetry to a popular audience, Scheindlin draws on the standard Hebrew studies of the subject by Haim Schirmann, David Yellin, and, more recently, Dan Pagis. (It is puzzling, though, in view of the attention that he devotes to the *muwashshaḥ*, or stanzaic poem, that he makes no mention of Tova Moked's excellent 1985 volume on that topic.) This is not a book, then, that has any pretensions to be ground-breaking. It does, however, offer many fine local insights in the commentaries on the poems; and the prefatory essays are apt and balanced.

The best of these is the one on love poetry, in which Scheindlin addresses the issue posed by the discomfiting, not to say shocking, fact that many of the love poems in question are frankly homosexual. Are these poems, as has been proposed by embarrassed exegetes in earlier generations, merely literary exercises, imitating Arabic models, or do they reflect an actual openness to the practice of homosexual love among the elite of Andalusian Jewry? Scheindlin may not have "solved" this question, but he does set it in a clarifying perspective by the stress he puts on the beloved as the embodiment of an aesthetic ideal in the poetry. Both the heterosexual and the homosexual poems, he helpfully proposes, convey "not primarily an experience of love, the consciousness of a passionate union between two souls, but a deeply felt admiration for an object which may itself remain unmoved; it is an aesthetic rather than a loving experience."

Scheindlin's translations are a brave attempt to find English equivalents for the exquisite musicality of the originals. His versions are often rhymed, though he prudently abandons rhyme when it can be maintained only through blatant contrivance. He favors iambic meters, allowing himself considerable freedom of metrical variation. His diction is somewhat archaic, often with little Elizabethan touches, including a good deal of syntactic inversion. These stylistic choices seem quite right, both because the Elizabethans (the sonneteers in particular) present the closest English approximation to this highly wrought, thoroughly conventionalized kind of poetry and because the closeness of the Renaissance diction to King James English at times manages to suggest something of the biblical tonality of the Hebrew.

IT WOULD require nothing short of poetic genius to forge these partial correspondences into aesthetically persuasive equivalences of the Hebrew poems. Failing that, Scheindlin can scarcely avoid little moments of awkwardness and even occasional lapses into doggerel. Thus, in a homosexual love poem by Moses Ibn Ezra, the fair young man is said to be "charming even in deceit; / The fruit of his mouth is like candy sweet," the arhythmia of the second line being a symptom of the way it lunges toward a regrettable cliché in order to make a rhyme. But Scheindlin usually does much better than this. In two earlier lines of the same poem —which was originally meant to be sung to the accompaniment of a lutelike instrument—his iambic rhythm, with one anapestic variation, captures the lilting movement of the original while he provides precise, idiomatic equivalents for all the Hebrew phrases: "A fawn is he with slender thighs. / The sun goes dark when it sees him rise." This corresponds neatly, if not exactly, to the tripping rhythm of the Hebrew: *ōfēr dālĕlū mōtnāv; / shēmēsh rād lĕmūl ēynāv.*

Here is an entire brief wine poem, with a secondary motif of teasing eroticism, in Scheindlin's translation. The poet is Samuel the Nagid, earliest of the Andalusian Hebrew masters:

> How exquisite that fawn who
> woke at night
> to the sound of viol's thrum
> and tabor's clink,
> Who saw the goblet in my hand
> and said,
> "The grape's blood flows for
> you between my lips.
> Come drink."
> Behind him stood the moon, a
> letter C,
> Inscribed on morning's veil in
> golden ink.

This may not be perfect (the rhythm falters at a couple of points, and the lonely spondee of the abbreviated fifth line obscures the symmetry of the original poem), but it serves well enough to intimate the quality of poised song one hears in the Hebrew. Scheindlin then proceeds in less than two pages of commentary to compensate for much of what has been lost in the Englishing and to talk the poem into full-bodied life. He evokes the concrete social setting of the nightlong drinking party in an ornamental garden; nicely observes the prominence of artifice (sky as tapestry, moon as calligraphy) in the representation of the scene; and conjures up a suggestive image of the dreamlike moment of suspended motion caught by the poem. Most interestingly, after explaining that in the Hebrew the moon is depicted as the letter *yod*, he notes that in medieval manuscripts the name of God was often indicated by three or four *yods*, and he wonders whether in the purely ornamental beauty of the scene there may be an intimation of neo-Platonic notions: "Does the use of the letter *yod* here identify the world of the banquet and of beauty with that world of ultimate reality?" Exercising exemplary critical tact, here and throughout the

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volume, Scheindlin does not insist on the point but opens it up to the reader as a possibility to ponder. His double presentation of the poem, through translation and explication, gives readers without Hebrew at least a vivid glimpse of the charm, the beautiful control, and the intellectual subtlety of the original—the first time this has been done in English for this body of poetry.

The poem in question, moreover, is characteristic of the corpus so aptly represented in *Wine, Women & Death* in its uninhibited celebration of aesthetic experience and sensuality against a large backdrop of philosophic contemplation. Such aristocratic concerns are not often associated in the popular imagination with medieval Jewry. But as Raymond Scheindlin observes more than once in his prefatory essays, for our own time, with its growing currents of assimilation on the one hand, and of a resurgent Jewish exclusivism on the other hand, what may be most precious in the Hebrew literary heritage of medieval Spain is the ability it exhibits so abundantly "to absorb the values and the style of the outside world and to reshape itself accordingly, without losing the sense of Jewish identity." This presentation of poems, then, from a privileged moment in cultural history is not only a delight for readers of poetry but also a finely instructive instance of the Jewish talent for living in more than one realm.

Part of the Problem?

RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING. Vol. I. Edited by CHERYL D. HAYES. *National Academy Press. 352 pp. $21.95.*

Reviewed by ANDRÉ RYERSON

THE United States is undergoing a rise in teen-age pregnancies on a scale hitherto unknown, and without equal in other industrial societies. (The closest competitor is Canada, where the number of girls under fifteen becoming pregnant is one-fourth the rate of ours.) In order to help us approach this crisis in an informed manner, and find solutions to it, the National Research Council—a creation of the National Academy of Sciences—recently brought together three panels of experts to examine the available research and make policy recommendations. The result is *Risking the Future.*

The study is candid about the gravity of the situation:

> Regardless of one's political or moral perspective, the basic facts are disturbing: more than 1 million teen-age girls in the United States become pregnant each year, just over 400,000 teen-agers obtain abortions, nearly half of whom have not yet reached their eighteenth birthday.

As the report goes on to state, the younger the age at which teens engage in sexual intercourse, the less likely it is that contraception will be used, which helps explain the rising rates of births and abortions at ever lower ages. Moreover, half of all teen mothers have repeat pregnancies within twenty-four months, regardless of whether they are enrolled in special birth-control programs aimed at avoiding this.

The drawbacks of motherhood at an immature age are numerous, reports the NRC: "These very young mothers have high rates of pregnancy complications including toxemia, anemia, prolonged labor, and premature labor. . . . Pregnant girls under age 15, for example, experience a rate of maternal death that is 2.5 times that for mothers ages 20-24." Teen-age mothers also have more children than the norm, a lower likelihood of lasting marriage, a greater instability in other intimate relationships with males, lower levels of education, lower-paying jobs (if they find them), and a greater dependency on welfare than any other category of the population.

Nor is the damage limited to the mother. From the start her offspring are likely to "have higher rates of complications" due to "maternal morbidity and mortality, and premature and/or low birth-

ANDRÉ RYERSON, *whose articles in* COMMENTARY *include "Capitalism and Selfishness" (December 1986) and "The Scandal of 'Peace Education'" (June 1986), is an artist and writer.*

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weight babies." There are also failures of attentiveness due to maternal immaturity: "children born to teen-age mothers are more likely to be injured and hospitalized by age five." Evidence is growing that "the age of the mother at the birth of her child does affect the child's intelligence as measured on standardized tests," and as a consequence such children are "at greater risk of lower intellectual and academic achievement, social behavior problems, and problems of self-control. In addition, data suggest that they may be more likely to become adolescent parents themselves than are the children of older mothers."

All the relevant figures are dramatically worse for blacks, with dire consequences for their economic condition. In 1981 the rate of births for girls under fifteen years of age was 2.7 per thousand for whites, 20.2 for blacks; the rate of abortions for girls under fifteen was 5.1 for whites, 27.0 for blacks. For the age category fifteen-to-nineteen, the rate per thousand of births among whites jumps to 44.7, but among blacks to 96.9.

WHEN it comes to recommendations, the authors of *Risking the Future* make clear their preference for government action. They propose an aggressive campaign for contraception, with emphasis on the pill. In their judgment the public schools should be included as distribution agencies for contraceptives, and abortion or adoption referrals (free of parental consent) should be offered to adolescent girls not disposed to keep their offspring or to carry their pregnancies to term.

The first and most obvious problem with these recommendations is that they ignore, even abuse, values held by much, and probably most, of the American public. The authors of *Risking the Future* are not ignorant of the feelings of Americans, but they cite the origins of those feelings ("We are a diverse society of individuals, families, and communities with differing values, traditions, and cultures") only to use them as an argument *against* telling adolescents why sexual restraint might be desirable. It is noteworthy, however, that even within the report itself, one of the three panels of experts, that on Adolescent Pregnancy and Childbearing, can be found giving many reasons why the delay of coitus in young adolescents is advisable, and offering none in favor of its inception—a conclusion which happens to coincide with the view of most parents of virtually every faith and cultural constituency, though not with the authors of *Risking the Future*.

This is not the only occasion where the study offers facts and arguments that contradict the logic of its own recommendations. The authors admit, for instance, that convincing fourteen-year-olds to use contraceptives is a daunting task, since "young teen-agers are handicapped in assessing the personal risk of pregnancy because of their cognitive immaturity." Nor can this fundamental obstacle be overcome by formal instruction: "Since many are still incapable of thinking abstractly and relating actions to specific consequences—particularly when their early personal experience is contrary to what they have learned—they have a difficult time planning for sexual intercourse and using contraception." No birth-control method, furthermore, is immune from natural or human failings.

Since pregnancy due to contraceptive failure will issue either in abortion or in birth, with the former (according to the report) raising the chances of future infertility, and the latter (also according to the report) increasing the risk of death to a young mother by 250 percent; since early childbearing entails marital and career deprivation, physical, intellectual, and social harm to children, and a burden of welfare expenditures to be borne by the rest of society; since there are accelerating risks of venereal disease such as herpes and AIDS, the first of which is incurable, the second fatal—for all these reasons one would think it a morally responsible course of action to urge educators and other adult authorities to state such facts bluntly to the young and admonish them against early intercourse. The report, nevertheless, declines to do so.

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To be sure, the authors do not entirely omit reference to the role of moral suasion in preventing teen-age pregnancy; it would, no doubt, be impossible to avoid mentioning so obvious and historically powerful a tool in controlling sexual conduct. But the idea is not given serious attention, on the perfectly circular grounds that few "programs" based on moral suasion exist and hence "there is little evidence to document their effectiveness." By contrast, for programs encouraging contraception "the scientific base is much greater, and programs can be based on the demonstrated effectiveness of contraceptive use."

And yet, one is tempted to ask, however futilely, if numbers and "demonstrated effectiveness" are to rule the argument, why not look at the experience of Japan, or Ireland, or Portugal, or even China, where rates of teen-age pregnancy are nonexistent by comparison with ours, for the simple reason that in their various ways the adults in those societies make it clear to the young that coitus at age fourteen is not acceptable behavior? Or why not look at the "demonstrated effectiveness" of religious belief, which even in *Risking the Future* is offered in evidence?

> Religiousness appears to be an important factor distinguishing early from later initiators of sexual activity. Devaney and Hubley (1981) found that women ages 15-19 were more likely to be sexually active if they were not regular church attenders and if they reported that religion was not very important to them. These findings are supported by numerous other studies. . . . Most researchers who have addressed this issue have found that the tendency to be devout and observant of religious custom and teaching is more important than any specific religious affiliation.

It would not require prodigies of inferential reasoning to devise nonreligious sex-education policies in tune with all this evidence. As Secretary of Education William Bennett put it in criticizing *Risking the Future*: "When it comes to the well-being of our children, there are certain precepts to which virtually all Americans adhere. For example, I have never had a parent tell me that he or she would be offended by a teacher telling a class that it is better to postpone sex. Or that marriage is the best setting for sex, and in which to have and raise children."

Offended by the affirmation of such values, apparently, leading opinion-makers prefer the myth that some biological determinism bars the way to standards of sexual temperance among the young, or that teen sex is beyond adult control or influence, and hence must be somehow appeased and accommodated. Thus, in the preface to *Risking the Future*, Dr. Daniel D. Federman asserts his own and his colleagues' view that "the potentially or actually pregnant teenager should be treated kindly and warmly and should have a complete set of options available with-

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out the interposition of moral hounding or economic barriers," and that until poverty, youth unemployment, poor education, and sexually provocative television programs are eliminated from American society, "the panel urges prevention rather than denial, kindness rather than exhortation, and research rather than doctrine."

As LONG as "a full set of options" is to include sex at thirteen and abortion on demand, free of "moral hounding" or even "exhortation," we are likely to remain on our present path. In that case, the prognosis is that 40 percent of today's fourteen-year-old girls, by the time they are nineteen, will have become pregnant. No modern society has contemplated how it can endure such a breakdown of family norms, or by what means the resulting chaos will be subsidized. For its part in perpetuating an official acquiescence in the present state of affairs, often in the face of evidence adduced in its own pages, *Risking the Future* reveals itself to be another symptom of the problem it sets out to address.

Aquarius at Middle Age

DO YOU BELIEVE IN MAGIC? THE SECOND COMING OF THE SIXTIES GENERATION. By ANNIE GOTTLIEB. *Times Books. 409 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by TOD LINDBERG

"SEE if these excerpts," advises Annie Gottlieb in *Do You Believe in Magic?*, "seem as familiar, as *homey*, to you as they do to me." The emphasis is in the original, and those homey excerpts, drawn "from a summary of Neo-Pagan values, by Isaac Bonewits of the New Reformed Druids of North America," include "a belief in a multiplicity of 'gods' and 'goddesses,'" and "a belief in the importance of celebrating the solar, lunar, and other cycles of our lives. . . ." They are only a part of the wisdom that is going to guide, is already guiding, "the second coming of the 60's generation."

These children of the postwar baby boom, "a tribe with its roots in a time, rather than a place or a race," are "now reaching the age of leadership planetwide." It is Miss Gottlieb's view that "the forty-year old corporate lawyer in the three-piece suit, the thirty-six-year-old social-service worker in the Volkswagen, the graying hippie in the hills are brothers and sisters under their styles." She offers this book as an "anthropologist's" account of where her tribe has been, and what promise it offers in finding a way out from under the looming menaces of late 20th-century civilization.

As a result of "the generosity and candor of the hundred or so people I interviewed in depth," to say nothing of intense reflection on her own experience, Miss Gottlieb is able to speak with some precision on the millions of people in question. She divides them into two groups: the "first wave," those born from 1944 to 1949, and the "second wave," those born from 1950 to 1956. The former are a "special generation," "at the epicenter of the cultural earthquake." (Miss Gottlieb is herself epicentral.) The latter wave was "impressed and confused by the changes, but young enough to adapt to them. While 'first-wave' people tend to be earnest, passionate, visionary, and somewhat shell-shocked, 'second wavers' seem ironic and low-key, with lower expectations, yet more resiliency."

Miss Gottlieb presents the fruit of her researches thematically. Lengthy sections of the book treat the great issues of the 1960's, offering lasting lessons for the day. We find discourses and reminiscences on the antiwar movement and the revolution, on the global wanderlust of the youth and their appetite for sex and drugs, on the forging of what Miss Gottlieb sees as a new world religion and the way its adherents, both second and first wave, have made their way in a material world.

En route we meet, among others, editors Marc Barasch of the now-defunct *New Age Journal* and Sy Safransky of the *Sun*; writers Whitley Streiber (*Warday*) and Stephen King; "visionary architect" Donna Goodman; "ritual artist and healer" Donna Henes; and, hardly least, Otter and Morning Glory G'Zell, denizens of a wooden yurt in Mendocino County, California, where, by means unspecified, they breed unicorns out of goats.

On the printed page, at least, Otter and Morning Glory are as insects preserved in amber, but most of Miss Gottlieb's hundred or so do seem to have been in some ways affected—for the better, of course—by the intervening years. Even Donna Henes, whose activities, Miss Gottlieb notes, "have involved chanting, fire, streamers inscribed with peace messages in many languages, and total personal commitment," is now considering the possibilities of global reach. " 'The infrastructure is right there,' " Miss Gottlieb quotes Miss Henes. " 'Even though it's satellites and computers and electromagnetic fields, it can enable us to do all this ritual ceremonial stuff.' "

A broadened perspective is also much in evidence in Miss Gottlieb's account of how her generation is now seeking social change. "Bombings and bank robberies were the work of a handful who carried the rhetoric of the 60's to its logical conclusion," she writes. "But they weren't qualitatively different from the rest of us. . . . Most of us had felt the pull of violence as a rite of passage. We wouldn't commit it first, but we would court it." Now, though, "We have to deepen the *ground* of politics, bring it down from the platforms of ideology and ego and into the heart." That will require many things, but chief among them is surely "the reconciling spirit . . . both tough and tender—and capable of laughter. Those who serve it don't deny the reality of injustice and evil, or hesitate to confront them. But they stay always open to the moment of connection, even—or especially—with the enemy."

RECONCILIATION would also seem to be a key feature of relations between the sexes. The first-wavers were "the last to grow up with sex roles and sex segregation—in dorms, schools, and sports—

TOD LINDBERG, *who contributed "The Rise & Fall of Roman Polanski" to our January issue, is an assistant managing editor of* Insight *magazine.*

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that made boys and girls strange and intimidating to each other." The sexual revolution had it that "love-making was like hitchhiking, one of those all-purpose gestures: a politico-sensual act fusing defiance and delight." But that was faulty, too, in Miss Gottlieb's analysis. "Looking back, the gap between the 'sexual revolution' and feminism—from about 1965 to 1970—was a bad time for women, despite some good times. Even men . . . admit that women got the short end."

The problem: "Our self-esteem still depended on pleasing men—and the way to please men in the late 60's was to go to bed with them." The solution: "The angry pride of early feminism finally gave women some of the sexual 'protection' we had lacked." Miss Gottlieb takes cultural note that "such books as Lonnie Barbach's *For Yourself* appeared, teaching women how to masturbate, celebrating the beauty and individuality of female genitals in drawings more explicit than any *Penthouse* photograph."

After a subsequent decade of breakup and divorce, a new reunion is taking place: "The real social units many of us live in, and the real safety nets we give our children, are far-flung clans in which different kinds of bonds—blood relations, old and new friendships, and passions—have equal status." And as for the early excesses, much, in Miss Gottlieb's analysis, was gained from them: "The confrontation freed many people to find their natural level of loving and their unblocked creative springs. These real victors in the sexual revolution are . . . clear-eyed and easy-bodied, a subtly new kind of American. They have the discreet yet uninhibited sensuality that has always intrigued us in French films."

Drugs, too, have occasioned some rethinking. Their initial promise was as an aid to inquiry: "Four hundred years after discovering the other side of the globe, we were finally tiptoeing into the other side of the brain, and drugs helped unlock the Doors." But this sensibility failed to stand the test of time: "It's a curious fact about LSD that at about the same time it began to be widely known and used, it began to lose its spiritual clout." In San Francisco, Miss Gottlieb records, "As drug dealers flooded the Haight to prey on the hippies, the quality of the drugs declined, but so did the maturity and motivation of the drug takers." The situation could only deteriorate, and in the fullness of time came a realization: when "drugs proved as treacherous as they were easy, . . . our culture's own native wisdom gradually reasserted itself. After all is said and done, most of us put our trust in work." Still, Miss Gottlieb avers, "Maybe a truly wise culture would provide for the periodic use of drugs in a ritual context, to refresh the vision."

The profound generational realizations Miss Gottlieb has disclosed on such subjects as politics, sex, and drugs now provide the am-

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

WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS DO?

By James M. Buchanan
Preface by H. Geoffrey Brennan and Robert D. Tollison

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Dr. Buchanan is General Director of the Center for the Study of Public Choice and Harris University Professor at George Mason University. Among his other books are *The Limits of Liberty*, and, with Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent*.

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munition and the battle plans for what she calls "the evolutionary war," a subject to which she devotes the concluding section of her book. No Social Darwinist she, the evolution she has in mind will come not through the survival of the fittest, but through that "reconciling spirit." She draws an illuminating analogy: "In nearly every hostage crisis, through all the jingoistic raging on both sides, there have been intimate, unmasked moments between hostages and captors, when they saw each other's human curiosity and pain. They talked about their wristwatches, or their children. 'The Stockholm Syndrome,' we belittlingly call it. . . . Those moments aren't treason. They are our hope. They suggest that the new world might not come in fire, but as gently as Reagan's touch on Gorbachev's elbow."

The importance of this, anyone can see—the 60's generation perhaps especially clearly. As Miss Gottlieb writes, "Some of us who are truly of an age with the Nuclear Age—who were born between 1944 and 1946—feel so fatefully related to the Bomb that we wonder whether it may not have made itself known to us much earlier, in some way addressing our infant minds or cells." But for all the danger, there is hope, "based on that all-important crack of light between 'probable' and 'inevitable.' It's the intention to shove a lever in that crack and widen it, shifting the odds the other way."

This cannot come to pass as a result of cold-hearted calculation; another quality is required, a quality Miss Gottlieb has detected in abundance in her generation: "Visionaries use magical, childlike imagery, because that force makes action not only possible but joyous, mysteriously guided, strangely light-hearted in the face of great discouragement. It can make the impossible actual—its symbol, the unicorn." As Miss Gottlieb has noted in an earlier chapter, "Of the spiritual path we can truly say, with Frodo, that 'the road goes ever on.' "

"We," "we," "we," all the way home: Miss Gottlieb's inclusive sensibility is much enamored of the first-person plural. The way she uses it, "we" is encompassing in the way "generation" is, a shorthand that allows her not to remind us that she is, after all, purporting to speak for some 40 million people.

Who are they, and how do they compare to "the hundred or so people" plus herself from whom Miss Gottlieb has deduced "we"? It is a bit tedious to point out that this "generation" includes Republicans and conservative Democrats as well as anti-nuclear activists; Catholics, Protestants, and Jews as well as homey neo-pagans; middle-management executives, policemen, steelworkers, and public officials as well as radical magazine editors, unicorn breeders, and leftist yuppies.

Such differences as these were even visible at the time, to anyone who could crack the radical rhetoric of "we" and "generation." (One of Miss Gottlieb's hundred or so even manages to speak of "the We Generation.") In addition to the approximately 50 percent of eighteen-year-old voters who went with Richard Nixon in 1972, there were vast differences among people involved in the movement itself.

Several different hard cores, Marxists all (though variously Leninist or Maoist), were seeking the overthrow of the government of the United States. They did not hesitate to deploy the "useful idiots" of their generation: the sort of people in a hallucinogenic fog who could be counted on to march and chant, give the finger to the pigs, and heckle and spit on U.S. servicemen returning from Vietnam; the sort of people who thought, at the time, that violence was only radical rhetoric taken to a perhaps regrettable conclusion, rather than an essential part of the revolutionary program; the sort of people who think, even now, that terrorists and their captives are alike (in that both are freely inclined to rage jingoistically), and that the victims' occasionally expressed sympathy for the terrorists is born of something other than the fear that comes from staring down the barrel of a loaded gun.

The much-remarked tendency of the 60's generation—i.e., the radical, radicalized, or radicalizing minority of it—toward self-congratulation and rationalizing self-justification is probably not unique to it. Most people, in most times, have occasionally felt the need to do a little explaining. The difference with the 60's generation is that there is so much explaining to do. The actual revolutionaries did not achieve their final ends, but they and their fellow-travelers and their stooges did achieve much in the way of legitimizing casual, promiscuous sex and the use of drugs at home, and of delegitimizing American efforts to contain Communism abroad.

It is in this context that Miss Gottlieb's partial recantations, on behalf of her generation, must be judged: there had been a little too much easy sex and not enough responsibility, now corrected; too many drugs and not enough productive work, now corrected; too many demands, not enough patience, now corrected; too great a willingness to abuse authority in the form of policemen and soldiers, not enough "reconciling spirit," now corrected. Miss Gottlieb thinks that these are indications that her generation is growing up, maturing as it attains "the age of leadership planetwide." In fact, though, the modifications and emendations are rather an attempt, perhaps unconscious, to salvage as much as possible of an agenda that led to shattered families, broken minds, and boat people drowning in the South China Sea.

The 60's generation as Miss Gottlieb conceives it, a minority among youth then, is even smaller now, as many of its erstwhile members, brought face to face with the consequences of their actions and beliefs, have changed their minds. *Do You Believe in Magic?* is of, by, and for the remainder.

It is also an act of personal vindication, at least to judge by the character of Miss Gottlieb's personal reminiscences and by the apparent gaps in her own experience: it seems as if she slept with a few men, but not egregiously many; took mescaline and used other drugs, but early and not too often; traveled around, but not to destinations particularly exotic; marched

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against the war, but did not blow up any buildings. Having avoided the excesses of that time, she has in a sense always been the sort of person that members of her 60's generation are now becoming. At the center of the "we" is the epicentral Annie Gottlieb, earnest, passionate, visionary, and showing more than a few symptoms of something like shell shock, to say the least. To say the very least.

Ignorance vs. Intelligence

DEEP BLACK: SPACE ESPIONAGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By WILLIAM E. BURROWS. *Random House. 401 pp. $19.95.*

Reviewed by ANGELO M. CODEVILLA

WILLIAM BURROWS, who teaches journalism at NYU, here performs a *tour de force*. He reveals the existence of nearly all U.S. technical-intelligence systems and describes many of their capabilities. Nevertheless, he manages wildly to misunderstand what these systems can and cannot do.

Although the book is about "black," that is, highly secret matters, its shortcomings are not due to lack of data. Rather, Burrows does not understand his subject because he is the eager intellectual captive of sources in and around the U.S. intelligence community whose primary commitment in life is to advance the cause of arms control, and who therefore see their field exclusively in that distorting light. These sources fed him scraps of facts—many of them wrong—and much ideology.

The intelligence community has officially warned all those (myself among them) whose background would permit them to disentangle the real from the fanciful in this book not to do so, lest they compound the damage. Hence, I will largely refrain from quibbling with the book's claims about the visual resolution or electronic sensitivity of individual satellites, etc., and concentrate instead on the perspective that leads Burrows to put his facts, both real and imagined, at the service of obvious political ends.

To begin with, the reader should understand that *Deep Black* is a journalistic rather than a systematic treatment of the subject. A systematic treatment might begin with a survey of the information that the U.S. requires about the Soviet Union for various purposes. Then it would describe the technology of intelligence, and show what that technology theoretically could and could not do to satisfy the various requirements. It might also describe how the U.S. technical-intelligence system has performed in the past. It might take note of how changes in the Soviet Union—its weaponry, its communications

ANGELO M. CODEVILLA *is a fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.* The Arms-Control Delusion, *a book of which he and Senator Malcolm Wallop are co-authors, will be published by ICS Press in June.*

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

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system, etc.—are affecting what we need to know and our ability to learn about it. Finally, it might examine the U.S. technical-intelligence system's options for dealing with these changes.

But *Deep Black* is organized semi-chronologically. This approach encourages one to evaluate technology against itself rather than against the reason for which it was sought in the first place.

For example, how "good" was the U-2 aircraft that in 1957 brought back the first set of photographs of broad stretches of the central Soviet Union? The correct answer is the same as to the question, "How's your wife?": namely, "Compared to what?" The U-2 surely was a marvel of aeronautical engineering. It flew higher and longer than anything ever had done before. Its cameras were sharper and more ingenious. Above all, the U-2 greatly raised the level of facts at our disposal about the Soviet military. Similar things can and should be said about every one of our new aircraft-based and satellite-based sensors. Burrows's stock-in-trade is to say them. But the effect is quite literally solipsistic—defining reality in terms of the ability of our technical systems to perceive it.

Burrows spends by far the largest part of the book conveying the impression that nothing of any significance, not even amorous affairs in the Soviet Union, can escape our technical wonders. Thus he states that the U.S. has not suffered a strategic surprise since Sputnik in 1958. Actually, however, Sputnik was no surprise, while in the years since, the U.S. has been truly surprised by the Soviet deployment of counterforce missiles under SALT I (not to mention the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Yom Kippur War). It is most irresponsible, then, for Burrows to tell his readers that strategic surprise and surprise attack are now impossible.

To support this contention, Burrows cites the improbability that a complex of missile silos could be dug and loaded at any given location within the short period of time between "visits" to that location by a U.S. imaging satellite. He is deeply mistaken, because he fails to draw the proper conclusions from the facts that he himself points out: namely, that the U.S. has never had more than a handful of imaging satellites, and that the competition within the intelligence community for what they ought to look at is intense. From this alone it should be obvious that U.S. satellites mostly look only at a few of many places already known to be interesting, and almost never at anything else. Moreover, on those very rare occasions (so few that they can be counted on one's fingers) when U.S. satellites have been able to see places not totally predicted by the Soviet Union's satellite warning program, we have found the Soviets doing things with their missiles that are radically different from the things they do when they know they are being observed.

Indeed, after reading *Deep Black*, one would be surprised to learn that the U.S. does not even know whether the famous SS-18 silos are loaded or not. We have never even *seen* an SS-18 missile. Much less have we watched each and every silo as it was loaded, and then watched to make sure that the missiles were not subsequently unloaded and taken somewhere else. And Burrows also seems to have missed the fact that smaller missiles can be stored horizontally in warehouses, raised upright, and shot off quite without silos. Nor does he deal with the fact that the U.S. knows virtually *nothing* about how many or what kinds of missiles the Soviet Union is producing (since this activity goes on not in the open but indoors where it is invisible to satellites).

Even more important than imaging satellites are signals-intelligence (SIGINT) satellites. But they, too, "see" only the surface of things. For example: of, say, 100 channels of signals that we intercept from the testing of a Soviet missile, anywhere from 70 to 98 will often be in unbreakable code. Why did the Soviets choose the channels they chose for encoding? Why did they choose to broadcast certain others for us to read? Such questions are simply beyond the scope of our col-

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lection systems. With regard to modern phased-array radars whose signals we intercept and analyze, Burrows does not tell us that these signals are anything but the final word on the radars' capabilities because both the signal that the Soviet radar transmitter sends out, and, more importantly, the use that the Soviet radar receiver makes of that returning signal, are constantly modified by the radar's own computers. In other words, just as in the case of imagery intelligence, signals intelligence gives us only a few glimpses of Soviet reality.

Signals intelligence and imagery intelligence provide cues for each other. Burrows argues that what is not evident to the combination of U.S. imagery and U.S. SIGINT is not worth worrying about. But what does it mean to be evident to instruments that at best sample only the surface of a secret society? Here, Burrows's answer is clear. "Over the years," U.S. analysts have "categorized everything they've seen in order to establish precise operational patterns. What does not fit the pattern causes immediate suspicion." Again and again, he emphasizes that the strength of our technical intelligence lies in this ability to recognize patterns. And why? Because the Soviets *always* behave according to rigid patterns.

THE truth, however, is that the American intelligence system's obvious reliance on "patterns" is not a strength but a fatal weakness that invites any sensible opponent to exploit it. Given that the Soviets have learned almost everything there is to know about U.S. technical intelligence, would it not be "cost effective" for them to manage their own exposure to it for the purpose of misleading us?

To take one example of many: in 1980 and 1981, the U.S. "observed" the Soviet Union using its newest surface-to-air missile system, the SA-12, to intercept its own test-fired missiles. Since that time, the usefulness of the SA-12 for anti-missile work has been a staple of the domestic American debate over whether to build anti-missile defenses. Then in 1987 some CIA analysts told the New York *Times* that the SA-12 really should not be considered an anti-missile weapon because in recent years our electronic observations have revealed that every time the Soviets have used an SA-12 this way, they have missed. Yet when we consider that the Soviet Union's paramount political-military objective in the 1980's is to stop the U.S. from deciding to build anti-missile weapons, and that the Soviets know how we monitor their testing of the SA-12, is it not possible that they decided to use controlled miss-distances in their tests? Doing so would not really detract from the military usefulness of the tests and would yield a substantial political dividend, i.e., disinforming the U.S. about the Soviets' own program of defense.

In addition to permitting Soviet deception, the reliance on patterns is conducive to self-deception. On the very rare occasions when U.S. intelligence analysts have been asked to investigate whether activities previously identified according to a pattern might conceivably be explained differently, they have found how thoroughly their colleagues had sometimes deceived themselves into not "seeing" very large and important activities that should have been obvious.

Few recognize that advances in technology are making this condition worse rather than better, and technical intelligence inherently less rather than more potent. Consider, for instance, how much simpler it is to gather intelligence about a missile than about a missile-killing laser. Missiles carry a load from point A to point B. If one can observe them doing this, one can learn quite a lot about them. But even the finest close-up photos of a laser device in operation will give no clues about vital parameters—such as pointing accuracy, jitter, evenness of the beam, fuel efficiency, retargeting ability—and few clues about the device's power.

A monumental saga continues...



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Only recently has the top echelon of U.S. intelligence admitted to itself that during the decades the U.S. was spending billions of dollars to monitor the width of silos within plus or minus 5 percent, the Soviet Union totally reversed the strategic balance and went from having 300 counterforce warheads to 6,000, largely *within* the letter of SALT I. How so? U.S. negotiators wanted an agreement to limit the number of Soviet missiles that could deliver counterforce warheads, but they realized that such a ban would be unverifiable, since American intelligence was unable to monitor the production of missiles or warheads, or the actual yield of warheads on any missile. Nor could our negotiators frame definitions of missile accuracy that could be monitored by U.S. intelligence. So they wrote the treaty in terms of features that U.S. intelligence *could* monitor—that is, launchers. But since the U.S. cannot monitor *all* ways of launching missiles, SALT I (and SALT II) only dealt with the two ways of launching which our imaging systems were capable of monitoring: silos and submarine tubes. More important, in order to be arguably verifiable, the treaties did not deal with actual missiles, warheads, or their potency. As we can now see from the proliferation of Soviet counterforce warheads, this "currency" that U.S. intelligence made available for the treaty turned out to be worthless.

Hence, since the mid-1970's, there has been a frantic search in the arms-control community for a better currency. But this search is foredoomed. Yes, tomorrow's cameras will be sharper than today's, and some day our satellites may even carry most of the devices Burrows says they already carry. But no responsible person has suggested that we could seriously define the characteristics of anti-missile weapons in ways that would allow them to be monitored even by the sensors that Burrows describes.

Deep Black is going to be an influential book. Unfortunately, all too few readers will be able to verify just how deeply ignorant a book it is.

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